About Prof Veli Mitova
Interests: Epistemology, Social Epistemology, Epistemic Decolonisation, Epistemic Injustice, Metaethics.
Veli is Professor in Philosophy and Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, at the University of Johannesburg, as well as the South African team leader for The Geography of Philosophy Project. Veli works at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and social epistemology. At the moment, her focus is on epistemic injustice, decolonising knowledge, and the ways in which phenomena such as white ignorance should make us rethink central normative-epistemology concepts like epistemic reasons, risk, blame, and responsibility. She is the author of Believable Evidence (CUP 2017), and the editor of Epistemic Decolonisation (2020) and of The Factive Turn in Epistemology (CUP 2018). Before joining the University of Johannesburg in 2015, Veli taught and researched at Universität Wien, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, Rhodes University (her alma mater), and Cambridge (where she obtained her PhD).
Talks on Youtube
Epistemic Decolonisation for Today’s Africa . Decolonising Knowledge across Four Continents, organised by the Diversity Reading List in Philosophy.
Epistemic Decolonisation and Epistemic Injustice. Socially Engaged Philosophy with Martin Kusch and Veli Mitova.
Meet the GPP with Veli Mitova. South African Team Leader of Geography of Philosophy Project.
Epistemic Decolonisation: what, why, how? What is Epistemic Decolonization? seminar series, LSE.
Keynotes and invited talks 2022
Nov Decolonising Experts. African Epistemologies Advanced Seminar Series, Institute for Humanities in Africa, University of Cape Town (online).
Oct The Geography of Philosophy and the Decolonisation of Philosophy. The Geography of Philosophy Final Conference, Pittsburgh (online).
July White Ignorance Calls for a Groupy Account of Epistemic Blame. ERC Group Agency Project Workshop, Vienna.
July Wilful Ignorance and Concept Travel. The Philosophy and Global Politics of Concept Travel Workshop, University of Basel.
June White Ignorance Undermines Internalism about Epistemic Blame. Vienna Analytic Forum, University of Vienna.
May White Ignorance Undermines Internalism about Epistemic Blame. Epistemic Wrongs Workshop, University of Zürich.
May The Vicious Cycle of Epistemic Injustice. PhilExpo. Zürich Society for Philosophy, Switzerland.
March White Ignorance Undermines Internalism about Epistemic Blame. Royal Institute of Philosophy, University of Kent
March Risky White People: The Epistemic Risks of Injustice. The social and political dimensions of epistemic risk. University of Seville (online).
Feb Socialising Epistemic Risk. Philosophy Speaker Series, University of Liverpool, UK (online).
2017 Believable Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2022 (with R. McIntyre and S. Salem) Pluralism, Relativism, and Skepticism. Special Issue of Inquiry.
2020 Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 49(2), July 2020.
2018 The Factive Turn in Epistemology (Cambridge University Press) – Reviewed by Notre Dame Reviews
Forthcoming Wilful Hermeneutical Injustice to the (Qualified) Rescue of Knowledge-first. In Logins, A. and Vollet, J. (Eds.) Putting Knowledge to Work. New York: Oxford University Press.
2022 The Collective Epistemic Reasons of Social Groups. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (47). DOI: 10.1007/s44204-022-00051-1.
2022 (with R. McIntyre and S. Salem) Introduction to the special issue: Skepticism, Relativism, Pluralism. Inquiry. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2135877.
2021 A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth. Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-021-00435-4.
2021 How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation. (pp. 24-47, Cape Town: HSRC Press).
2020 Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49(2), 191-212.
2020 Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(5), 707-722.
2019 Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism. In Doyle, C., Milburn, J., and Pritchard, D. H. (Eds.) New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (pp. 194-214, New York: Routledge).
2019 The Duty of Inquiry, or Why Othello was a Fool. In C. Bourne and E. C. Bourne (Eds.) The Routledge Companion to Shakespeare and Philosophy, (pp. 311-323, London: Routledge).
2018 Introduction: The Factive Turn. In V. Mitova (Ed.) The Factive Turn in Epistemology (pp. 1-12, CUP).
2016 What Do I Care about Epistemic Norms? In M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals (pp. 199-223, Berlin/ Boston: DeGruyter).
2016 Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (3): 293-301.
2015 Truthy Psychologism about Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (4): 1105-1126.
2012 Age and Agency. Philosophical Papers 41(3): 335-369.
2011 Epistemic Motivation: Towards a Metaethics of Belief. In Reisner, A. and Steglich-Petersen, A. (Eds.) Reasons for Belief (pp. 54-74, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2011 La Normatividad de la Creencia. Translated by M. Fernandez, Valores Epistémicos, edited by M. Fernandez and M. Valdés (pp. 325-336, México: IIFs-UNAM).
2009 A Quasi-Pragmatist Explanation of our Ethics of Belief. Teorema, 28(3): 113-130.
2008 Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist. Philosophical Papers, 37(3): 471-489.
2008 Why Pragmatic Justifications of Epistemic Norms don’t Work. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27(2): 141-152.
2005 The Value of Epistemic Norms. South African Journal of Philosophy, 24(2): 65-76.