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Prof Veli Mitova

Name: Veli Mitova
Location: Room 7, Floor 3 UJ on Empire
Faculty of Humanities, Rated Researchers  Staff Members

Contact Details:
Tel: 011 559 3133


About Prof Veli Mitova

Veli is Professor in Philosophy and Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science at the University of Johannesburg. She is the PI of Philosophy through Indigenous Knowledge in the Global South (funded by the NIHSS) and a collaborator on Epistemic Reparations (funded by the Northwestern Buffet Institute). Veli works at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and social epistemology. At the moment, her focus is on epistemic injustice, decolonising knowledge, and the ways in which phenomena such as white ignorance should make us rethink central normative-epistemology concepts like epistemic risk, blame, responsibility, and expertise. She is the author of Believable Evidence (CUP 2017), and the editor of Epistemic Decolonisation (2020) and of The Factive Turn in Epistemology (CUP 2018). Before joining the University of Johannesburg in 2015, Veli taught and researched at Universität Wien, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, Rhodes University (her alma mater), and Cambridge (where she obtained her PhD).


Supervision areas:

Veli welcomes excellent Honours, MA and PhD students who would like to work in any area of epistemology, social epistemology, and feminist epistemology, especially on epistemic injustice, the decolonisation of knowledge, and the epistemology of AI.

Check out African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science to see if what we do is a good fit and  you have what it takes to join ACEPS vibrant Team & PostGrads!

For You tube talks on her work and a list of keynote addresses, see Veli’s website.

Recent Publications: 


2017      Believable Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Edited works:

2022      (with R. McIntyre and S. Salem) Skepticism, Relativism, Pluralism. Special Issue of Inquiry. Routledge.

2020      Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 49 (2).

2018      The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Forthcoming      Can theorising epistemic injustice help us decolonise? Inquiry.

Forthcoming      Motivated Irrationality, Epistemic Innocence, White Ignorance. Philosophical Topics.

Forthcoming       Wilful Hermeneutical Ignorance to the (Qualified) Rescue of Knowledge-first. In Logins, A. and Vollet, J. (Eds.) Putting Knowledge to Work. New York: Oxford University Press.

Forthcoming      Replies to Critics. Asian Journal of Philosophy.

Forthcoming     et al.  Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers. Nature Human Behaviour.

Forthcoming     et al.  Social perception of wisdom across cultures. Nature Communications.

2024      Decolonising Experts. In Farina, M., Lavazza, A. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 253–273). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2024      Social Group Moral Encroachment. Episteme, 20(4): 894-911.

2023      Socialising Epistemic Risk: on the Risks of Epistemic Injustice. Metaphilosophy, 54 (4): 539–552.

2023      A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth. Erkenntnis, 88: 1911–1933.

2023      Why Epistemic Decolonisation in Africa? Social Epistemology. DOI: 0.1080/02691728.2023.2184218.

2022      The Collective Epistemic Reasons of Social-identity Groups. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (47). DOI: 10.1007/s44204-022-00051-1.

2022      (with R. McIntyre and S. Salem) Introduction to the special issue: Skepticism, Relativism, Pluralism. Inquiry. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2135877.

2021      How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation (pp. 24–47). Cape Town: HSRC Press.

2020      Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49 (2): 191–212.

2020      Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23 (5): 707–722.

2019      Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism. In Doyle, C., Milburn, J., and Pritchard, D. H. (Eds.) New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (pp. 194–214). New York: Routledge.

2019      The Duty of Inquiry, or Why Othello Was a Fool. In Bourne, C. and Bourne, E. C. (Eds.) The Routledge Companion to Shakespeare and Philosophy (pp. 311–323). London: Routledge.

2018      Introduction: The Factive Turn. In Mitova, V. (Ed.) The Factive Turn in Epistemology (pp. 1–12). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.