Veli is Professor and was Head of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.
She is also co-founder and now Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, the South African team leader for The Geography of Philosophy Project, and a co-PI for the
Epistemic Injustice, Reasons, and Agency project funded by a Newton Advanced Fellowship.
Veli works at the intersection of epistemology, metaethics and the philosophy of action. At the moment, she is thinking about epistemic injustice and decolonising knowledge.
She is the
Believable Evidence (CUP 2017), and the editor of Epistemic Decolonisation (2020) and of
The Factive Turn in Epistemology (CUP 2018).
2020-11-19 & 20
THE 3RD GEOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY WORKSHOP ALL TEAM ZOOM WORKSHOP
2017 Believable Evidence (Cambridge University Press).
Forthcoming (with S. Salem)
Relativism. Special Issue of
Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 49(2), July 2020.
2018 The Factive Turn in Epistemology (Cambridge University Press).
For online versions, visit Veli's Academia website
A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.
2021 How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism.
Decolonisation as Democratisation, S. Khumalo (ed.) (Cape Town: HSRC Press).(pp.
Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49(2), July 2020.
2020 Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. In Radoilska, L. (Ed.)
Epistemic Injustice, Special Issue of
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23, November 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10094-z
2019 Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism. In Doyle, C., Milburn, J., and Pritchard, D. H. (Eds.)
New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (pp. 194-214, New York: Routledge).
2019 The duty of inquiry, or why Othello was a fool. The Routledge Companion to Shakespeare and Philosophy, C. Bourne and E. Bourne (eds.)
(pp. 311-323, London: Routledge).
2018 Introduction: The Factive Turn. In V. Mitova (Ed.) The Factive Turn in Epistemology (pp. 1-12, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2016 What do I care about epistemic norms? Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (eds.) (Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter).
2016 Clearing space for extreme psychologism about reasons. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (3): 293-301.
2015 Truthy Psychologism about Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (4): 1105-1126.
2012 Age and Agency. Philosophical Papers 41(3): 335-369.
2011 Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief. Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
(pp. 54-74, Cambridge University Press).
2011 Knowledge, virtue, and epistemic motives. Epistemology: contexts, values, disagreement. Kirchber g am Wechsel.
2011 La Normatividad de la Creencia. Translated by M. Fernandez, in Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos. Ensayos sobre epistemología contemporánea, edited by M. Fernandez and M. Valdés
(pp. 325-336, México: IIFs-UNAM).
2009 A quasi-pragmatist explanation of our ethics of belief. Teorema, 28(3): 113-130.
2008 Why W. K. Clifford was a closet pragmatist. Philosophical Papers, 37(3): 471-489.
2008 Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don't work. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27(2): 141-152.
2005 The Value of Epistemic Norms. South African Journal of Philosophy, 24(2): 65-76.