RESISTANCE and TRANSFORMATION

EDUCATION, CULTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

MICHAEL CROSS

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Methodologically, the book rests on three central epistemological and theoretical foundations. Firstly, it takes *history* as a point of departure with regard to the problem of social and cultural transformation. Whatever reality society has is an historical reality. Great political projects have failed because they did not take into account the realism informed by an intellectual command of the particular historical and contemporary circumstances. As Marx pointed out:

> [History] is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in

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> [History] is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in

> completely changed circumstances with a completely changed activity.[1]

Thus the book re-asserts the centrality of history as a *method of inquiry*. This is particularly important because the practice of conceptualising the problems of the present and future *historically* has not yet penetrated with success much of the political and educational thought in South Africa.

Secondly, this book emphasises the concept of *totality* as the territory of dialectical thinking, more specifically the conception of social phenomena in their entirety and interrelatedness and not as a conglomerate of fragmented and isolated parts. For example, while some approaches would treat the existing ethnic departments of education (African Education, Coloured Education, Indian Education and White Education) as autonomous entities and take the uniqueness of their empirical organisation in the natural world as something given, this book is firmly based on the idea of a relationship between them. Thus the South African cultural process is conceptualised as a whole, whose individual and concrete parts reveal their dialectical essence precisely in the qualitative differences between them and in the continuous transformation of their objective structures and institutions.[2]

Thirdly, this book is an expression of concern with an unresolved paradigmatic battle in cultural studies between two traditions: (1) those who assume cultural processes as passive movements determined by the changes in social and economic structures with no space for active social intervention; and (2) those who, with delightful simplicity, assert that 'men have heads' and can hence act as they choose. Of course it is the real human being, the thinking, willing and acting person, with needs and interests, who constitutes the precondition for social change. However, people's actions are as much their creation as they are a product of the very same creation or human history. I would rather align myself with Schumpeter whose persuasive argument is worth quoting:

> of course men 'choose' their course of action which is not directly enforced by the objective data of the environment; but they choose from standpoints, views and propensities that do not form another set of independent data but are themselves moulded by the objective set.[3]

The book is divided into three parts: Part I scrutinises the intellectual context and history that has informed educational and cultural studies in South Africa; Part II examines the position of culture in the process of national oppression; and Part III is entirely dedicated to the question of culture and the challenge of reconstruction.

Chapter One reconstructs the evolution of South African educational historiography, outlining and exploring the distinctive features of the dominant schools of thought. Chapter Two discusses the main African responses to the dominant debates and policies in education. Chapter Three critically reviews the main theoretical approaches in the study of culture, particularly youth culture.

Chapter Four looks at the role that particular conceptions of culture played in the making of the present education system. Chapter Five examines the use of culture to justify the 'retribalisation' and bantustanisation of Africans in the reserves. Chapter Six discusses the significance of resistance culture to the process of national reconstruction.

Chapter Seven investigates educational strategies, problems and possibilities for developing a national culture in South Africa. Chapter Eight examines the cultural heritage and the potential of the main generation on which the task of reconstruction rests: the youth. Finally, Chapter Nine reconstructs the history of the so-called 'open' schools in South Africa with reference to the process of cultural change.

The themes included in this book were informed not only by personal research interests but also by the state of the art in current educational research, which has concentrated almost exclusively on the nature of apartheid education and resistance in education, neglecting the importance of culture in the process. There are many other important themes that have been left out of this project either because they have already

received extensive treatment elsewhere or because they would require further research and special attention.

Some of the material in this book was first published in other forms. Chapter One appeared as 'A Historical Review of Education in South Africa: Towards an Assessment' in the British journal *Comparative Education*, 22 (3), 1986; Chapter Three as 'Youth Culture and Resistance in South African Education: A Theoretical Review' in the South African journal *Perspectives in Education*, 12 (2), 1991; Chapter Four as 'The Foundations of a Segregated Schooling System in the Transvaal, 1900-24' in the British journal *History of Education*, 16 (4), 1987; Chapter Seven as 'Education for National Culture in South Africa: Problems and Possibilities', in D Freer (ed.) *Towards Open Schools: Possibilities and Realities for Non-racial Education in South Africa* (Macmillan, 1991); and Chapter Nine as 'Catholic "Open" Schools in the Transvaal, 1976-1986: The Road to Non-racial Education in South Africa', in the Australian journal *Education and Society*, 5 (1&2), 1987.

I am grateful to the University of the Witwatersrand Research Grant Committee and the Human Sciences Research Council for their financial support for the research of sections of this study and to the following individuals for their helpful comments on all or parts of the text: Linda Chisholm, Peter Randall, Mary Hazelton and Mothobi Mutloatse. I am also grateful to Professor Penny Enslin for making funds available for editorial work. Albertina Cross, Michael and Eunice provided me with moral support throughout the study.

Notes

1. Karl Marx, 'Conclusions from the materialist conception of History: history as a continuous process, history as becoming world history, the necessity of communist revolution', in John Elster (ed.), **Karl Marx: A Reader** (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1986), p.182.
2. See Georg Lukacs, 'Technology and Social Relations' in **New Left Review**, (39), 1966.
3. J A Schumpeter, 'Marx the Sociologist', in Tom Bottomore, **Interpretations of Marx** (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.52.

Chapter 1

Education in South African Historiography

Introduction

The development of the schools crisis between 1976 and 1980 appears to have had the effect of committing many social scientists to a more serious approach to the study of education in South Africa. This is expressed through the attempt to review the traditional schools of thought, and redirect the theory and history of South African education. To some extent, it represents a broader widening of the debate, expressed, for example, by the publication of the De Lange Report in July 1981 as well as the release in July 1985 of a Human Sciences Research Council report which identified *apartheid* as the cause of conflict in South Africa.

The outstanding feature of this development is the emergence of a new generation of educationists and historians of education with a viewpoint startlingly opposed to the 'liberal' and 'conservative' traditions. They argue that any objective analysis of an education system must be accomplished with the use of the tools of political economy and with reference to the contradictory nature of the colonial order itself, particularly in periods of rapid social change or crisis.[1] It is stressed that the dominant traditional approach, which presents education or schooling as an independent field of enquiry, divorced from the wider political, social and economic context within which

instruction were justified on 'religious, psychological-educational and national-cultural grounds for the maintenance of Afrikaner identity'. In 1948, he explained the same issue in this way: 'We as Calvinistic Afrikaners will have our CNE schools; Anglicans, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Jews, liberalists and atheists will have their own schools'.[7] Coetzee was supported by men like H G Stoker, D J van Rooy and P.J. de Klerk, while educationists and sociologists like Du Plessis and Bot remained critical and 'impatient at clerical meddling in their professions'.[8]

Essentially, CNE education was to be adjusted to the life and world view of the Afrikaners: all school activities were to reveal the Christian philosophy of life and Calvinistic beliefs and promote the principle of nationalism in education. By nationalism was meant the national ideal, traditions, religion, language or culture of each social group. From the 1920s onwards, these ideas were associated with the need for Afrikaner pre-eminence in the sphere of the state and in the restructuring of the relations between white and black people in the light of the CNE doctrine, in contrast to the previous concern for the survival of Afrikanerdom.

The most well-known of CNE writers dealing with education for blacks were Du Plessis, Fourie and Nel. Du Plessis was concerned about cultural disintegration amongst Africans and suggested that black societies should undergo a Christian transformation but retain their 'Bantu' character.[9] Fourie emphasised the need for the preservation of the intrinsic qualities of the African culture and maintained that teaching should be in the mother tongue in order to ensure that 'the national pride of the Africans is not harmed'.[10] Nel undertook the task of demonstrating that segregation was aimed at the development of 'a racially genuine Bantu culture'.[11] In general, most CNE writers advocated complete segregation of Africans, instruction in the vernacular, restoration of the 'Bantu culture' and Christianisation with a minimum degree of 'westernisation'. Assimilationist and egalitarian policies held by liberals were categorically rejected; blacks would lose their culture and Afrikaners would sink to the level of the 'kaffirs' and would ultimately be dominated by

them.[12] For this reason, as Nel pointed out, an educational policy for blacks should be formulated according to the viewpoint of the Afrikaner nation, i.e. the CNE foundation.[13] These ideas were picked up by theorists of anthropological orientation like Eiselen, Cook, Eloff and Verwoerd, who ultimately became predominant in the Afrikaner ranks. Using their influential positions within the state they converted their ideas into state policy during the 1950s and 1960s.[14]

During the last two decades, the Afrikaner tradition has been characterised by a more systematic theoretical commitment. The distinctive feature of this development was the creation of new disciplines more adjusted to the CNE tradition in the field of educational studies. Viljoen and Pienaar, in what has probably been the most widely-prescribed book in the sphere of education in South Africa over the past decade, formulated a new theory and philosophy of education based on CNE, positivist and phenomenological traditions, known as fundamental pedagogics. The underlying assumption is that, in the process of scientific practice, one has to bracket 'all faith, superstition, dogma, opinions, theories and philosophies of life and the world'[15] in order to discover the 'universal essences of education'. However, these essences as a new knowledge should be applied by the scientist (pedagogician) into the life-world of every day to enrich the culture of the group to which he belongs.[16] On the same lines, Stone has been searching for a new approach in comparative education which to his mind will establish the balance between the two sides of educational reality, the common and the diverse. These, he argues, are of equal importance to comparative research.[17]

Furthermore, J H Coetzee has recently announced the replacement of the history of education by what he calls 'metagogics'. He criticises the history of education on a number of grounds, the most important of which claims that the history of education 'burdens the students with a mass of irrelevant facts' and that it has no utility for either the present or the future. What is required, he argues, is an alternative discipline with 'more scope, advantages and potential to cope with all educational demands in a technical and functional world

This 'benevolent paternalistic' attitude, to use the words of the historian Shula Marks, was at no point concerned with the abolition of the basic conditions of that oppression. Legassick has also noted, as a common ideal, the 'desire to transcend a repressive policy which gives no outlet for African expression of grievances without granting to Africans significant political power to determine white destinies'.[27]

Robertson has made the point that in South Africa liberalism has been determined by the context in which different groups have found themselves. She points out that, in general, liberals have advocated two alternative solutions to the South African 'colour problem': total separation and parallel institutions. The theory of parallel institutions (separate-but-equal education) was liberal orthodoxy until about the 1930s.[28] Rich shares the view that the 'separate-but-equal' tradition was a part of the 'liberal tradition' during the 1930s and 1940s. The liberals, he argues, 'looked, as did the government itself, via a strategy of territorial segregation, to the rural reserves as the main repositories for African political and economic rejuvenation'.[29] This was to change as the National Party became the chief advocate of segregation and as the effects became manifest.

I shall briefly set into historical sequence some of the social features represented by the liberal school during the twentieth century. From the 1880s up to the 1920s, the South African industrial revolution took place under the dominance of mining capital. Large sectors of the African population were drawn to the mines as migrant workers. Amongst whites, the process of proletarianisation involved the rise of the so-called 'poor white' problem, i.e. unemployed unskilled white labour. From the 1920s onwards, large-scale proletarianisation of blacks began as a result of the 1913 Land Act and the emergence of a manufacturing industry. The main urban centres became crowded with black proletarians seeking jobs. This created serious social problems. Educational historiography and debate, at this stage, were directly or indirectly responding to these social changes.

During the early period of the mining revolution, some criticism of the new policy of segregation developed in terms of

nineteenth century liberalism. It was expressed as a recognition of individuals on the basis of 'civilisation' rather than race. But such criticism, as already mentioned, did not go beyond the framework of segregation and was mainly concerned with the alleviation of the effects of this policy. The education of blacks was left in the hands of missionaries, even if the 'missionaries could be somewhat irritating with their mildly assimilationist tendencies'.[30]

Rapid social change during the 1920s and 1930s increased interest in the 'natives' and, in particular, the education of blacks. Basically, two main factors contributed to this new development: first, the emergence of an African urban proletariat and, secondly, the growth of mission-educated Africans who were beginning to emerge as an identifiable elite. On the one hand, it was considered necessary to formulate proposals for the education and integration of the African proletariat into the new economic order and new forms of life. On the other hand, the crucial mediating role which the emerging petty bourgeoisie could play in this political context was recognised. According to Rich, one of the key issues was to 'instill in them some form of political accommodationism linked to alternative political outlets through the rural reserves'.[31]

The liberal answer to these problems was to try to control the leisure-time of adults and youth, through the promotion of different kinds of cultural and educational institutions. These were to act as channels of communication with the African elite in the process of their attempted political co-option. Thus the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) and a number of social welfare institutions such as the Gamma Sigma Club, the Bantu Men's Social Centre, the Helping Hand Club for Native Girls, the Joint Councils, the Bridgeman Memorial Hospital and various newspapers became the means through which the liberals tried to meet the problems of an African elite and effect a compromise between black aspirations and their ameliorative goals.[32]

At the same time, a new force came to reinforce liberal activities: the universities. Legassick argues that these attempted to develop social and educational research in order

to overcome the problems of ignorance and maladministration in resolving the 'native question'.[33] Couzens provides the following picture:

> In the universities, departments of Bantu Studies were formed. In 1918, the University of Cape Town appointed a Professor of Bantu Philology; and in 1921, A. Radcliffe-Brown became Professor of Social Anthropology; in 1921, Rev. A.T. Bryant was appointed Research Fellow and Lecturer in Zulu History at the University of the Witwatersrand, and in 1923 C.M. Doke was made Senior Lecturer in Bantu Philology and Lecturer in Social Anthropology. In Pretoria, at the Transvaal University College, Dr Edgar Brookes taught similar courses. The University of the Witwatersrand started publishing its magazine Bantu Studies in 1921 with Rheinallt-Jones as editor.[34]

The most controversial problem, however, remained that of educating the African working class. Having accepted the principle that the Africans were capable of benefiting by education and schooling, liberals remained divided in their conceptions about the type of education appropriate for blacks. Many of their formulations were influenced by Loram's theory of the 'native's mental apathy' and 'mental arrested development', an approach he formulated in 1917 in *The Education of the South African Native*. According to this theory, the 'native' might exhibit intelligence during childhood, but his intellectual development was arrested at the adolescent stage.[35] This theory was supported by intelligence tests undertaken by Dr M L Fick which were published in 1939 under the title *The Educability of the South African Native*. Many other tests were run by other institutions with the same purpose. In many cases they were used to justify the argument that the 'native' was not capable of education, or at best, could

hardly benefit by it. This can be interpreted as a form of 'biological racism' in South African history.

Opposed to the school of the 'primitive mentality' of the 'native' was Rheinallt-Jones, an influential figure within the SAIRR and related institutions. He attacked these conceptions as 'scientific pretensions of racism'.[36] Other social scientists and educationists like McKerron, historian of education at Rhodes University, supported these views. McKerron herself argued that theories of 'arrested development' could scarcely be regarded as scientific either in conception or in application.[37] She challenged those who argued that black criminality could be attributed to 'overeducation' and maintained, instead, that it was due precisely to its opposite, inadequate education.[38] Her main concern was rather different:

> Our main problem today is not to weigh the arguments for and against Native education, but to devise a system of education which will give scope for the highest development of the Native, and effect a happy co-ordination between European and Native life.[39]

Brookes took these debates further. Indeed, he expressed views remarkably similar to those of present-day neo-Marxists in South African education:

> Education is resisted because it would produce more claimants for the franchise, because it would reduce the available number of farm labourers, because it would upset the social structure of South Africa, because it would encourage miscegenation.[40]

In contrast to the dominant views of the time, Brookes believed that:

> the problem of Native education is, in essence, whatever it may seem, much more of a class problem than of a race problem; for the objections made to it are precisely the objections made to the education of the European masses during the last century.[41]

These are some of the ambiguities of behaviour and ideology typical of the 1920s and 1930s historiography, which reflect not simply personal psychology (individual consciousness) but the structurally dependent position of liberal individualities within the colonial political economy and the contradictory nature of the colonial order itself, particularly in periods of rapid social change or crisis.[42]

Despite the differences in viewpoint amongst the liberals, the main solution to 'native education' was in the provision of some form of 'adapted education' which, it was thought, would unite different races without sacrificing the individuality and social position of any one of them. Drawing its inspiration from American Tuskegeeism and the Phelps-Stokes Inquiry of the 1920s, 'adapted education' had, as its main purpose, the provision of skills suitable to rural life.[43]

The doyen of liberalism in South African education, E G Malherbe, demonstrates a similar but different path of development. During the 1920s and 1930s, Malherbe remained aloof from debates about schooling for blacks. His first volume of *Education in South Africa*[44] seems to have been concerned with the promotion of South Africanism, conceived of as including whites and excluding blacks. Later, through his work in the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry into Poor Whites, and the South African Council for Educational and Social Research, of which he was the Director, his main commitment seems to have been national development and rationalisation of methods for scientific study of social problems. In the South African Council for Educational and Social Research, predecessor of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), he played a key role in the formulation of national policy, and in particular educational and social policy. When, in the 1920s,

the inflow of the black proletariat to the towns became a serious problem for the dominant classes, he was one of those who relied on social research as the basis for the formulation of rational policy. Thus by 1930 his interest in white education made way for a concern with the study of black education:

> One [topic] which urgently needs investigation ... [is] the social effects of the urbanisation of South African Natives. The work of the two commissions of 1883 and 1905 should be carried further with a view to assessing the degree of disintegration of Bantu life as a result of their increasing industrialisation and detribalisation. Social workers tell me that their family life is disintegrating to an amazing degree and that the incidence of illegitimate births amongst the natives is over 80 per cent in some of the urban locations in the Transvaal. These children are growing up. The educative and disciplinary influences of the normal Native family are totally absent. The result is an appalling rise in criminality amongst Native juveniles in these cities.[45]

As conditions changed during the 1960s, his views and priorities did too.

Post-1948 liberalism

Meanwhile, the general election of 1948 culminated in the political victory of an alliance of white farmers, teachers, ministers and workers expressing an extreme right-wing ideology. Thereafter, the strategy of the ruling class involved, on the one hand, the intensification of state intervention to control the circulation of labour through its redistribution and repulsion, and on the other, a decisive challenge to the progressive liberal trends. Special legislation was promulgated (such as the Influx Control, Bantu Authorities,

and Group Areas Acts) aimed at controlling the rapid and growing influx of proletarianised Africans into urban areas. In education, state control was asserted over missionary schooling and black education was segregated through the fragmentation of the education system and the differentiation of curricula in a process initiated during the Reconstruction Period (1902-1924) and consolidated by the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Similar legislation was promulgated for 'coloured' and Indian 'population groups' during the 1960s. How did the liberals react?

As far as whites were concerned, liberalism suffered a strong defeat. Rich interprets the development of the Liberal Party after 1953 as 'only a somewhat tardy and defensive reaction by liberals concerned with the political consequences of the government's exclusive nationalism' and merely an attempt to revive the Cape-inherited franchise for the educated African minorities.[46] In 1968, however, the Liberal Party went under; its rhetoric was continued in the Progressive Party, which later became the Progressive Federal Party. Multi-ethnic political representation, the amelioration of apartheid in urban areas, the relaxation of influx control and the establishment of a black middle class remained the pillars of its strategy.

Educational strategies reflected similar directions. The traditional bastions of liberalism, the English-speaking universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, and the SAIRR, reacted through reaffirmation of the principles of political liberalism. On the initiative of the SAIRR, a study was undertaken by E.H. Brookes and J.B. Macauley which resulted in the publication of *Civil Liberty in South Africa*, which could be seen as an authentic 'liberal manifesto'.[47] Here they protested against the violation of various 'freedoms', including that of education. Following rumours that a University Education Act would be promulgated, preventing the admission of black students to these 'open universities', they organised a Conference consisting mainly of senior members to prepare and publish a statement on the value of the open university. The conclusions were published in 1957 as *The Open Universities in South Africa*.[48] The work drew

extensively on the American experience of integrated education, particularly the 1954 *Brown / Board of Education* dispute.[49]

The only books of note in the 1960s dealing with education were those of Muriel Horrell, E G Malherbe and the Education Panel at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits). Horrell's concern, like that of the SAIRR, was mainly to document the effects of Bantu Education. She undertook the invaluable task of translating legislation into a series of books which have become standard source-material for students of Bantu Education.[50] The Wits Education Panel, and the direction in which Malherbe was now to move, demonstrate a rather different and changing strand within liberalism in South Africa. The Wits Education Panel included the noted Wits educationist, Raymond Tunmer, who subsequently also produced a compilation of *Documents in South African Education* with Brian Rose, thus gradually beginning to open the field of education for academic and professional study.[51]

The publication of the *Education Panel* heralded a new era in liberalism in South African education, the era of so-called 'economic liberalism'.[52] It essentially argued that certain apartheid practices were 'archaisms' and ought to be removed. Bantu Education, it stressed, would lead to a dire skills shortage and steps had to be taken to prevent this from occurring. In addition, it favoured the promotion of black leadership through education. The main thrust of this emerging economic liberalism was well pinpointed by E.G. Malherbe in his address to the 1966 National Congress of the Progressive Party. Here, with a high sense of humour, he compared the situation and conceptions of the 1930s with the present and future reality. He maintained the separate-but-equal strand in his thinking, but he was much concerned with liberalisation of the education system. He argued that: 'the demands of the economy of South Africa are stronger than the colour bar with plenty of evidence out of the past to support and, indeed, to prove this view'.[53]

Thus, by the 1960s, new developments had produced a new Malherbe and a new school of thought in South African education. What were these developments?

Two main factors seem to have determined the emergence and rapid development of economic liberalism: (1) the unprecedented rise of the organic composition of capital during the 1960s and 1970s, followed by considerable changes in the structure and nature of the labour force; and (2) the influence of human capital theory, associated with modernisation theory, which led to an emphasis on the economics of education. 'Manpower planning' was a central feature of thinking within this school. There is a large and rich literature on human capital theory; only its application to South African education will be dealt with in this paper.[54]

Throughout the sixties, the South African economy experienced massive economic expansion and deep qualitative changes in the form of capital accumulation. The rapid centralisation and concentration of capital, at the expense of high rates of exploitation of labour, was fuelled by large injections of foreign capital which made possible the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. The rise of the organic composition of capital led to two contradictory processes. On the one hand, it accelerated the expulsion of workers from the productive process; on the other, it expanded the need for suitably qualified skilled workers. This proceeded more rapidly than the supply of skilled labour trained by the educational system.

The state tried to minimise the shortage of skilled labour by recruiting skilled white immigrants and by 'floating' the colour bar and allowing limited numbers of blacks into semi-skilled and skilled occupations.[55] As Malherbe stressed in 1966, it was assumed that 'further economic growth was quite impossible without the constant shifting of boundaries between the work done by whites and work done by non-whites'.[56] However, the limitations and price of recruitment of external manpower could not be maintained indefinitely. It had to be accompanied by the expansion of education. It was, in part, the increased recruitment of black students to secondary schools, without any comparable increase in expenditure on the expansion and extension of facilities, that led to the conditions of over-crowding, double-shift, etc. during the early 1970s, and to the dramatic growth in the students' frustration with the

quality of schooling.[57] Liberal educationists, amongst whom might be counted the reformist wing of the Botha government, which took over much of the 1960s discourse in its De Lange Report, have continued to express the view ever stridently that lack of educational reform is having a damaging effect on economic growth, and that the resolution of South Africa's educational problems must involve paying greater attention to the issue of manpower planning.

The neo-Marxists' critique of the liberal school has focused on this view. They argue that posing educational problems as questions of manpower planning produces technicist solutions, rather than the political and economic solutions that are required. They maintain that, beneath this apolitical formulation of the problem, lies the assumption that the removal of the more backward features of apartheid would lead to the emergence of a liberal capitalist democracy. This approach, they argue, will lead to notions of equality of opportunity but not to equal education. Kallaway interprets it as a strategy 'designed to change and modify social conditions that have become widely regarded as unjust and unacceptable'[58] and as serving to 'strengthen and perpetuate essential power relations (class relations) ... if introduced on their own, without corresponding economic and political changes'.[59] In addition, drawing on the 'new sociology of education' and radical critiques of schooling in capitalist societies, neo-Marxists criticise the liberal school for treating educational development as a neutral and independent process. It is

> presented as a process of 'natural' and 'unproblematic' growth ... rather than as the outcome of a complex historical process in which each new development is contested by the interested parties ... while conflicts over the form and the content of educational policies are masked and struggles between the various interested parties are hidden. The dominant tradition of educational research hides a belief in some simple

> history of educational progress, a history with no costs, no struggles, no ambiguities.[60]

A third criticism made is of its excessive concentration on the history of white schooling and empiricism.

Why has the reaction of this school to its predecessors been so intense? And what is the nature and value of its contribution to educational studies in South Africa?

The radical/neo-Marxist school

Different reasons can be advanced for the emergence of this school. Amongst these must be the heightened conflict in education, demonstrated by the growth of the Black Consciousness Movement, based primarily in schools and universities during the early 1970s, the uprisings of 1976 and the school boycotts of 1980. These developments generated the view that the priorities and questions which were popular amongst educationists and other academics during the sixties and seventies were irrelevant in the light of new developments. Their theoretical emphasis was, in addition, profoundly conditioned by both the neo-Marxist political economy tradition in Southern African studies and the repercussions of the influence of 'reproduction theory' in the sociology of education. The main sources of 'reproduction theory' in the mid-1970s were Althusser, and Bowles and Gintis.[61]

Neo-Marxist political economy became important in Southern African studies from the early 1970s with the growth of the left-wing intelligentsia. The economic boom of the 1960s finally discredited the traditional liberal argument that apartheid and growth were incompatible. Once again, the relationship between the apartheid system and the economy came to the centre of debates between liberals and radicals, paving the path to the development of an impressive Marxist social science, in which theoretical rigour was combined with traditional British empiricism. Another important theme has been whether race or class constitutes the appropriate category of analysis to understand the complexity of the South African

process. Charney quotes Charles van Onselen, director of the Wits African Studies Institute, as expressing his satisfaction for the victory of the left in this way: 'We've largely won our battle against the liberals. In the social sciences, we dictate the terms'.[62] Indeed, the neoclassical studies produced by the early radical and Marxist social scientists such as Johnstone, Davies and Wolpe, and the early works of Legassick, Trapido and Marks were followed by a remarkable proliferation of Marxist-sounding papers and studies in the main liberal institutions (Wits and UCT), supported by progressive publishers such as Ravan Press.[63]

However, it is noteworthy that neo-Marxist political economy did not penetrate the educational field before 1980. Webster's claim, in 1977, that any analysis of the history of education should be located in the political economy of its time seems not to have produced any immediate echo.[64] Shortly thereafter, historians and sociologists of education were drawn into a revisionist debate against the economic reductionism and structuralism which dominated early neo-Marxist studies in the political economy of South Africa. More important, however, was the debate about the uses and limitations of 'reproduction theory' in education. This debate was conducted locally in the journals *Perspectives in Education* and *Africa Perspective*, followed by *Social Dynamics*, between 1980 and 1982. In 1984 the major expression of this new mode of thinking was found in the publication of Peter Kallaway's *Apartheid and Education*, which drew on a wide range of scholars, only a few of them based in South Africa; my concern in this appraisal is with the latter, as other contributors to the book revealed different theoretical and historical preoccupations. Recently Bill Nasson's work for the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry into Poverty in South Africa has involved a significant evaluation of the debate.[65] The next section will review this debate, and then examine the strengths and weaknesses of *Apartheid and Education*.

Althusser's *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* appeared as a study of major importance in the field of the social sciences. In summary, Althusser distinguishes in that article between (1) state power as control of the state and (2)

> ideology of the hegemonic fraction in the state. It would also have to allow the possibility that ideologies that contradict the hegemonic ideologies (either the ideologies of rival fractions of capital or fractions of working class) might develop and even become dominant within the educational ISA. Furthermore, it would have to take account of the other social fractions, social strata and categories which would have specific effects on the production of ideology in the educational ISA ... bureaucracy ... intellectuals ... and petty-bourgeoisie.[70]

The debate was continued by Shapiro, who again applied a combination of the above analyses to the introduction of Bantu Education.[71] In her article she stressed that education cannot be understood apart from the social context within which it operates. Her main contribution to the debate is her attempt to theorise *conflict* in education. She does so by arguing that there is a contradiction between the function of education and the knowledge that is provided through it.[72] This is a contradiction at the heart of any ideological state apparatus. There followed an attack from Chisholm and Sole whose main concern was the by now unproblematic acceptance of the 'historical and mechanistic accounts of education', paying 'little heed to class struggle as a fundamental feature of class society' produced by the Althusser — Bowles and Gintis problematic. They urged, instead, concrete analyses of the way in which educational institutions in South Africa have mediated complex class and social struggles. They also called for recognition of the possibilities of 'ideologies of the exploited' resulting in transformative practice.[73]

This debate was also played out between Collins and Christie, again using Bantu Education to exemplify the usefulness of reproduction theory, and Frank Molteno in his work on the 1980 student boycotts in Cape Town. Molteno, in summing up the debate, argued that:

> So long as the burden of selection/sorting/examination is placed on schooling in an unequal and class society, then 'reproduction' perspective must be taken into account... This does not mean that schooling has to do with nothing apart from the role in social reproduction or that schooling plays whatever role it does in this regard because social reproduction requires it to.[74]

Nonetheless, he adds the important rider that reproduction theory 'renders any notion of failure inconceivable', since such failure 'must imply the failure on the part of theories of reproduction too'.[75]

In summary, it is clear that social conditions and resistance and reform in education in South Africa prompted considerable debate about the usefulness of the reproduction theory. Applied to the specific context, its weaknesses became manifest. This refinement has recently been accompanied by a systematic scrutiny of the American resistance theories developed by Giroux and Aronowitz in an attempt to formulate adequate frameworks for an understanding of the increasing social conflict in South African education.[76] Thus, sociological theory of education was at once refined and developed through concrete analysis of a changing social context.

Apartheid and Education involved a somewhat different project. It attempted to demonstrate how Marxist political economy and historical materialism, applied to the educational field, could provide a better understanding of educational developments in South Africa than the earlier liberal approaches. The book is devoted to a critique of the liberal interpretation of education within apartheid, African responses to Bantu Education, and recent state strategies in education. It provides both an historical-philosophical and a contemporary analysis of South African education.

As a new prescription, *Apartheid and Education* was received with a certain degree of scepticism amongst academics

and students of education in South Africa. Criticisms were made about the structure, form and content of the book. Some criticised the racial composition of the contributors: all are white and nine out of 15 from outside South Africa. Others, focusing their attention on the content, criticised the 'urban' focus of the book and absence of any concrete direct 'solutions' to the problems in education. Unfortunately, in these first responses no criticisms were directed to the main issue of the book, namely its concern with redirection of approach in the study of education. This was taken for granted. The most detailed criticism was made by Enslin, who took issue with the characterisation of the dominant tradition in education in South Africa as liberal. Rather, she argues, the dominant tradition is a conservative one.[77] Here again, however, the criticism does not touch the central direction of *Apartheid and Education*.

Before commenting on the conceptualisation of education presented by the book itself, it might be apposite to comment on the criticism of the racial composition of the authors. This objection was also raised after the publication of the *Oxford History of South Africa*.[78] One could easily respond to these kinds of criticisms by arguing that social science is not a race property. In other words, there is no specific social science for each racial group, or 'population group' according to our official lexicon. One can hardly argue that racial factors play an important role in determining the nature and character of the products of social research. Rather, social research is mainly determined and conditioned by the material social existence of the researcher. Thus, the fact of 'whiteness' of the contributors is a reflection of their social context; the results of their research are not, by extension, a result of their whiteness, but of their material circumstances, and the way in which they have responded to it. Briefly put, the exclusively racial composition of the authors does not negate the relevance of the book for both black and white researchers. But it does raise another important problem: the minor participation of black academics in social research in South Africa, particularly in future-oriented projects like *Apartheid and Education*. I shall return to this issue. Let us turn to the conception of the book

as summarised in Kallaway's introduction.

If the introduction was designed to outline the philosophy behind the book, Kallaway failed to accomplish this task adequately. First, the introduction suggests reorientation of the approach to education in the light of political economy. But, one can ask, which political economy and from which point of view? Secondly, Kallaway explains the appeal of the new approach in terms of the necessity to study education in its social, economic and political context.[79] However, this form of analysis can be done in very different ways with very different aims. As Carr has indicated, the facts in history

> are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish and what tackle he chooses to use — these factors being determined, of course, by the kind of fish he wants to catch.[80]

This means that the particular mode of contextual analysis suggested by Kallaway remains unclear.

Most of the articles in this book implicitly or explicitly declare that alternative theory should be based in historical materialism. For this reason, Kallaway's introduction seems more like an additional article than a general introduction to the concept of the book.

There is another feature which negatively affects the book as a whole and that is its extreme black-sided view. This has been justified by the fact that, to date, the history of education has focused on white education. The question arises as to whether the ideal response to an extreme 'white-sidedness' is necessarily 'black-sidedness', irrespective of whether the issues were illuminated by the tools of political economy or not. The racial fragmentation of the education system does not imply that there is not a single and basic dynamic informing the whole. Hence, the general model provided by *Apartheid and Education* assumes the form of an ideological reaction which

does not adequately reflect the potential of the new analytical tools: it fails to grasp the total dynamic of the system and the real dimension of the implications of education for blacks in society as a whole. Most of the articles reflect this limitation.

One could argue that the concentration on 'black education' could be seen rather more dialectically, as a necessary phase in the redirection of the history of South African education. This might be acceptable only as a preliminary stage in any research on education. It does not have much plausibility as a form of conceptualising education in South Africa. That must be done in an interrelated way, as part of South African society as a whole, as has already been pointed out elsewhere.[81]

The principle of a focus on black education is not in dispute. The problem lies in the tendency to isolate 'black education' in a tight compartment without addressing its relationship to the educational edifice. Methodologically, this is a problem of how to reconcile the fundamental with the secondary aspects in education to make the object of analysis more comprehensible.

Since the late 1970s, educational writings by black South Africans have been floating in their approach and content between a neo-Marxist/Charterist tradition[82] and the traditional Africanist/Nationalist tradition,[83] depending on whether they recognise class as an analytical category and on the role they attribute to the working class, particularly the black working class, in the struggle for liberation. However the mainstream literature produced by African writers still reflects the Africanist and Black Consciousness Movement educational concepts.[84] In some cases, this has been refined into a more Marxian approach.[85]

Conclusion

From this general overview, it is clear that education in South Africa has become one of the most controversial fields in the social sciences in South Africa. At present almost all issues concerned with education seem to have fallen into a deep polemic. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, theoretical debate can progress only with concrete analytical work. In this regard, educational research has been left far behind the other social sciences.

Nonetheless, the general direction taken during recent years has been encouraging. The tradition of liberal empiricism has been challenged, although it still dominates the most influential academic circles. War has been declared by the emergent historiography against economic reductionism and determinism, inherited from a variety of sources. The functionalism of many of the theorists associated with reproduction theory has been rejected. In all, the issues with which South African educationists are grappling are deeply problematic and complex and will probably dominate educational debate for some time.

Notes

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3. See, for example, Tony Fluxman, 'Education and economy: A critique of S. Bowles & H. Gintis' "Schooling in capitalist America" ', **Perspectives in Education**, 5 (3), Nov 1981, p.3.
4. A H Lugtenburg, **Geskiedenis van die Onderwys in die SAR, 1836-1900** (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1925); A K Bot, **100 Jaar Onderwys in die Transvaal, 1836-1936** (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1936); A K Bot, **The Development of Education in the Transvaal, 1836-1951** (Pretoria: TED, 1951); J C Coetzee, **'n Onderwys in die Transvaal, 1838-1937: 'n Historiese Oorsig** (Pretoria: Van Shaik, 1941); J C Coetzee, 'n Beeld van die Afrikaanse Taalewe en maatskaplike toestande op die Rand' (DLitt thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1936); L J du Plessis, 'Die toepassing van die C.N.O.-Beginsel', **Koers**, 7 (1) 1939; H C M Fourie, 'Christelike nasionale opvoeding van die naturel', **Koers in die Krisis**, 2 (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia-Drukkery, 1940).
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8. J D Shingler, 'Education and the political order in South Africa, 1902-1961' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1973), p.139.
9. L G du Plessis, op cit, p.12.
10. H C M Fourie, op cit, pp.407-408.
11. B F Nel, op cit, pp.24-25.
12. L G du Plessis, op cit, p.40.
13. B F Nel, 'Inleidende opmerkings tot die Afrikaner en naturelle opvoeding en onderwys', **Koers**, 8 (2), 1940, p.66.
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16. Ibid, p.10.
17. Henry Stone, 'The common and the diverse', **Perspectives in Education**, 6 (1), July 1982, p.49.
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25. Martin Legassick, 'Ideology and social structure ...', op cit, p.1.
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33. Martin Legassick, 'Ideology and social structure...', op cit, p.13.
34. Tim Couzens, op cit, p.318.
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48. **The Open Universities in South Africa** (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1957).
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50. Muriel Horrell, **The Education of the Coloured Community in South Africa, 1652-1980** (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1970); and Muriel Horrell, **Bantu Education to 1968** (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1968).
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    Although it is recognised that the immediate educational and social needs of the different groups of South African people may require ... variations in educational control and administration in teaching techniques and in language medium, Conference re-affirms the thesis that education is ultimately **not** divisible. Conference therefore looks forward to the time when the administration of education will be on a regional basis, with responsibility for the education of all the people in an area being vested in one authority. (The Report of the 1969 Conference on Bantu Education, SAIRR, 1969, p.6)
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77. See Penny Enslin, 'Is the dominant tradition ... a liberal one?', op cit, and Michael Cross, op cit.
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Chapter 2

The Black Intelligentsia, African Politics and Education in South Africa, 1884-1976

Introduction

Since the inception of the 'political economy' school of thought in South African educational historiography in the early 1980s, educational issues have been largely debated with reference to the wider social, economic and political developments. However, while there has been some sensitivity towards the dialectics between education and politics, the complexity of South African politics in its relationship to education has not been adequately addressed. So one cannot see, for example, how the important field of African politics has impacted on education. One cannot see how struggles in African politics conditioned developments in education, itself a site of struggles and in South Africa the centre of wider social struggles.

This chapter is thus an attempt to examine critically and assess the evolution of African politics as articulated by the black intelligentsia, and its impact on South African educational history. African politics in South Africa developed through three main periods: (1) Christian-liberal reformism and moderation, 1884-1943; (2) pragmatic nationalism and Africanism 1943-1976; and (3) critical nationalism and Africanism, 1976-1986.

The first period was characterised by elitist politics and

moderation combined with strong scepticism towards radical perspectives on issues concerning South Africa, particularly Marxism and socialist ideologies. Marxism was rejected and, very often, portrayed as 'atheist' or a 'foreign ideology'. This is partly due to the pragmatism and dogmatism that dominated Marxist analyses of South African society and popular resistance, developed almost exclusively within the white ranks of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA).[1]

The second period brought about the celebration of an almost mystic Africanism and nationalism that, as happened to Marxism in the previous period, were pragmatically incorporated into the struggle, without the necessary criticism. The emerging ideas of 'negritude' that dominated earlier nationalist formulations were uncritically incorporated into the struggle. Old-fashioned Christian-liberalism and reformism came under fire. Marxists depicted their theories with a much higher sense of flexibility and self-criticism than their predecessors had taken in their approach to African politics.

Benefiting from the contradictions that arose out of the struggles of the 1950s and the unprecedented crisis of the 1970s, the third period showed an increasing theoretical and ideological refinement. Paradoxically, the political vacuum created by the bannings of political leaders of all persuasions in the 1960s had the effect of widening participation in the debates by the different sections of the middle class, including those not affiliated to any political organisation. This *democratisation of thought* played a crucial role in creating a spirit of self-criticism within and outside the resistance and liberation movement. It made possible the achievement of higher levels of political militancy and ideological and theoretical sophistication among black intellectuals.[2]

Radical and Marxist ideas were broadened and creatively adjusted to the specific circumstances of the existing social and political movements, namely the Black Consciousness, Africanist and Charterist traditions. Critical thinking and theoretical exercises were finally institutionalised in African politics and education. They became important tools in the pursuit of national undertakings amongst black intellectuals

and the masses. This chapter will concentrate on the first two periods.

Christian-liberalism and political moderation placed the black elite on the same platform as white liberals. This black elite seemed attracted by the liberal concept of 'adapted education' as the most suitable form of education for the African masses. Accordingly, education for the African masses had to be considered as much as possible from the point of view of the African's 'own possibilities, needs and aspirations'.[3] To put it differently, African education was seen as having to conform to the social and economic roles which African people were expected to perform. The anti-liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s and the increasing radicalisation of the African intelligentsia led to the rejection of this accommodationist strategy. The concept of Bantu Education and the liberal concept of equal-but-separate education were severely criticised.

Moderation and liberal reformism, 1886-1943/8: The early African 'modernisers'

A common feature amongst African proto-nationalists in Africa is that they were well-educated and elitist and could take advantage of the existing circumstances to pursue their petty bourgeois politics. They were great doctors, great lawyers, great priests and great pastors, and made use of the mass media more extensively than the later nationalists, who adopted more mass orientated politics. They were however respected by the masses because they spoke good English, French or Portuguese. They were articulate and very often enjoyed a privileged economic status. Politically, what distinguished these early 'modernisers' from the later activists is that they tended to operate within the existing oppressive system and not to challenge it. They knew that the chances of rejecting the system successfully were limited or hopeless. Thus, they favoured the accomodationist policy advocated by the liberals as realistic and more in line with their petty bourgeois interests, which included access to individual

material and social privileges. Essentially, they claimed rights and equality with white settlers on the grounds of their privileged condition within the colonial system as an educated elite. In this respect, the early African middle class in South Africa was not an exception. Though more militant than its counterpart in most African countries, the early African petty bourgeoisie in South Africa displayed a similar political style: reformism and Christian-liberalism.

The ideas propagated by white liberals had considerable influence among educated middle-class Africans. From 1886 to around 1950, mainstream African thought remained essentially reformist and moderate in perspective; it embraced a liberalism that sought equality of opportunity within the existing social, political and economic framework. This despite the fact that the African intelligentsia had been exposed to Marxist ideas since the early 1920s. Josiah Tshangana Gumede,[4] Bransby Ndobe and Elliot Tonjeni,[5] Willie Nkomo, Moses Kotane[6] and James LaGuma,[7] in the 1930s and the 1940s, emerged as the most knowledgeable blacks who assimilated Marxist ideas and made some impact on African thought. The overwhelming majority of African leaders however continued to be indifferent or even hostile to radicalism and Marxism, which was promoted mainly by white intellectuals, particularly those affiliated to the CPSA. Gumede, a founding member of the African National Congress (ANC), was soon silenced and so were other black Marxists.

Four main reasons seem to have determined this apathy to Marxism amongst the African petty bourgeoisie: (1) the impact of the Cape liberal tradition; (2) the influence of Christianity; (3) the activities of white professional liberals during the first half of the present century; and (4) most importantly, the mechanistic and dogmatic form of early Marxist thought in South Africa.

From the early 1880s, Africans in the Cape Colony were placed on the common voters roll on the basis of a qualified and non-racial franchise. This offered some hope to those educated and successful Africans who believed that British liberal principles of equality before the law, civil rights, freedom of the press and an independent judiciary would be extended to the

provinces of Natal and the Transvaal. These hopes were heightened after the Anglo-Boer War in 1902. When South African capitalism was consolidated, Cape liberalism formed a basis for liberal criticism of the policy of racial segregation. Liberals demanded the recognition of individuals based on 'civilisation' rather than race and expressed the desire to transcend repressive policies that allowed no expression of African grievances. Given the existing political and economic constraints, liberalism appeared to be the most realistic and attractive political strategy for the black intelligentsia.

Liberal perceptions were also strengthened by missionaries and Christian educators, who preached that all human beings were born equal, and propagated universal concepts of peace, love, justice, equality and the common brotherhood of all, as well as obedience to authority, tolerance, patience and sacrifice for those who suffered injustice and oppression. It is against this background, Ranuga argues, that it was ideologically very difficult for the African elite to accept Marxist ideas.[8] Marxism claimed a revolutionary strategy and ideal not popular within the ANC. The leaders of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC — later the African National Congress), created in 1912, while taking the Christian-liberal principles as part of their tradition and way of life, denounced Marxism as 'foreign' and 'atheistic'.[9] This approach prevailed within the ANC, which adopted peaceful means and constitutional policy as its main strategy to redress economic imbalances and achieve political reform. Its 1919 constitution explicitly stated that resolutions, protests, constitutional and peaceful propaganda, deputations, petitions and other forms of representations and passive action including the investigation of grievances, education, lectures and distribution of literature would be the means employed for the achievement of its goals.[10]

The ideology of liberalism was revitalised in the 1920s and 1930s by a small but influential group of liberal professionals, nicknamed 'friends of the native' by Legassick.[11] In 1921, they established Joint Councils of Europeans and Africans and welfare institutions to promote inter-racial justice, co-operation and understanding. They also created research

institutions to handle the so-called 'Native question'. These initiatives had the support and participation of African leaders and exerted a strong ideological influence on them.

Of no less importance was the dogmatism which overshadowed initial attempts to apply Marxism to the struggle in South Africa. Exposed to the version of Marxism articulated by the Third International, early Marxists tended to play down the racial aspects of the South African society and its struggles. They focused on the class nature of the conflict. They saw national liberation as a class struggle, with the aim of establishing a non-racial class ideology, which would link the working class across race boundaries in a common struggle against capitalism. They regarded nationalism as a reactionary ideology with a minimal role to play in a struggle for the emancipation of the working class irrespective of race. The concept of *class* was generally understood within the framework of Marxist-Leninist principles, as a colour-blind category.[12] Marxists shared the principles of proletarian internationalism under the banner 'Workers of the World Unite'. This lacked appeal for black nationalists, who saw race and racial oppression as a fundamental aspect of their social experience and, as such, part of the conflict. Black Marxists such as Gumede, LaGuma and Kotane tried to overcome the problem by adding a nationalist dimension to mainstream Marxism-Leninism. For example, LaGuma suggested that before a peasants' and workers' republic could emerge a national 'Black Republic' should be established.

LaGuma was a trade unionist who joined the CPSA in 1925 and the ANC in 1927 as secretary of the Cape branch. He visited Moscow as a CPSA delegate in 1927, when the Commintern was trying to come to grips with the 'colonial question'. From the discussions he had with the Commintern, a resolution was drafted on the nature of the struggle in South Africa. It was later adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International after consultation with the CPSA. The resolution urged the constitution of 'an independent Native Republic, as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' government', i.e. a stage towards the achievement of socialism.[13] The Central Executive of the CPSA opposed the

resolution on the grounds that its strategy would exclude all whites and the land would entirely belong to the Africans.[14]

Kotane argued that although lessons could be drawn from Europe, they should however not lose sight of the fact that Europe differed historically, politically and economically from South Africa.[15]

In addition, the traditionally hostile attitude of white workers to black labour made it difficult for the left to explicate the applicability in real labour relations of the principle of working class solidarity propagated by Marxist ideology. This led the main white organisations to concentrate their efforts on white workers while neglecting the potential role of the black working class in the struggle against capitalist and imperialist domination. The South African Labour Party (SALP), which emerged as a white organisation, ruled out any non-racial approach to working-class struggles. Progressive white trade unions promoted socialist ideology almost exclusively amongst white workers. The CPSA, which was formed in 1921 in Cape Town, had no significant black membership.[16] Only the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), a militant trade union founded in January 1919 in Cape Town by Clement Kadalie from Malawi, developed a favourable climate for the proliferation of socialist ideas amongst African workers. Its constitution held out as an ultimate goal a colour-blind socialist society. However, no healthy relationship existed between the ICU and the CPSA as existed between the ANC and the CPSA. These factors had some bearing on the tradition of moderation and liberal reformism shown by the early African modernisers.

The role of the press

With few exceptions, Africans expressed their opinions through the press. African views appeared in several periodicals and newspapers such as the *Christian Express*, which acted as the mediator between the overbearing section of colonial opinion, on the one hand, and the African elite, on the other. The English newspapers *The Star, Cape Mercury, Cape Times, Eastern Province Herald, Daily Dispatch* and *Natal Advertiser* provided channels of communication between

the liberal viewpoint and the African petty bourgeoisie. More important than these were the existing African newspapers such as *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Native Opinion) (1884-1908), the second oldest newspaper published in any of the indigenous South African languages. It represented perhaps the most moderate and even conservative section of the African petty bourgeoisie, reflecting to a large extent the political ambiguity of its editor John Tengo Jabavu, whose politics were a symbiosis of opposition and collaboration. It provided an important forum for the debate and expression of African opinion on education policy. When Jabavu and his close friends created the first South African Native College at Fort Hare (initially Inter-State Native College) in 1916, the newspaper came to be looked upon as the mouthpiece of the College and the College itself as *I Kolijii ka Jabavu* or *Sekolo sa Jabavu* (Jabavu's College).

The moderation of Jabavu, which made him 'the best bantu patriot' according to the *Christian Express*, placed *Imvo Zabantsundu* in a heated war with the more radical *Koranta ea Becoana* (The Bachuana Gazette), and in particular *Tsala ea Becoana* (Friend of the Becoana), later renamed *Tsala ea Batho* (Friend of the People) edited by Sol Plaatje and Silas Molema.[17] Of particular importance was *Abantu-Batho*, the official organ of the ANC until the early 1930s. Other important African papers were A K Soga's *Izwi la Bantu* (The Voice of the People) in East London, written in English and Xhosa and published from November 1897; the *South African Spectator*, edited by F Z S Peregrino, a West African journalist residing in South Africa; *Umteteli wa Bantu*, funded by the Chamber of Mines and run by the Native Recruiting Corporation, a paper with a wide readership and influence among educated Africans; *Ilanga lase Natal* (The Natal Sun), founded by the Rev John L Dube in 1903, and published in Ohlange, Natal; and the Johannesburg newspaper, *The Bantu World*, created in 1931 to enable white businessmen to reach the growing African market. The conflicting interests represented in these newspapers frustrated the unifying attempts made by Sol Plaatje and FZS Peregrino to create a South African Native Press Association.[18]

In education, the African liberal-reformist tradition carried different nuances according to the changing social, economic and political circumstances. From the late 19th century to the early 1950s, one can identify three main features that dominated the educational ideas and practices of the African intelligentsia: (1) the struggle for access to educational opportunities; (2) the struggle for social, political and economic accommodation; and (3) the struggle for legitimacy. In all cases, moderation and reformism prevailed. This can be illustrated by examining the biographies of three prominent African educators and political activists, namely John Tengo Jabavu, Davidson Dengo Jabavu and John L. Dube.

J T Jabavu appeared to be more concerned with setting conditions for the training of an African elite or leadership by widening opportunities for higher education. His efforts and campaigns culminated with the opening of the South African Native College, the first institution providing higher education to Southern African blacks. His son, Davidson Jabavu, who lived when an identifiable African elite already existed, turned his attention to the social condition of this elite and its role in the existing political dispensation, without however blinding himself to major educational issues affecting African people. These efforts were complemented by John Dube who turned his attention to the role the educated elite could play vis-à-vis the wider African masses, thus addressing the issue of accountability. He created the first industrial training institution for Africans in Inanda, based on the American model of Tuskegee.

John Tengo Jabavu, 1859-1921: Educating the elite

J T Jabavu was a pioneer and a key figure in the shaping of African educational thought in South Africa.[19] He was one of the first African matriculants, who could not go further because the existing system made no such provision for black South Africans.[20] The first African to pass the matriculation exam was Rev S P Sihlali (1880), and the second J T Jabavu (1883), the next five being Alexander Tyamzashe (1895), George

Tyamzashe (1896), Margaret Makiwane (1897), Marianne Mzimba (1897) and Chever Falati (1898), all trained at Lovedale, the only institution providing education up to the Matric level at the time.[21] Many African matriculants had to travel to the USA or Britain to seek higher education. According to Davidson Dengo Jabavu, it was once estimated by the Cape Department of Education that between ninety and a hundred black young matriculants had gone to America from the Cape Colony alone for education during the period 1898-1908.[22]

Particular circumstances gave inspiration to Jabavu's thought. In 1901, in view of the discontinuation of the Matriculation class at Lovedale, J T Jabavu applied to get his son Davidson (then studying at Lovedale) admitted as a day student at Dale College, a school for white children at King Williamstown. The application was turned down by the Dale College Committee for racist reasons. The matter dominated the press with statements that remind us of the present day controversy on 'open' schools: 'our social system does not at present admit of innovations like that which Mr Jabavu's request involved'; 'other requests from natives for similar privileges would follow, and the establishment would become a school for both races, a result that would materially interfere with its prosperity and mar its usefulness among those who vastly preponderate in the community [Europeans]'; 'if a precedent was established, the status of the school would rapidly degenerate from that of a first-class school to that of a mission school'; ' we scarcely think that the life of the handful of native youths among a crowd of European boys in a colonial school would be a happy one'; 'the time is not yet ripe for such an innovation as a school for both races ... to us it is hard to think that the time will ever be ripe'.[23]

It appeared to J T Jabavu that what was required was an institution of higher education to cater for black matriculants. The idea was supported by the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) of 1903, who were certainly influenced by the controversy. They recommended the establishment of a Central Native College to afford opportunities of higher education for African teachers.

In 1906, J T Jabavu visited the most important centres in the Cape Colony and travelled to Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Maseru, Gaborone, Mafikeng and Pietersburg where he held meetings to gain material and political support for the proposed College. The fact that his son had been refused enrolment in a white institution gave him a negotiating basis. Taking a moderate stand, J T Jabavu made the project popular within the colonial officialdom. His son Davidson described his father's political life as alternating between the offensive and the defensive. J T Jabavu often criticised the conservative position of the Cape Department of Education, which opposed the project, but he did not entertain the opposition of those on the left like Sol Plaatje who saw him as a collaborator: 'It is no secret that influences are at work among the Natives which seek to alienate them from their European friends and implant in their minds a distrust of all Government proposals whether framed for their benefit or not.'[24] More radicalised African leaders condemned J T Jabavu's 'pragmatic collaboration'. For example, some of those who opposed Jabavu's orientation in white politics founded the South African Native National Congress in 1912 to co-ordinate African activities in the eastern Cape Colony, particularly with regard to electoral politics. For them the state had the responsibility of providing compulsory state-subsidised education.[25] He was again left aside when progressive African leaders, among them J L Dube and Sol Plaatje, in response to Pixley ka I Seme's call, assembled in Bloemfontein in January 1912 to form the South African Native National Congress, which in 1923 changed its name to the African National Congress.

Despite his political conservatism J T Jabavu remained one of the most prominent educationists of his time. Fuelling his desire for higher education was an outstanding philosophical refinement. While the dominant conception among the authorities was that education should commence at the bottom, with a concentration on primary education based on manual labour, and gradually work upwards, Jabavu contended that education should work from the top downwards. There must, he argued, be an educated elite with higher education to teach and uplift the masses, 'for the light comes from above'. The

solution to the problem of African education consisted in providing the masses with basic education, while concentrating on the few who were to be the leaders and uplifters of the rest.[26] The tradition of 'half-education' or 'little education' would lead to a situation where the masses would have to be led by 'blind leaders, or, worse still, by leaders with mental eyes so insufficiently opened as only to be able to see "men like trees", for the danger of the country both for white and black'.[27] Black upliftment would come about through a sophisticated education and the empowerment of a group of black 'modernisers'. This elitist conception of education was in line with the ideas propagated by white liberals at the time. James Henderson, an influential liberal missionary, also argued strongly that education should proceed 'from above downwards' since 'a few really well educated Natives have more influence upon this people than hundreds of semi-educated ones'.[28] This is how he interpreted white fear regarding the Native College:

> They know that knowledge is strength; and wishing — in their own interest they think — to keep the Native perpetually in subjection, they believe that to achieve their end, they must keep such an Institution as the College away from him. The fallacy in this reasoning lies in the belief that the mere fact of the establishment of a Native College necessarily means that every one of the five million able South Africans will, heigh presto, have a College education, and thus be serious competitors to the white community. Well, where this is possible it would be a miracle. It has not happened in other countries, and there is not the slightest fear of its taking place here...
>
> For what, then, is the College required? The ignorant opponent of Native education will readily ask. And our ready reply is, *it is required to fully qualify the handful who are to labour among the mass of their people as uplifters* — missionaries, teachers, and leaders along right lines. [My emphasis][29]

Davidson Dengo Jabavu: Accommodating the elite

When J T Jabavu came to the end of his career in 1921, his son D D Jabavu had already completed his degree at London University, in October 1912, and had been appointed the first lecturer of the South African Native College in March 1915.[30] D.D. Jabavu inherited the experience of early 20th century African politics led by his father and outstanding personalities such as Sol Plaatje. However, his political and educational thought as well as that of John Dube must be understood with reference to the particular historical circumstances of their time. Fuelled by the South African industrial revolution since the late 19th century, interest in the 'natives' and, in particular, African education had increased. This was related to two major developments: firstly, the emergence of an African urban proletariat and, secondly, the growth of mission-educated Africans, who were beginning to emerge as an identifiable elite. On the one hand, some liberals had recognised the need for reforming education to provide more effectively for the social and economic integration of the African proletariat. On the other hand, they also acknowledged the crucial role that the emerging petty bourgeoisie could play in this political context. This social category was initially seen by both the ruling class and the liberal establishment as a potential political threat, particularly after the foundation of the SANNC in 1912.

Conservative circles saw total segregation as providing a framework for solving these problems while liberals favoured partial segregation and the alleviation of some social ills in the urban areas with the help of rural reserves. Both regarded 'adapted education' as an adequate solution for the integration of the African working class into new forms of social and economic life. Liberals also showed some sympathy for the

concept of *equal-but-separate* education.[31]

Through his paper *Umteteli wa Bantu*, D D Jabavu dealt with different matters relating to the so-called 'Native question': from education for Africans, African unrest and labour reserves to the 'Native bills'.[32] However, one major issue absorbed much of his attention: the policy of racial segregation and the problems it created for the accommodation of the African elite. As any contemporary Marxist would agree today, Jabavu considered segregation a 'shallow fallacy' designed to

> confine the black man within such circumscribed limits that he should never be territorially independent, but be compelled by intolerable congestion to go out of his habitat and seek labour with whites and thus constitute a never-drying reservoir of cheap unskilled labour, especially for the farmers.[33]

The 'Native question', he argued, was 'a misnomer for what would be better understood if we renamed it "Inter-racial Relationship"',[34] for a '"Native" is not a question, a question is the way whites deal with the "Native". How should this problem be resolved?' D D Jabavu believed that existing middle-class organisations such as the Joint Councils of Europeans and Africans, universities, and student and welfare organisations formed effective instruments to minimise racial tensions and pave the path to racial harmony between whites and blacks. Hoping that the educated elite would eventually be exempted from the practice of segregation, he viewed education as the key to attaining racial harmony. African people, he suggested, must replace untrained leaders with a number of intellectual spokesmen of the type of Booker T Washington and J E K Aggrey. He regretted the fact that the mismanagement of 'race relations' had led to a situation where 'the best educated Bantu never come into touch with the best educated Europeans until they have adopted toward each other an attitude based on theoretical and preconceived notions'.[35]

He stressed that certain principles deserved study on the part of the rulers: 'the better educated Natives cannot be neglected in legislative affairs by reason of their small percentage as compared with the masses.'[36] Karis and Carter characterise his position as reflecting 'the orientation of the educated African elite, who suffered most directly from the failure of the system to fulfil the liberal promise of the 19th century nonracial franchise in the Cape'.[37]

Similar views were also expressed by one of the most influential members of the SANNC (Cape Province Branch), Reverend Zaccheus Mahabane.[38] In his presidential address delivered at the Annual Convention of the Cape Province Native Congress in 1920, Rev Mahabane stated that the removal of the 'Colour Bar' was the key to what was commonly seen as the 'Native Question'.[39] In 1922 he pointed out that the Joint Councils had a 'body of white men ... who have taken practical steps in the right direction of removing this artificial colour bar'.[40] Among many of the elite at that time, the Joint Councils were highly appreciated and publicly acknowledged as an adequate method for minimising racial friction and promoting racial justice.

There are however three main interpretations of the significance of the Joint Councils to the black elite. The first is that they translated into practice the lobbying politics of the SANNC, particularly its commitment to a constitutional policy of peaceful co-existence and liberal reforms within the existing system. The second is that they reinforced the belief and hope that white opinion could be modified and prevailed upon through education and debate to extend justice to the African people. The third interpretation, one held by Ranuga, is that by promoting racial co-operation, the Councils contributed towards delaying the early emergence and growth of an assertive and radical African nationalism, which became the distinctive feature of the Congress Youth League in the 1940s.[41]

The views expressed by both J T Jabavu and his son cannot be discussed meaningfully outside the context of the social forces that shaped their lives. J T Jabavu represented the concerns of an emerging minority whose survival was

uncertain unless social conditions for its reproduction were immediately created. A fundamental component of these conditions was undoubtedly the provision of basic and higher education. In this sense, J T Jabavu also articulated the general opinion of the African political leadership that the government should reconsider its position that African education should be 'gradual'[42] and build government schools. Testimonies before the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1904 considered the lack of government schools as the main problem in education.

The proliferation of institutions of training and the increasing process of social stratification culminated with the emergence of an identifiable black educated elite during the first decades of the present century. This made it possible for D D Jabavu to turn his attention to the social condition of this elite, without, however, blinding himself to the major educational issues affecting African people.

The liberal concept of 'adapted education' had great appeal in Jabavu's thought. He endorsed the proposals of the report of the Native Education Commission of 1919, which emphasised the need for adjusting African education to the culture of the 'Bantu'.[43] He believed that the cure for the successive failures of peasant agriculture lay 'firstly, in the educational training of headmen and chiefs who will encourage the pursuits of agriculture; secondly, in the multiplication of Native farm demonstrators, on the American style, to teach dry farming methods, and, thirdly, in the establishment of Agricultural Schools for Natives'.[44] These convictions were consolidated after his visit to America in 1913, where, under the request of the Minister of Native Affairs (Union Government of South Africa), he compiled a detailed report on Booker T Washington's ideas and discussed their applicability to South Africa. Only the outbreak of the World War prevented the Secretary of Native Affairs, Mr Edward Dower, from putting it into a Blue Book form.[45]

After the passage of the Hertzog legislation in 1936, D D Jabavu and Pixley ka I Seme, President of the ANC, called a meeting of Africans from all shades of the political spectrum to form a new national umbrella organisation, with the original

purpose of uniting opposition to the legislation. They formed the All African Convention (AAC). Leaders of the ANC, members of the Communist Party, members of the declining ICU, tribal chiefs and professional and church dignitaries took part in the gathering. The delegates drafted important resolutions on African grievances. The resolutions, particularly those concerning education, to a large extent reflected D D Jabavu's liberalism. For example, the AAC's policy statement only stressed the 'axiomatic fact' that the education of the Africans was essential to their efficiency in employment and their progress in agriculture. It demanded better financing of African education and equal pay for African and European teachers.[46] This differed from the views expressed by those who were under the leadership of the ANC. A deputation from the ANC to the Minister of Native Affairs in May 1939 challenged the segregated nature of African education. The Reverend A M'timkulu, who presented the resolution on education, said: 'We want our education to be on the same basis and on the same lines as the education of other peoples, under the direction of a specialist body with the right attitude'.[47] Another delegate, J M Lekheto, stressed that 'Education is a universal thing and should not be segregated.'[48] They were accused by the Minister of 'arguing along theoretical lines' without tackling the problem 'in the most practical way', i.e. as a Native problem quite distinct from those of the Europeans.[49] The educational principles spelt out by the ANC's deputation were systematically elaborated in the Bill of Rights formulated by the ANC in 1943 as a response to the signing of the Atlantic Charter between the USA and Great Britain. Once again the idea of a special type of education for Africans came under fire and free compulsory primary education was demanded.[50]

John L. Dube, 1871-1946: Educating the masses

What Davidson Jabavu achieved in theory materialised in the practice of Rev J L Dube, who after study-visits to the USA established the Zulu Christian Industrial School in 1899 in Ohlange, Natal. This was the first industrial school of

American type founded by a professionally trained African educator.[51] Like D D Jabavu, Dube had experienced a privileged education and was conscious of his status as an educated African. He knew that he possessed a solid knowledge and skills that the authorities and the white community in general should have made use of: 'I think the white race has a tremendous responsibility to lead us on the right lines. But that leadership must come from the experience of give and take. We have a lot to learn from the white man and he has a lot to learn from us'.[52] In this sense, Tabata is right when he says that the 'earliest African modernisers, men such as John Dube, Pixley ka Izaka Seme, Tengo Jabavu, Simon Peter Sihlali and Walter Bencon Rubusana, had dreamed of an African Renaissance'.[53] They placed great stress on the assimilation and adaptation of European culture by Africans through formal schooling as it had been run by the missionaries since the 19th century.[54] However, Dube's involvement in the ANC's politics made him perhaps the most radical of the three educationists examined. Since its inception the ANC showed concern for the need for a free, compulsory and public system of education for the whole Union of South Africa.[55] Generally, African educational thought of the 1920s and 1930s reflected the prevailing elitism and petty bourgeois politics. In many cases, wittingly or unwittingly, African educationists mediated the dominant colonial conceptions, particularly those propagated by the liberal establishment. This was recognised by Dr A B Xuma, President of the ANC, in his presidential address in 1941:

> Today you and I, the better trained we are, seem more disposed to work under orders and direction of others against and away from African organisations. Someone said to me one day, with some degree of truth, 'We uneducated Africans feel that the educated African is lost to us. He is afraid to identify himself with his own people. We do not know whether the education you get puts fear in you.' I was dumbfounded; but was somewhat ashamed because you and I, outside our jobs for which we are paid, have not done the best we can to assist our people.[56]

D D Jabavu and Dube distinguished between education for the masses and education for the elite. For them, while the elite should be nurtured with higher levels of academic know-ledge and skills to enable it to uplift the masses, the latter should be provided only with those skills that could turn them into a more productive force. Thus, the Government's educational strategy of concentrating the curriculum for African schools on industrial or manual training had some appeal to the educational thinking of Jabavu and Dube.

Africanism and Charterism, 1948-1976

Throughout the African continent, the post-World War II era marked the transition from pro-nationalism to militant nationalism and struggles for national liberation. In South Africa too there was an increasing radicalisation of the black middle class, and the widening of the mass democratic movement, culminating with the banning of political organisations in 1960. An outstanding feature of this nationalism was its anti-liberal spirit in contrast to the reformism and moderation of the 1920s and 1930s. White sympathisers — first the missionaries and then 'professional liberals' — were accused of always having used their 'friendship' to break African unity. Consequently, Africans chose to go it alone.[57] Co-operation between left-wing organisations, particularly between the ANC and the CPSA, made possible the promotion of radical ideas including Marxism in black politics. The dogmatism of the 1920s gave way to a more critical Marxism. Educational opinions voiced by black intellectuals can only be correctly interpreted with reference to the emerging political and ideological mood within the opposition. In education, they focused on one major issue: segregated schooling, particularly the system of Bantu Education introduced by the apartheid regime in 1953. Strong

opposition to Bantu Education came mainly from a group of a few Africans who had generally assimilated and come to value much of Western culture, and who considered education, along Western lines, a key element for the place that they envisaged for themselves within South African society and economy. In this context, names such as D G S M'Timkulu, L L Sihlali, I B Tabata, P Ntantala, A M Mbere, J E B Msomi, R M Sobukwe, Zeph Mothopeng, E'skia Mphahlele, H Mashabela and others spring to mind.[58]

From the mid-1940s onwards, Africans, 'coloureds', Indians and progressive whites developed their ideas towards issues of common concern, particularly the issue of active resistance to apartheid oppression and the struggle for national liberation. The most radical sections of the African intelligentsia sharing developing ideas in the ANC, SACP and the white democratic movement laid the foundations for the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter. Four main factors played a crucial role in this ideological shift: (1) the establishment of the African National Congress Youth League (CYL) in 1944, which brought militant radical politics into the ANC and the mass democratic movement; (2) the spirit of cooperation between the ANC and CPSA and other progressive organisations created during the 1946 strike; (3) the increasing scepticism about the meaningfulness of the slogan 'Africa for the Africans' within the ANC senior leadership; and (4) the accession to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, which unleashed a spirit of defiance and the need for a united action against apartheid, particularly between the CYL and the CPSA. The League brought together prominent personalities such as A M Lembede (president), Oliver R Tambo (secretary), Walter Sisulu (treasurer), A P Mda, Nelson Mandela and W Nkomo. Two main theoretical and ideological traditions emerged from this body: Africanism and Charterism.

Africanism: 'Africa for the Africans by the Africans'

Lembede, whose short life ended in 1947 when he was only 33, became the pioneer of the nationalist movement known as

'Africanism'. The slogan '*Africa for the Africans by the Africans*' captures precisely the nationalist ideology shared by the Africanists. As stated in the CYL Manifesto of March 1944, Africanism held that: (1) the African should 'determine his own future by his own efforts' without relying on white tutelage, for 'no nation can free an oppressed group other than that group itself'; (2) the African should strive for the achievement of African liberation and African unity; and (3) the African should borrow useful ideologies from outside but reject the wholesale importation of 'foreign ideologies' into Africa.[59] It assumed that:

> The Africans are a conquered race, their oppression is a racial oppression, in other words, they do not suffer class oppression. They are oppressed by virtue of their colour as a race — as a group — as a nation! In other words they are suffering national oppression.[60]

Africanism has also been seen as an 'attitude of mind', a way of life, an act of consciousness emphasising a sense of pride in being an African and, consequently, a commitment to the promotion of the ideals of the continent. Africanism dominated the policy of the CYL and penetrated the highest ranks of the ANC, where it co-existed with a developing Charterist tradition until the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1958. With regard to education, these developments did not bring about significant policy shifts within the ANC. Education was regarded as a means to ensure the realisation of an effective democracy. The strategies for achieving this ideal included the implementation of free compulsory education for all children and mass adult education.[61]

When the PAC broke away from the ANC in 1958, it reasserted the Africanist philosophy as outlined by Lembede and later by Sobukwe.[62] In the PAC's view, an ideology of multi-racialism within the liberation movement lacked the emotional appeal to mobilise African support. Only an ideology based on orthodox or exclusive African nationalism could be

dynamic and powerful enough to attract the African masses to the struggle. African socialism based on traditional African communalism became popular among Africanist leaders.[63]

The Freedom Charter: 'A people's charter by the people for the people'

Despite the initial isolationist attitude of the CYL, the intensification of state repression and the promulgation of the Suppression of Communism Act necessitated a common strategy between the ANC, the ANC Youth League, the Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the Communist Party. For this purpose, a Joint Planning Council was established in May 1950 as a co-ordinating body. The ANC finally adopted the Programme of Action designed by the CYL in 1949, which called for active boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-co-operation in the struggle for national freedom. All these developments together resulted in a favourable atmosphere for the Defiance Campaign of 1953-5. This in turn generated the right climate for the staging of a multi-racial alliance uniting the ANC, CYL, the newly-formed Congress of Democrats and SACTU, which provided a forum for the drafting of the 'Freedom Charter' on 25-26 June 1955 at Kliptown, near Johannesburg.

The Freedom Charter represents a unifying symbol for all those blacks and whites who have firmly committed themselves to a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. It marks the beginning of the formulation of alternative policies to the existing political dispensation in South Africa. Thus the concept of 'people of South Africa' was redefined to encompass not just blacks or Africans, but 'all who live in it, black and white'.[64] Most importantly, a clear policy for a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa was formulated. Broadly speaking, this has as its goals: (1) the replacement of all bodies of minority rule by democratic organs of government; (2) equal rights for all national groups; (3) redistribution of wealth to all South Africans, including nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry; (4) the sharing of land amongst those who work on it; (5) equality before the law; (6) equal human rights; (7) employment, housing and peace for all; (8) free, compulsory, universal and equal education for all children as well as the abolition of the colour bar in cultural life, sport and education.[65]

The last of these goals provided the basis for the ANC's educational programme developed in the course of the liberation struggle. This aims at preparing cadres to serve in the national liberation struggle and the post-liberation phase, and at training them to be able to serve society in all fields of social activity.[66] The programme embodies the following principles: (1) the ANC education policy shall be geared towards producing a new type of society 'dedicated to serve the interests and needs of the South African people as a whole' i.e. irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed; (2) the ANC educational programme shall draw on the most advanced scientific knowledge of the people of South Africa and the world; (3) 'education shall combat the division between mental and manual training and the artificial separation of the arts and sciences'; (4) democratic practice shall prevail among students, teachers and the community in all educational activities.[67]

The Freedom Charter also marked the beginning of a new tradition in African thought and politics: Charterism. Drawing extensively on Marxist theory and African nationalism, Charterism identifies the working class as the main and leading force within the struggle for democracy in South Africa. This position distinguishes between two major camps in the struggle: (1) the enemy and (2) the mass democratic movement made up of 'the overwhelming majority of South Africans — the black working class, the rural masses, the black petty bourgeoisie (traders), and the black middle class strata (clerks, teachers, nurses, intellectuals), and those whites "who stand shoulder to shoulder in struggle with the majority"'. A practical implication of this approach has been the initiatives undertaken by various circles to empower the working class, such as the intensification of trade unionism, worker education and literacy programmes, all of them developed on a non-racial basis.

However, neither the Congress alliance nor the Freedom

Charter was accepted by the Africanist section of Congress. The Africanists argued that, because of its multiracial character, the Freedom Charter was irreconcilable with the ideology of Africanism formulated by Lembede and the 'Nation-Building' spirit proclaimed by the 1949 CYL Programme of Action. They considered the involvement of white liberals and left-wing groups in the national liberation movement unacceptable.[68] In 1958, this section broke away to form the Pan Africanist Congress under the leadership of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe.[69] They restored the Africanist philosophy. Their principles were outlined in the 1959 Africanist Manifesto, known as the Madzunya Manifesto after Josias Madzunya, who was known for his criticism of the Congress Alliance and who later played a leading role in the founding of the PAC.[70]

Black Consciousness: 'Black man you are on your own'

Two main factors led to the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the late 1960s: (1) the political vacuum left when the ANC and the PAC were banned in 1960; and (2) the dissatisfaction of black students with white student politics in NUSAS, a predominantly white student body that viewed the problems of black people from a white liberal perspective. However, the BCM can also be seen as a peculiar and complex response to three main forms of social control: (1) attempts to inculcate conformist modes of behaviour, passivity and a psychological and cultural predisposition to accept the apartheid oppressive system through various agencies of control, particularly Bantu Education; (2) the past historical experience of blacks under apartheid; (3) broader political, economic and social circumstances to which blacks have been subjected. Under the leadership of Stephen Bantu Biko, black students formed the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in Turfloop in 1968.[71] Their ideas soon reached beyond the limits of campus life to involve the wider black society. In 1972, the Black People's Convention was created in Pietermaritzburg as an

umbrella organisation representing a variety of educational, cultural, trade union, community and church organisations, operating under the banner of the BCM.

The BCM places emphasis on the overriding importance of the psychological aspects of the oppressed as a precondition to national liberation.[72] It is concerned with the liberation of the self or the colonised mind in the first instance.[73] This is how Biko defined Black Consciousness:

> It becomes more necessary to see the truth as it is if you realise that the only vehicle for change is these people who have lost their personality. The first step therefore is to make the black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity; to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth. This is the definition of 'Black Consciousness'.[74]

As with Africanism, the BCM dismissed integration before liberation for it would allow white liberals to control the way blacks responded to the system.[75] While white liberals were seen as carriers of 'complexes of superiority', blacks suffered from a chronic disease of inferiority that could degenerate into total apathy if there was integration in the liberation struggle. Yet white liberals had plenty of work to do in educating their community. However, other important factors seem to have contributed to the growing anti-liberalism within the liberation movement in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s: (1) the disillusionment with the failure of pre-1948 liberalism to fulfil its promises to minimise the increasing social and economic contradictions faced by Africans; (2) the emergence of 'economic liberalism' in the 1960s, which emphasised a 'human capital' approach to South African economic, social and educational problems following the rise of the organic composition of capital and consequent mechanisation of the industry. Liberals

tended to be seen as siding with capitalist exploitative interests. Of significant importance also were the successes achieved by the African liberation movement in the struggle against colonialism in the continent.

Black Consciousness organisations also declared their commitment to a socialist ideal. For example, a Black People's Convention (BPC) congress taking place in King William's Town in 1975 appealed for the need for building a 'strong, socialist, self-reliant economy'.[76] The Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA), the 'external wing' of the BCM launched in London in April 1980, assumed a more radical position. In its declaration of principles, the BCMA adopted 'the theory and practice of scientific socialism to guide it in the struggle'. Although there seems to be some ambiguity about the concept of socialism as proclaimed by both the Africanist and BCM traditions, socialism is in both cases the stated goal.[77] The two traditions do not seem to be colour blind, though the Africanists assumed a more restrained attitude and focused on the issue of national oppression.[78] However, they rejected the argument that the situation was one of class struggle rather than racial struggle.

The ideology of BCM did not remain unchanged. From 1976 the concept of class began to find its way into the thinking of some BC leaders. Evidence shows that during the 1976 Soweto uprising, students not only expressed more radicalised attitudes, but, more importantly, they finally recognised that in the cause of liberation 'the power for change lies with the workers'.[79] Apartheid began to be seen not just as a racist system but as an organic part of capitalism. Diliza Mji, the president of SASO, in his presidential address in 1977, referred to the issue of class or stratification in these terms:

> The need is therefore to look at our struggle not only in terms of colour interests but also in terms of class interests; skin colour in fact has become a class criterion in South Africa.[80]

What remained specific to the BCM was the assumption

that only the black working class and not white liberals or the white working class could bring about meaningful change in South Africa. The black working class enjoyed a unique position within the system in that its class condition was not only determined by economic factors but predetermined by skin colour. The BCMA reiterated similar principles in 1980: (1) the recognition of national oppression as a direct result of capitalism and imperialism and, consequently, the conceptualisation of the struggle as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist; (2) the adoption of the theory and practice of scientific socialism in the struggle; (3) the realisation of the black working class, the most oppressed and exploited section of South African society, as the major force in the struggle.[81] However, the theory of scientific socialism does not seem to have been entirely accepted by the internal wing of the BCM. Nonetheless, to the embarrassment of the South African Government, which considered the ANC an extremist organisation, subsequent developments in the 1980s brought about an increasing radicalisation of the BCM and Africanist leaders.

Educational ideas produced by African educationists are bound up with these ideological trends. Depending on whether class is recognised as an analytical category and on the role attributed to the working class, particularly the black working class, in the struggle for liberation, recent educational writing by black South Africans has been vacillating between a Neo-Marxist/Charterist tradition[82] and an Africanist/Nationalist tradition.[83] However, mainstream literature produced by African writers still reflects the considerable influence of Africanist and BCM concepts. This is for example the case of the Council for Black Education and Research and its discussion forums.[84] Very few intellectuals can be said to have engaged in a truly Marxist discourse.[85]

Conclusion

It has been argued that there has been a relatively direct correlation at each historical stage between dominant black politics, mainstream educational literature and ideas

promoted by the African intelligentsia. Early African 'modernisers' within and outside the SANNC/ANC tended to share the political values and educational ideals propagated by the white liberal establishment. In their perspective, these ideals could be entirely and satisfactorily fulfilled within the existing political dispensation.

It was not until the 1950s and the 1960s that the liberal and reformist perspective came under fire within an emerging atmosphere of militant anti-liberalism and commitment to national liberation. Accomodationist strategies were finally defeated. Elements of an orthodox nationalism were incorporated and developed into three main intellectual and ideological traditions with different implications for education: Africanism, BCM and Charterism. They all came under an increasing influence of Marxist theory by which they differently explain the role of class and race in the struggle for national liberation.[86] This is partly due to the failure of orthodox Africanist theories to come to grips with the complexity of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.

Notes

1. The Communist Party regarded South Africa as a capitalist country comparable to Western Europe or North Africa. They considered class analysis as providing a key theoretical basis for African liberation and regarded nationalism as reactionary. This position changed only in the 1930s when the Executive Committee of the Communist International insisted that the CPSA should promote the idea of an independent Black Republic as a step towards a socialist South Africa.
2. See for example the writings by Eric Molobi, Neville Alexander, Bill Nasson, H Vilakazi, L Sebidi, H Mashabela, M Buthelezi and F Chikane.
3. See Udo Dube, 'The concept of adaptation in British colonial Africa', **Comparative Education**, 19 (3), 1983.
4. J T Gumede was a founding member of the ANC, who took part in the drafting of the 1919 constitution of Congress. He participated in the 1920 African Mine Workers strike as an organiser and in 1927 travelled to Brussels to attend the first International Conference of the League Against Imperialism. In June 1927, he became President-General of the ANC, taking over from Reverend Z Mahabane, and later that year he attended the Moscow celebrations of the Russian revolution. He returned to South Africa in 1928 to intensify the struggle against imperialism, which culminated with a serious ideological and class conflict and repudiation of the ANC association with the CPSA. He was made President of the CPSA's League of African Rights in his private capacity while President-General of the ANC. Gumede lost the presidential election in 1930 to Dr P ka I Seme.
5. B Ndobe and E Tonjeni were members of the CPSA from the early 1920s until about 1929. Around the same time they were forced to leave the ANC by the conservative leader of the Cape branch, James M Thaele, self-named 'Professor'. In November 1930, they formed a new organisation called the Independent African National Congress which urged support of African trade unions and promoted the idea of a Black Republic.
6. Moses Kotane joined the ANC in 1928 and the CPSA in 1929. In 1930, he attended the Lenin School in Moscow. In 1939, he was elected General Secretary of the Party, a position he held for many years. In 1946, he was elected to the national executive committee of the ANC.
7. James LaGuma was a trade unionist who joined the CPSA in 1925 and promoted the idea of an independent Black South African Republic as a stage towards workers' and peasants' rule, an idea condoned by the Communist International.
8. Thomas K Ranuga, 'Marxism and Black Nationalism in South Africa (Azania): A comparative and critical analysis of the ideological conflict and consensus between Marxism and Nationalism in the ANC, the PAC and the BCM, 1920-1980' (PhD thesis, Brandeis University, 1982), pp.10-12.
9. Ibid.
10. Constitution of the South African Native National Congress, September 1919, quoted in Thomas Karis & Gwendolen M Carter (eds.), **From**

Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964 (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1972), Vol I, p.77.

11. See M Legassick, 'Ideology and social structure in 20th century South Africa' (Postgraduate Seminar Paper, ICS), p.1. See also M Cross, 'A historical review of education in South Africa: Towards an assessment', **Comparative Education**, 22 (3), 1986, pp.186-193.
12. See the Communist International, 'The South African Question' (Resolution of the ECCI), 15 December 1928.
13. See Edward Roux, **S P Bunting: A Political Biography** (Johannesburg: Published by the author, 1944), p.89. See also Edward Roux, **Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa** (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).
14. See endnote 13.
15. M M Kotane, 'Letter to the Central Committee' in A. Lerumo (pseud. of Michael Harmel), **Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa 1921-1971** (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971), p.133.
16. The CPSA was formed in 1921 on the basis of the 21 points of the Communist International in a unity conference involving the Social Democratic Federation, the Durban Marxist Club, the Cape Communist Party and the Jewish Socialist Society.
17. See for example, Sol Plaatje, **Native Life in South Africa** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982), pp.193-210.
18. The South African Native Press Association, founded in 1904, had a very short existence.
19. Literature produced by Tengo Jabavu includes speeches scattered in different publications, and mainly articles and editorials published in **Imvo Zabantsundu** (1884-1908). Files of this paper were destroyed in an unfortunate accident. Several extracts of his writings appeared in the **Christian Express** and the **Cape Argus**, to which he became a regular correspondent before creating his own newspaper.
20. John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1921) was the pioneer of the African press, an impressive editor and a teacher. He was born on 11 January 1859 and concluded his elementary schooling at the Wesleyan Methodist Mission School of Healdtown. In 1875, he gained the Government Teachers' Certificate of Competency and Honours and became a teacher at Somerset East in 1887. The rest of his life involved: correspondent to the **Cape Argus** (1877-1881); editor of **Isigidimi Samaxosa** and teacher at Lovedale (1881-1883); founder of an evening school at King Williamstown; member of the Native Educational Association (1877-1895); editor of **Imvo Zabantsundu** at Lovedale (1884-1914); provided evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission (1903-1905); member of a deputation to London to fight the Colour Bar clause in the Union Constitution (1909); elected to attend the Universal Races Congress in London (1911); founder of the South African Native College, Fort Hare (February 1916); one of the four Africans in the Native Education Commission of 1919; passed away on Saturday 10 September 1921.

21. D D Jabavu, **John Tengo Jabavu, Editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, 1884-1921** (Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1922), p.69.
22. Ibid, pp.70-71.
23. These reactions appeared in different articles published in the **Cape Mercury**, **Uitenhage Times**, **Daily Dispatch**, **Cape Argus**, and **Cape Times**. Ibid, pp.71-75.
24. Ibid, p.82.
25. Karis & Carter, **From Protest to Challenge ...**, op cit, p.9.
26. Ibid, p.88.
27. Ibid, pp.93-94.
28. **The Christian Express**, 1 November 1917; see also Paul Rich, 'The appeals of Tuskegee: James Henderson, Lovedale, and the fortunes of South African liberalism, 1906-1930', **The International Journal of African Historical Studies**, 20 (2), 1987, pp.271-292.
29. Karis & Carter, op cit, p.93.
30. D D Jabavu concluded his elementary studies at Lovedale Missionary Institution. Having been denied admission to Dale College, King Williamstown, for being a black child, he was sent to a boarding school at Colwin Bay, North Wales in April 1903, where he remained until he entered London University in 1906. He completed his degree in October 1912. He undertook supplementary studies at Birmingham University in 1912-1914. During these two years, he visited Booker T Washington's Industrial and Agricultural School for Black Americans at Tuskegee, Alabama, USA. He returned to South Africa in October 1914 to be appointed, in March 1915, the first lecturer in the newly-created South African Native College, where he taught African languages and later Bantu Studies. During his professional career, Jabavu occupied important positions in African organisations, namely: President, Cape Native Voters' Convention; President, South African Teachers' Federation; Organiser, Ciskei & Transkei Native Chiefs' Convention; Chairman, Non-European Conference; Founder, South African Native Farmers' Congress.
31. See for example E H Brookes, **Native Education in South Africa** (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1930).
32. See his writings and compilations, namely: D D Jabavu, **The Black Problem, Papers and Addresses on Various Native Problems** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution Press, 1920); D D Jabavu, **The Segregation Fallacy and Other Papers** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution Press, 1928); D D Jabavu and Others, **Criticisms of the Native Bills** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution Press, 1935); D D Jabavu, **The Native Teacher out of School**, Paper read at the Natal Teachers' Conference and published for circulation by the Natal Education Department (Natal: Education Department, 1918); D D Jabavu, **'Native disabilities' in South Africa** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Press, 1932); and D D Jabavu and others, **Native views on the Native Bills** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution Press, 1935).
33. D D Jabavu, **The Segregation Fallacy and Other Papers** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution, 1928), p.11.
34. Ibid, p.26.

Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964 (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1972), Vol I, p.77.

11. See M Legassick, 'Ideology and social structure in 20th century South Africa' (Postgraduate Seminar Paper, ICS), p.1. See also M Cross, 'A historical review of education in South Africa: Towards an assessment', **Comparative Education**, 22 (3), 1986, pp.186-193.
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13. See Edward Roux, **S P Bunting: A Political Biography** (Johannesburg: Published by the author, 1944), p.89. See also Edward Roux, **Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa** (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).
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15. M M Kotane, 'Letter to the Central Committee' in A. Lerumo (pseud. of Michael Harmel), **Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa 1921-1971** (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971), p.133.
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21. D D Jabavu, **John Tengo Jabavu, Editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, 1884-1921** (Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1922), p.69.
22. Ibid, pp.70-71.
23. These reactions appeared in different articles published in the **Cape Mercury**, **Uitenhage Times**, **Daily Dispatch**, **Cape Argus**, and **Cape Times**. Ibid, pp.71-75.
24. Ibid, p.82.
25. Karis & Carter, **From Protest to Challenge ...**, op cit, p.9.
26. Ibid, p.88.
27. Ibid, pp.93-94.
28. **The Christian Express**, 1 November 1917; see also Paul Rich, 'The appeals of Tuskegee: James Henderson, Lovedale, and the fortunes of South African liberalism, 1906-1930', **The International Journal of African Historical Studies**, 20 (2), 1987, pp.271-292.
29. Karis & Carter, op cit, p.93.
30. D D Jabavu concluded his elementary studies at Lovedale Missionary Institution. Having been denied admission to Dale College, King Williamstown, for being a black child, he was sent to a boarding school at Colwin Bay, North Wales in April 1903, where he remained until he entered London University in 1906. He completed his degree in October 1912. He undertook supplementary studies at Birmingham University in 1912-1914. During these two years, he visited Booker T Washington's Industrial and Agricultural School for Black Americans at Tuskegee, Alabama, USA. He returned to South Africa in October 1914 to be appointed, in March 1915, the first lecturer in the newly-created South African Native College, where he taught African languages and later Bantu Studies. During his professional career, Jabavu occupied important positions in African organisations, namely: President, Cape Native Voters' Convention; President, South African Teachers' Federation; Organiser, Ciskei & Transkei Native Chiefs' Convention; Chairman, Non-European Conference; Founder, South African Native Farmers' Congress.
31. See for example E H Brookes, **Native Education in South Africa** (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1930).
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33. D D Jabavu, **The Segregation Fallacy and Other Papers** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Institution, 1928), p.11.
34. Ibid, p.26.

35. Ibid, pp.85-86.
36. Ibid, pp.85-86.
37. Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol I, p.66.
38. Rev Richard Zaccheus Mahabane was a Methodist minister who joined the Cape Province branch of the SANNC in 1917. In 1919, he was elected President of the Cape branch of the SANNC and twice became President-General of the ANC, in 1924 and 1937. He was a moderate leader who believed that Christian principles could be effectively invoked in efforts to bring about meaningful change in South Africa.
39. Rev Zaccheus Mahabane, 'The colour bar', Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Convention of the Cape Province Native Congress (Queenstown, May 1920).
40. Rev Z Mahabane, 'The evil nature of the colour bar', Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Convention of the Cape Province Native Congress, 1922.
41. Ranuga, 'Marxism and Black Nationalism ...', op cit, p.105.
42. This policy was justified by Sir Langham Dale, Superintendent- General of Education in 1900, as follows: 'I do not consider it my business to enforce education on all the aborigines, it would ruin South Africa. If I could produce 60,000 educated Tembus or Fingoes tomorrow, what could you do with them? Their education must be gradual' (Education Report for 1900).
43. D D Jabavu, 'Native Unrest', paper read before the Natal Missionary Conference, July 1920, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol I, p.124.
44. D D Jabavu, 'The causes of our discontent', in Francis Wilson and Dominique Perrot (eds.), **Outlook on a Century: South Africa, 1870-1970** (Fort Hare: Lovedale Press, 1973), p.243.
45. See D D Jabavu, 'Booker T Washington, his methods applied to South Africa', **The Black Problem ...**, op cit, pp.25-67. Booker T Washington's ideas were translated into programmes of industrial training for black Americans at Tuskegee Institute, Alabama, USA.
46. 'Policy of the AAC', statement issued by the Executive Committee of the AAC, December 1937, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.62.
47. 'Report of a Deputation from the ANC and Congress of Urban Advisory Boards to the Minister of Native Affairs, May 15-17, 1939', in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.139.
48. Ibid, p.140. See also Rev J A Calatta, 'Presidential Address', Cape African Congress, June 25-27, 1939, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.148.
49. Ibid, p.145.
50. 'Bill of Rights', in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.220.
51. Born in Natal in 1871, son of the Reverend James Dube, one of the first ordained pastors of the American Zulu mission, John L Dube was educated at Inanda and Amanzimtoti Theological School (later Adams College). In 1887, he attended Oberlin College and Rochester, New York, for five years in the USA. Between 1896 and 1899, he returned to the USA for training in industrial education and to raise funds for a Zulu industrial school based on the Tuskegee Institute established by Booker T Washington in Alabama. His other activities included: founder of Inanda Industrial School (1901), the first African-founded educational institution; founder of the Zulu-English weekly newspaper **Ilanga Lase Natal**; present at the Conference of African opponents to the Act of Union in 1909; first President of the South African Native National Congress (African National Congress) until his death in 1946.
52. Quoted by Shula Marks, **The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p.44.
53. I B Tabata, **Education and Political Order in South Africa, 1902-1961** (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1973), p.285.
54. Ibid.
55. See for example the 'Resolutions of the Annual Conference of the African National Congress', May 28-29, 1923, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol I, p.298.
56. A B Xuma, 'Presidential Address', in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol. II, p.173.
57. See PAC, **Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe** (New York: PAC Observer Mission to UN), n.d.
58. See D G S M'Timkulu, 'The African and Education', **Race Relations Journal**, 16 (3), 1959; and L L Sihlali, 'Bantu Education and the African Teacher', **Africa South**, 1 (1), 1956.
59. 'Congress Youth League Manifesto', March 1944, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.300. See also A M Lembede, 'Some Basic Principles of African Nationalism', in **Inyaniso**, February 1945, reproduced in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol III, p.315.
60. Letter on the Youth League, from A P Mda to G M Pitje, August 24, 1948, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.330.
61. 'Basic Policy of Congress Youth League', Manifesto issued by the National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1948, in Karis & Carter, op cit, Vol II, p.323.
62. Manda Seleoane, 'The Nactu Congress: A fore-taste of things to come', **The Azanian Labour Journal**, 1 (2), p.31.
63. Only a group of medical students around Willie Nkomo used Marxism as a tool of analysis.
64. See the 'Freedom Charter' in J A Polley, **The Freedom Charter and the Future** (Cape Town: IDASA, 1988), p.134.
65. Ibid.
66. See 'African National Congress (SA) Education Policy', paper presented to the Seminar on Education, Development and Social Transformation (Gaborone: National Institute of Research, 1982), pp.218-219.
67. Ibid, pp.220-221.
68. Ranuga, op cit, pp.221-224.
69. R M Sobukwe was born in 1924 at Graaff-Reinet in the Cape Province. As a student he won a scholarship to Healdtown where he graduated in 1947. He entered Fort Hare University College where he distinguished himself as an outstanding student and activist. As an activist he became a member of the Fort Hare branch of the ANC Youth League. In 1949, he became the President of the Students' Representative Council and National Secretary of the Youth League. After graduating in 1949, he taught in Standerton in the Eastern Transvaal where he was fired for his involvement in the 1952 Defiance Campaign. In 1954, he took a teaching

post at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. It was here that Sobukwe became involved with the Orlando Africanists — the core of the Africanist movement. His Africanist ideology was nurtured by the ideas of Anton Lembede, Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and others within the Pan-Africanist movement.

70. See Chris More, 'One man's struggle', an interview with Pan Africanist Congress leader Zeph Mothopeng, in **Tribute**, March 1989, pp.13-17. Madzunya was banished to Sibasa in 1962 after serving an 18-month jail term for incitement after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960. He played a leading role in the Alexandra bus boycotts.
71. S Biko was born in December 1946 in Kingwilliamstown, in the Cape Province. He received his early education in the Cape and attended St Francis College in Natal where he matriculated in 1965. He entered the medical school of the Non-European Section of the University of Natal, where he interrupted his studies in 1972 to pursue his political career. He then dedicated the rest of his life to the promotion of Black Consciousness ideology. Biko was murdered in prison during detention by the South African police on 12 September 1977.
72. S Biko, **I Write What I Like** (London: Zed Press, 1979), p.68.
73. Ibid, p.49.
74. Ibid, p.29.
75. Ibid, p.66.
76. Ibid, p.31.
77. Mothopeng puts it this way: 'Socialism is a broad subject. It cannot be tackled from a simplistic premise. There are various strands of socialism, and Karl Marx — the man who propounded theories on socialism — did not prescribe a model for how it should be implemented. He laid the broad principles, philosophies and economic outlines. Socialism depends ultimately on the peculiar circumstances of those who wish to implement those broad principles.' In Chris More, 'One man's struggle', an interview with Zeph Mothopeng, **Tribute**, March 1989, p.14.
78. Cunningham Ngcukana, quoted by Seleoane, 'The Nactu Congress ...', op cit, p.32; see also Es'kia Mphahlele, 'Towards a humanistic philosophy of education', in **The Capricorn Papers**, No. 1, December 1982, pp.19-50; C Manganyi, **Looking through the Key-hole**, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981); and Sam Mabe, **Star Africa News**, 30 July 1987.
79. No Sizwe, **One Nation One Azania** (London: Zed Press, 1979), p.193.
80. Diliza Mji, 'Presidential address to the 8th GCs', in **SASO Bulletin**, 1 (1), June 1977, p.2.
81. Black Consciousness Movement of Azania, 'Policy Statement', **Solidarity**, (4), October 1980, p.4.
82. Es'kia Mphahlele, 'Alternative education as process and goal', in Peter Randall (ed), **Addressing Educational Crisis and Change**, Conference Papers (University of the Witwatersrand: Centre for Continuing Education, September 1987), pp.85-93; **Education for Affirmation**, Conference Papers (Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1988); S Qgubule, 'Education for liberation in South Africa', **South African Outlook**, 112 (1335), September 1982, pp.137-138; SACTU, 'Education for liberation', **Workers Unity** (24), February 1981; Lebamang Sebidi, 'A brick in the process of alternative education' in **Funda Forum**, 12 (1), March 1986; Buti Tlhagale, 'Education, liberation and empowerment', in Peter Randall (ed.), op cit, pp.143-155; and Mokgethi Motlhabi, **Black Resistance to Apartheid: Theory and Practice** (Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1984).
83. N Alexander, **Sow the Wind: Contemporary Speeches** (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1985); E Molobi, 'Academics and the struggle for a democratic education', in **Kenton on the Rocks** (Kenton Conference, November 1987), pp.7-16; and Z Sisulu, 'People's Education for People's Power', Keynote Address, NECC Conference, March 1986, in **Transformation**, (1), 1986.
84. Harry Mashabela, **Black South Africa: A People on the Boil, 1976-1986** (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1986); Es'kia Mphahlele, 'Alternative education as process and goal', in Peter Randall (ed.), op cit, pp.85-93; S Qgubule, op cit, pp.137-138.
85. N Alexander, op cit; N Alexander, 'Nation and ethnicity', **Work in Progress**, (28), August 1983, pp.6-13; John Samuel, 'The education context: Crisis and change', in P Randall (ed.), op cit; Eric Molobi, 'People's education: Learning and teaching under a State of Emergency', 20th Feetham Memorial lecture, (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1986); and Eric Molobi, 'South Africa: Education under apartheid', Keynote Address, Conference on United States Initiatives for the Education and Training of South Africans and Namibians, Michigan State University, 23 November 1986.
86. Ranuga, op cit, p.3.

Chapter 3

Youth Culture and Resistance in South African Education: A Theoretical Review

Introduction

During the last decade we have seen a proliferation of literature attempting to address the educational crisis and the process of change in black education. The common themes include resistance, 'alternative education' and People's Education. A connecting thread in much of this literature is the assumption that youth in general and school children in particular have been the main actors in initiating either the process of resistance or the search for alternatives in education.

However, unlike in Britain and the USA, analyses of youth movements in South Africa have not been accompanied by a systematic critical examination of the prevailing theoretical models. Consequently, while traditional theories of youth behaviour have tended to trivialise and devalue important youth cultural forms, the emerging revisionist rhetoric has not escaped the tendency to romanticise some of these forms.[1]

For example, while many SA studies claim that large numbers of children who are products of Bantu Education are demonstrating attitudes and patterns of behaviour that are contrary to official expectations and can thus be interpreted as counter-hegemonic, the scope, nature and complexity of wider

youth practices, and what their short- and long-term effects will be, have been overlooked. For example, certain forms which are unproblematically explained in terms of 'resistance' and 'struggle' might have unexpected effects in the long run once the political crisis has been resolved. This fundamental problem in the history of educational struggles in South Africa comes not merely from the somewhat *triumphalist* form of revisionist literature in education, but, above all, from the unreflective manner in which its alternative analytical models have been developed and used.[2] Of relative importance is also the fact that the commitment to social emancipation and justice, the sense of sympathy, support and solidarity, can blind one to the reality and make one see only the idealised version of it.[3]

This chapter attempts to draw attention to the need for theoretical criticism, still lacking in youth studies in South Africa. As Bragança and Depelchin have pointed out, 'it is at times necessary to backtrack and question knowledge that is considered definitive'.[4] It should be seen as a modest foray into major selected theoretical items, the value of which lies in showing that it is not only possible, but necessary, to review, re-analyse and reconceptualise the existing accounts of youth and student struggles. The aim is to improve our analytical tools and also better understand the contradictions that are emerging today. It is necessary to raise new questions. This should be done, however, in a manner that encourages a study of the history and sociology of youth struggles, not as an unchangeable text, but as a complex, contradictory and uneven process.

The chapter will involve three main steps. First, it will critically examine the theoretical and empirical traditions that have informed the study of youth resistance and delinquent subcultures in Western settings. It will seek to demonstrate that overemphasis by traditional Western literature on mass culture, generational conflict, adolescence and cultural deprivation theories, without adequate reference to the class and gender basis of youth cultures, tended to underrate these cultural forms. Second, an attempt will be made to measure the extent to which these theories have influenced debates on

youth culture and student movements in South Africa. This will necessarily involve decoding and dismantling the prejudice and depersonalising imagery that surrounds the study of this particular group from both the liberal and radical points of view. It will be argued that a crude class analysis without an adequate examination of the mediating role played by race, ethnicity, gender and the consciousness of African national oppression has been a major limitation in many South African youth analyses. This is perhaps part of the rationale of Masilela in calling for 'an "epistemological break" between our conception of cultural studies and the British conception, which seems to have dominated our historical imagination'.[5] Third, an attempt will then be made to offer a theoretical basis for an alternative framework in the conceptualisation of youth subcultures in South Africa.

Western Literature

One can identify four main traditions in the conceptualisation of youth culture in Western literature: (1) mass-culture and anomie theories; (2) adolescence and generation-conflict theories; (3) deprivation theories; and (4) revisionist theories with two main strands — structuralist and culturalist theories.

For sociologists and historians of mass society in the past century, vital elements of social control were lost, and the least socialised working-class youngsters were drawn into mass action, once the working classes were inducted into mass culture.[6] Their main contention is that 'the combined forces of mass production, mass consumption, mass communication and mass democracy tend to undermine traditional values and to dissolve the individual's moral strength and the community's social purpose in an undifferentiated and de-socialised mass'.[7] The youth, particularly the working-class youth, came to be seen as the group most vulnerable to the debilitating effects of a mass society. As long as these processes affected only the middle classes, they argued, personal behaviour did not deteriorate. The middle classes had for a long time demanded inhibition and self-discipline in their children. Critics within this school of thought tended to approach working-class youth

using concepts closely related to Durkheim's and Merton's concepts of anomie, which stress atomisation and consequent disintegration of moral control.[8] The condition of youth normlessness, restlessness and anti-social behaviour arises when disruption of the social order occurs and the collective social order ('collective conscience') fails to control individual aspirations.[9] Under these circumstances, it is argued, youth develop forms of behaviour characterised by psychological imbalance, instability, conformity, escapist fantasy and violence — which are referred to as characteristic of its culture. Youth culture is thus explained in terms of youth insecurity, uncertainty, purposelessness, aimlessness, excitability, alienation and confusion.

However, Humphries, Willis and Corrigan have convincingly demonstrated that much of the behaviour of working-class youth that is conventionally stigmatised as antisocial can alternatively be conceptualised as resistance to social contradictions such as the unemployment and poverty experienced in capitalist societies and, to some extent, can be viewed as an indictment of oppressive institutions.[10] They emphasise that theories of mass society disguise political problems of class inequality and exploitation by their use of the depoliticised concepts of the individual as opposed to the masses and of the masses as opposed to the elite, whose specificity is defined in cultural terms.[11] Mungham and Pearson share the same opinion, and blame schooling for manufacturing delinquency.[12]

Drawing on the concept of 'adolescence', some critics such as Schwendinger tend to explain the alleged 'delinquent' manifestations of youth subcultures as an expression of the emotional disturbance, identity crisis and moral conflict experienced by youngsters at adolescent age. They regard adolescence as a transitional stage in individual development where youth culture loses its class- and context-specific character and constitutes or becomes conflated with a universal youth culture. What is questionable in these psychological theories is the assumption that the transition from childhood to adulthood involves a universal experience characterised by the alleged classlessness of youth subcultures

and their isolation from parent cultures.[13] While adolescent theories may correspond to some extent to middle-class cultures, characterised by individualistic values and a prolonged dependency on parents, they have little explanatory power when applied to working-class youth, typified by group solidarity and a rapid transition from childhood to adulthood.[14] They reduce explanations that require sociological and historical treatment to biological and psychological issues. They thus fail to situate behaviour in the broader class context of poverty, inequality and exploitation.

Similarly, generational conflict explanations argue that the convergence of age, status, generation and educational achievements produce a classless adolescent culture and replace class as the basis of social stratification.[15] The implication is that generational consciousness and conflict is given a far more important role than class consciousness and conflict in the shaping of youth culture, a view which masks class inequalities and mystifies the class variations of youth subcultures.[16] Given this starting point, generational conflict explanations have tended to ignore the potential of class interpretation of youth resistance and have seen little connection between generational conflict and class conflict. They have seen shared age and shared membership of a particular generation as far more potent factors than class position in the development of a common consciousness and youth subculturalisation. Resistance is thus reduced to an expression of generational conflict between youth and adults.[17]

Cultural deprivation theory traces the origins of deprivation to faulty family socialisation processes such as authoritarian patterns of thought and education, the erratic and inconsistent application of discipline, restricted conceptual and linguistic codes and low expectations of achievement, all of which contribute to a culture of poverty and reproduce the cycle of deprivation and inequality. Briefly, delinquent cultural forms such as violence, brutality and intolerance are attributed to working-class cultural and intellectual inferiority and not to the social system or bourgeois institutions that shape them. Working-class cultural dynamics are the cause and not simply

the expression of deprivation. Against this tradition is the functionalist thesis which attributes delinquent behaviour to the breakdown of institutional and family mechanisms of control.[18]

The revisionist tradition involves three main developments: (1) French and British Althusserian structuralism; (2) British culturalism; and (3) recent American theories of reproduction and resistance. The structuralist tradition concentrated on theories of 'modes of production', 'social formation', the use of the 'base-superstructure' model and the concept of 'over-determination'.[19] Culturalism refined Gramsci's cultural categories of 'commonsense' and 'hegemony', and combines them with the notion of 'human agency'.[20] The main lines of divergence between the two paradigms flow, as Hall has indicated, from 'the conception of "men" as bearers of the structures that speak and place them, rather than as active agents in the making of their own history: the emphasis on a structural rather than a historical "logic"; ... the recasting of history as a march of the structures ... the structuralist "machine"'.[21] Its main thrust is the reminder that 'unless the dialectic is taken into account, in any particular analysis, between both halves of the proposition — that 'men make history ... on the basis of conditions which are not of their making' — the result will inevitably be a naive humanism with subsequent voluntarist and populist political practice'.[22] Structuralism also allows us to think of the relations of a structure on the basis of something other than mere relationships between people; it privileges the necessity of abstraction as the instrument of thought through which relations are appropriated. Its conception of 'the whole' or 'totality' is crucial in social analysis. On the other hand, culturalism adds a new dimension by its emphasis on the relative autonomy of culture and ideology in relation to economic and political processes, secured by the mediating role of human agency. It introduces a dimension of agency, contestation and resistance into discussions of reproduction while arguing that culture, ideology and politics are not reducible to simple expression of material conditions or structures.

Building on Althusser, Gramsci, Thompson and Bourdieu's cultural analyses, American theorists of cultural reproduction and resistance have been seeking a more balanced approach between structuralist and culturalist traditions.[23]

Concerning youth culture, revisionist critics in Britain and USA have concentrated on the issue of the class basis of youth culture. They have interpreted 'delinquent' youth subcultures within a class, as opposed to a pathological framework.[24] These, they argue, can broadly be reformulated as effects rather factors of deprivation. The so-called typically working-class values, such as roughness and the prizing of immediate gratification as opposed to long-term planning, can be viewed as rational adaptations to the harsh and uncertain living and working conditions imposed by capitalist exploitation. Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts suggest a symbiosis of Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' and the Althusserian notion of 'articulation' to explain the dynamics between hegemonic cultures and subordinate working-class cultures.[25] They argue that a hegemonic cultural order operates not by false ideas or perceptions but by incorporating the subordinate class in the key institutions and structures that support the social authority of the dominant class. Further, the subordinate class experiences or lives its subordination in these structures and relations. Subordination is secured when the dominant class succeeds in imposing its hegemony by weakening, destroying, displacing or incorporating alternative institutions of defence and resistance built up by subordinate classes. The terrain on which this hegemony is won, worked for or lost is the terrain of the superstructures, the institutions of civil society and the state, which Althusser and Poulantzas called 'ideological state apparatuses'. The dominant culture represents itself as *the* culture, and tries to define and contain all other cultures within its inclusive range. Hegemonic cultures, however, are never free to reproduce and amend themselves without contradiction and resistance. A crisis in the dominant culture opens room for opposition, resistance and cultural upheavals which can take different forms and lead to a new hegemonic order.[26]

Of particular importance are the attempts made by Willis

to formulate a methodological and analytical base for cultural studies within education, particularly the role of cultural processes within school. Willis places the oppositional school culture in the context of both the wider shopfloor culture or working-class culture which youths share with their parents and the institutional structure of the school. He argues that the forms of opposition within the school are shaped by the contradictory pressures to which these give rise.[27]

South African Literature

In the course of colonial history, ethnographers tended to argue that African youth were unable to develop distinctive cultural traditions because of the 'rigidity' of African traditional institutions.[28] Similar arguments have also been shared by Africanist historiographers since the late 1950s.[29] Their writings concentrate on rites of initiation, a means by which children are integrated into adulthood and parent 'traditional' cultures, except where significant pockets of working-class people have developed as in Rhodesia and South Africa. Underlying their arguments is the assumption that the existence of strong bonds between adults and youth and of rigid mechanisms of youth upbringing within African cultures provided no room for distinctive cultural expressions. Theoretically, there is more ethnographic recording than a coherent conceptualisation of African cultural forms.

Writers like Ranger and Isaacman have with little success attempted to analyse the role played by youth in the early resistance movements, the latter using Hobsbawm's notion of 'social bandit'.[30] However, 'social banditry' as a form of political culture or 'delinquency' is interpreted neither as a response to increasing colonial disruption nor as a phenomenon determined by the dynamics of traditional society, but as positive pathological behaviour appropriated by the resistance movement. Here again the paucity of theory has left important issues obscure. The thrust remains in the writers' concern with the need to dismantle colonial prejudices and the depersonalising imagery that surrounds colonial accounts of African cultures.

In respect of more recent developments, a parallel seems to exist between European formulations of mass society and deprivation theories, and some interpretations of youth culture in South Africa, where youth resistance has very often been explained in terms of: (1) aimless and gratuitous violence; (2) erosion of traditional authority, community and family control; (3) imitation of violent behaviour transmitted by mass media; (4) social disorganisation involving the breakdown of 'civilised' behaviour; (5) communist onslaught; (6) influence of violent gangs in slum Zambezi; and so forth.[31]

The fact that increasing numbers of social scientists, particularly psychologists and sociologists, are coming into regular contact with people affected by political violence, including youth, at the level of legal advice and clinical practice has created a fertile climate for debate on youth issues. Important theoretical developments have taken place in South African psychological research. These are well captured by Swartz, Gibson and Swartz in their account of the development of progressive psychology in South Africa.[32] Two conflicting trends can be distinguished here: (1) work informed by the discourse of stress and (2) work informed by the discourse of political psychopathology. The first trend describes for example the reactions of children to detention in terms of a range of symptoms common to pre-schoolers under stress using a typically positivist approach.[33] Psychopathological disorders of the individual are construed as natural responses to stress. As Swartz et al have pointed out, 'the very model being employed encourages the psychologist to study political detention and its effects as if they were somehow separate from the broader political structures out of which both the ex-detainee and the detention itself emerge'.[34] Related to this is also the argument that 'Westernisation', urbanisation and 'socio-cultural transition' are inherently pathogenic for black South Africans.[35]

Another trend has emerged among a growing group of self-named 'progressive psychologists' whose work has a special focus on blacks as passive, innocent and vulnerable 'victims of violence' who suffer the psychological effects of violence. The child is portrayed either as passive in the face of

social forces or as an innocent victim of uncontrollable forces.[36] This commitment to understanding individual problems in the light of the surrounding social forces is implicit in what can be termed the main mouthpiece of this discourse, the journal *Psychology and Society*. Emerging from this school is also a group of psychologists who, though accepting the parameters of mainstream psychology as a discipline, claim to be in line with what they term the 'discourse of the struggle'. Their main thrust lies in the assumption that issues concerning power and powerlessness are central to understanding the relationship between psychology and political violence in South Africa.[37] However to date this trend has not made any significant impact. The problem with both approaches is the same as that faced by the psychological theories reviewed above. They tend to contradict and conceal issues that require sociological treatment, for example the role of children as active participants in what has come to be known as 'the struggle'. Without denying the empirical basis which supports some of their allegations, the problem is that they preclude any possibility of class conflict, or class-mediated resistance, concealing the meaning, creativity and the counter-hegemonic nature of youth subcultures.

Three main approaches have dominated revisionist literature in recent years. The first approach concentrates on internal economic structures within specific social formations.[38] The second tradition is more concerned with relations between internal and external economic features.[39] These two traditions have in common the fact that they take economic relations and structures as having an overwhelmingly determining effect on the social structures of such formations.[40] The third tradition, which Hall calls 'sociological', represents a shift from the 'economic' to social relations and relations between different racial, ethnic and cultural groups. Its general feature is the fact that it stresses the autonomy, the non-reductiveness, of race and ethnicity as social factors.[41] Rex's work represents an important attempt to analyse race and class phenomena within a Weberian framework and a radical non-conflict model.[42]

There are also those who, like Wolpe, have devoted much of

their attention to the concept of *articulation* and the '*dissolution/conservation*' thesis. As Wolpe has pointed out, this thesis assumes that where capitalism develops by its means of articulation with non-capitalist modes, the mode of political domination and the content of legitimating ideologies assume racial, ethnic and cultural forms.[43] Hall suggests that the social formation itself can be analysed as an 'articulated hierarchy' of different social elements.[44] Depending on the nature of this articulation, capitalist forces can undermine the domestic sector, driving peasants into urban slums as underemployed labourers, who breed working-class and lumpen cultures, while promoting a small bureaucratic elite pursuing typical colonial middle-class cultures.[45] A good example are the symbols and culture around nightclubs, casinos, hotels and resorts that became hotbeds of crime, corruption and bribery. Here colonial behaviour was copied. Fanon's thinking was devoted to the cultural dilemma faced by this elite.[46] However this partial restructuring of the domestic sector is of necessity based on the preservation of pre-capitalist economic and cultural forms.

The theoretical implications of the 'dissolution/conservation' thesis for the analysis of youth culture are obvious. It assumes that, contrary to European capitalist countries, capital in Third World countries appears to have conserved pre-capitalist productive units such as the tribal group, family farm and respective social relations, which prevent the proliferation of youth delinquent subcultures.

So long as pre-capitalist modes of production survive, they restrict the recomposition of class relationships and reabsorb part of the labour force, including unemployed youth, thrown off by capital. They thus provide reintegration of unemployed youth into traditional relationships that prevent the proliferation of youth delinquent behaviour.[47] This reintegration into communal relationships exerts traditional controls that support lawful behaviour and impede the alienation of youth and the development of their particular subcultures. As such, youth subcultures are absorbed into parent/family cultures without being able to develop an autonomous expression. Hebdige mentions the fact that, in

some cases, African traditions were suppressed by the authorities (the Church, the colonial and even 'post-colonial' governments). However, these outlawed traditions re-emerged in the 1960s with an almost fanatic celebration of Negritude, a wide social movement for a return to African origins.[48]

In South Africa, the 'economic' fever of the 1970s has been superseded by the advent of the 'social history' tradition which focuses on the complexity of the superstructural features of South African society.[49] The most outstanding feature of this school is the development of 'peoples' history', which has had an increasing impact in the main fields of social inquiry, particularly history, sociology, political sciences and educational studies. The on-going crisis in education precipitated by the tragedy of Soweto in 1976 culminated in a nationwide mobilisation of the mass democratic movement. Out of this movement emerged the call for 'People's education for people's power' in 1986 as a counter to Apartheid education and a vision for an alternative education system. This was followed by a call for 'people's history' in 1987.

People's history is essentially anti-apartheid history, i.e. history written explicitly as a counter to the racist and elitist stereotypes and perversions that have characterised the history propagated, especially in government schools. It is 'popular' history in that 'it deliberately seeks to bring the black underclasses into South African history, and at the same time is written primarily for a readership drawn from those classes'.[50] People's history is thus an alternative to the perspective of the 'Great Man' approach to history. It is the history of the 'ordinary people', the oppressed and exploited masses, viewed not as simple objects of a particular intellectual activity but as active subjects of the very same activity. However, herein lies the main problem with the people's history perspective in that it tends to overemphasise and sometimes reify the 'lived experience' at the expense of a systematic theoretical abstraction. Most importantly, the people's history perspective relies on the popular discourse of South African history, which, in turn, tends to obscure class and align analysis primarily in terms of 'national' (ethnic) or

racial divides. How have these developments informed our thinking about youth culture?

Literature dealing with black youth in South Africa can be grouped in four main categories: (1) the nationalist/conservative perspective, (2) the liberal perspective, (3) radical Africanist and Black Consciousness perspectives, and (4) the neo-Marxist perspective.[51]

The nationalist/conservative perspective is characterised by an emphasis on traditional Afrikaner culture, Christian-National ideals and extreme white-centredness. Where it deals with issues concerning black youth, it concentrates almost exclusively on those aspects perceived as of 'national interest' such as 'riots', 'terrorism' and 'black against black violence' or 'tribal clashes' to use its conventional terminology. 'Terrorism' and 'riots' are generally explained as a result of an 'increasing animosity towards South Africa' and of the 'infiltration of undesirable elements' amongst youth or the manipulation of youth by 'political agitators'.[52] Cultural roots are traced to explain the violent nature of all these forms of behaviour. Cloete for example argues that the culturally inspired view of violence still exists in modern black communities. He goes on to say that 'the idea that violent action is inadmissible is not yet internalised, and many members of these communities still regard it as an acceptable form of behaviour'.[53]

Liberal literature has little theoretical value and provides descriptive and factual accounts of the Black Consciousness Movement, the 1976 Soweto Uprising and subsequent school boycotts within a framework of a consensus model.[54]

Radical Africanist and Black Consciousness orientated perspectives reflect the increasing radicalisation of black intelligentsia which dominates this form of thinking. The differences between the Africanist and the Black Consciousness perspectives are minimal and essentially political. The Black Consciousness writers are informed by their belief that racism by whites is the cause of South Africa's problems and they oppose the participation by whites side by side with blacks in the liberation struggle. The Africanists are driven by a common 'state of mind', their commitment to the

African continent, societies and cultures. The two traditions do not seem to be colour-blind though the Africanists have assumed a more restrained attitude and have focused on the issue of national oppression.

The Neo-Marxist perspective has generally been informed by the revisionist theories discussed above. Its main thrust is the introduction of class and gender as necessary analytical categories within a framework of social conflict in analysing cultural forms. Its main problem has been the difficulty in establishing the balance between these categories and other important sociological categories such as race and ethnicity within the specificity of the South African context. Literature under this category focuses on the initiatives undertaken by schoolchildren in implementing forms of alternative education ranging from cultural activities and informal education to People's Education. It stresses the need to recognise the power of children in determining or conditioning the course of state policy and social process in South Africa.[55] Seekings' work is particularly important for an understanding of the role of the political economy in the diversification of political consciousness. Also of particular importance to the study of youth culture is a set of literature within the conflict model which attempts an alternative conceptualisation of workers' struggles and student movement in terms of culture and subcultures.[56]

Perhaps the most remarkable is the almost complete inability of earlier works to locate cultural phenomena in the context of race and class relationships and the social stratification determined by the changing South African political economy. Erlman considers that Coplan was one of the first researchers to show interest in African working-class culture when he initiated his research in South Africa on 17 June 1976. He points out however that in the decade following Coplan's fieldwork, revisionist historiography expanded and consolidated itself, and 'whatever merits Coplan's book may have as one of the first attempts to explore the complex issues of class and culture in South African black performing arts, they are impaired by his failure to incorporate the current debates on ideology and class cultures'.[57] Frankel's

conceptualisations of African political culture in South Africa cannot escape this charge either.[58]

Revisionist historiography of class cultures gained momentum with works by Moss, Lunn, Lodge, Bozzoli, Couzens, La Hausse, Sitas and in particular Bonner. A common concern in this set of literature is the need to fill the vast space between the broad processes of proletarianisation and the different cultural expressions including organised political action.

Some literature has undertaken the task of tracing the 'contours of community, class and culture'.[59] For example, Bonner argues that a distinctive black urban culture on the Rand seems to have been distilled out of a diversity of sources in the second decade of the 20th century, involving cultural elements from the Afrikaans, Malay, 'coloured', Afro-American, British missionary and Oorlams communities. He distinguishes three main sources: (1) the educated Christian black middle class; (2) the Cape 'coloured' and Oorlams community; and (3) the vast proletarian mass that laboured in the mine shafts, the kitchens and stores, particularly the section of these migrants that failed to remain anchored in either homestead or compound and became cultural brokers and innovators in the towns.[60] The exchange of cultural experiences between these groups, fermented by external influences from the neighbouring countries and Afro-American elements, was behind the creation of the black urban cultures. Bonner concentrates on working-class cultures which seem to incorporate street gang cultures. Middle-class cultures are somewhat neglected or remain as simple sources of the black urban culture — this can be possibly justified by the limited significance of this social stratum in the 1940s and 1950s, the period dealt with in his work. In general his work points to a close relationship — which should not be assumed unproblematically — between, on the hand, the process of class stratification and class subculturalisation and, on the other, parent class cultures and youth subcultures. What remains obscure is the role played by race in the process. What emerges in his work is an idea of the process of acculturation and subculturalisation as a 'melting-pot' where

class rather than ethnicity and race assume dominance. Nonetheless, Bonner's contribution represents an important innovation in South African cultural studies.

Attempting specifically to reconstruct the history and sociology of youth subcultures which focus on resistance subculture are the writings by Nkomo, Glaser and, most importantly, Bundy.[61] While Nkomo correctly identifies the shaping of a student resistance culture that contradicts the official government policy of Bantu Education, he fails to define adequately the interplay of forces which led to its emergence. He establishes a causal relationship between Bantu Education and youth resistance culture. To consider Bantu Education as the sole determinant of youth resistance subculture in South Africa is too simplistic. The implications of this approach will be discussed later. Bundy's work is a refreshing and convincing account of youth resistance culture. Drawing from important theoretical literature on resistance, particularly from Manheim, Maravall, Moller and Hobsbawm, he identifies three main 'objective' factors that might have determined the militant political action of youth in South Africa: (1) a self-conscious generational unit with its own counter ideology; (2) demographic pressure determined by the large proportion of youth in the total population; and (3) the over-production of intellectuals with no or little opportunity of employment. Exacerbating the situation were also the constraints imposed by the nature of the South African educational system: the glaring defects of black education, the very substantial expansion of black schooling over the past couple of decades and the issue of unemployment amongst school leavers. All these factors in combination explain why education in South Africa has become the centre of social conflict and why the youth has played the role it has in the process.

Appraisal

Theories of youth and youth culture in South Africa are still incipient and circumscribed to a limited circle of intellectuals. In this section I shall discuss those theoretical elements which in my opinion represent a major contribution for an understanding of the issue of youth culture in South Africa.

These are: (1) Seekings' contention that the changing political economy has some bearing on the diverging forms of political action or culture; (2) Nkomo's assumption that the complex and contradictory dynamics in education have played a crucial role in the shaping of youth resistance culture; (3) Bonner's use of a class approach to understand the dialogue between black working-class cultures and the dominant culture; and (4) Bundy's concept of 'generational unit' in youth subculturalisation. From these, one can speculate that the increasing alienation from the prevailing economic, political and social structure has produced a wide variety of cultural responses amongst South African black urban youth. The expression of these responses ranges from disaffection from school work, classroom disobedience, school boycotts, 'stayaways' and absenteeism to social crime and street-gang life, activities that oral and documentary evidence suggest have occurred with some continuity during the past two decades. All these activities constitute the basis of three main forms of black youth subculturisation: (1) lumpen and unemployed youth delinquent and semi-delinquent subcultures; (2) middle-class cultural rebellion and reformist movements; and (3) working-class students and youth resistance culture, activism and political militancy. Each of these forms of youth sub-culturisation represents a peculiar and complex response to three main forms of social control: (1) attempts to inculcate conformist modes of behaviour, passivity, psychological and cultural pre-disposition to accept the apartheid oppressive system through various agencies of control, particularly Bantu Education; (2) common past historical experience under apartheid; (3) broad political, economic and social circumstances, particularly the changing forms of social control.

This stratification sometimes appears blurred because of the dominant role played by *race* in mediating social relations. Very often some sections of middle-class youth do experience similar living conditions in the townships to those of working-class youth and lumpen youth. Similarities are strong in their lifestyles, aesthetics and symbols — in the dress, dance,

music, forms of interaction and the whole rhetoric of style. Like their parents, black youths seem to float easily from one class or cultural category to another. This is recognised by Glaser who argues that class analysis does not provide an explanation of the divisions which existed among the urban African youth on the Rand in the late 1940s and 1950s.[62] However, in many cases, particularly in Soweto, the situation has changed considerably, the contours of these class strata have increasingly crystallised and their different social worlds are more distinguishable. One can speculate that recent state initiatives in the rehabilitation of black townships is to a large extent a clear response to these trends in the social structure. Indeed, the state seems to be committed to consolidating this process by promoting distinct middle-class townships while improving job and economic opportunities for this class stratum. Although this is still an area to be researched there is no doubt that recent state housing policy in Soweto has stimulated the accelerated development of (relatively) elite residential areas such as 'Selection Park' (in Pimville), 'Prestige Park' (in Diepkloof) and Protea North, a development which is being encouraged countrywide.[63] This strategy has militated against the emergence of a strong Soweto- wide sense of a (working-class) 'community', which has developed in poorer townships on the East Rand and Eastern Cape.

The place of *race* as an analytical tool for our understanding of culture and youth culture should therefore surely be restored, but not at the expense of other factors such as class and gender. To my knowledge, there is no text that attempts to analyse objectively the content, impact and limits of race as well as class and gender in shaping a particular cultural expression without falling into one or another form of reductionism, that is, into giving primacy to one factor over another. This leads to an oversimplification of the complex cultural reality in South Africa.

As far as working-class youth resistance cultures are concerned, Nkomo has suggested that Bantu Education has spawned a 'culture' of its own that contradicts Government expectations and challenges the apartheid education system countrywide.[64] This deserves applause in so far as it shows

that dynamics in education and the contradictory interplay of educational forces can certainly produce unexpected results. However, while some of these seem to be linked to the emergence of a youth resistance culture, the development of this culture and its complex expression are only comprehensible when related to the wider political economy of the South African capitalist system. No clear-cut causal relationship can be adequately established between Bantu Education and youth resistance culture.

The behaviour that, I contend, can be regarded as resistance is for example persistent rule-breaking at school, opposition to township authorities and attempts to establish forms of alternative education, and social and political institutions, in the townships. The most dramatic manifestation of working-class youth resistance has been the school boycott and the resistance to Bantu Education. This form of pupil protest is a collective response to the schooling system characterised by demonstrations and meetings to enlist both the support of children in neighbouring/regional schools and parental sympathy, and to encourage solidarity. Generally it involves a widespread use of pupil pickets, banners and street marches and demonstrations, stone-throwing, cultural activities and programmes of political awareness including forms of alternative education.

Different interpretations have been given to school boycotts such as (1) inadequate adult control and guidance; (2) manipulation by political leaders; (3) the effects of sensational press reports; and (4) the expression of youth adolescent neurosis. My contention is that resistance in the classroom and school boycotts can properly be understood only when situated within the broader social context of the structure and aims of Bantu Education and related to hegemonic culture and political eco-nomy.

Delinquent cultures range from more organised and established gangsterism to sporadic youth street gangs rooted in the breakdown of the family or parental base and the inaccessibility of economic opportunities. Why are gangs formed? What holds them together? How can they be identified against their proletarian background? These are

fundamental questions that have been addressed by Bonner and Glaser and, in particular, by Don Pinnock in his important study on street gangs and state control in Cape Town.[65] Pinnock develops an interesting argument that, in many aspects, can be generalised to the rest of the country. For him, ganging is primarily a 'survival technique' in response to the socio-economic system which reproduces poverty.[66] With the Group Areas relocations, the poor were sealed off in single-class townships 'with no one to buy their labour or products', with no access to income opportunities.[67] Only gang functions could offer them a substitute for what society had failed to give. They represented an attempt to resolve the contradictions which remain unresolved in the parent culture, such as unemployment and poverty, or to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture, such as family care and the solidarities of the traditional neighbourhood destroyed by Group Areas.[68] Bonner also argues that the principal factors in the breeding of juvenile delinquents and youth gangs in the 1950s were the shortage of schools, the absence of employment opportunities for youth, the grinding poverty of black urban life, and the general instability of family life.[69]

In their expression street-gang cultures derive to some extent from parent cultures, which value physical strength and tolerate aggression, and offer black youth the opportunity to sublimate their feelings of hunger, failure and insignificance and to assert a proud and rebellious identity through which members can feel masters of their own destiny. Their focal concerns involve the assertion of masculinity, a desire to create immediate excitement, and the exploitation of any opportunity to supplement a meagre diet and income. Their activities include law-breaking, burglary, rape, drugs and alcohol abuse, and violent behaviour. These aspects characterised the wave of gangsterism which led to a temporary closure of schools in the township of Diepkloof in Soweto in 1989. Generally, subcultural styles which hold them together are drawn from the family and the neighbourhood, and from the symbol systems sponsored by the entertainment industry.[70] Elements of the dominant culture are also common, particularly its

external symbols of wealth such as the 'leather jackets' and luxurious cars displayed by the 'jackrollers'.

'Delinquency' is however a notion which does not entirely do justice to the complex manifestations of street gang culture. For this purpose, Humphries' concept of 'social crime' appears to be a valuable complementary tool.[71] It encompasses 'the innumerable minor crimes against property committed by black youth that are condoned by large sections of both the youth and parent cultures as legitimate, despite their illegality, and justified by extreme poverty and the working-class family's struggle for survival'.[72]

Similarly some actions of youth gangs have clearly assumed a political character. Bonner indicates that in the 1950s youth gangs were street-wise, anti-social and suspicious but that they represented a potentially powerful resource for any aspiring political leader and were suspected by white officialdom of being the tools of political 'agitators'.[73] He goes on to say that youth gang culture was 'also a vital resource in wider political struggles presenting both opportunities and constraints to political action'.[74]

However, the political role of gang elements is very limited. Pinnock has correctly indicated that gang activities 'are obviously not a recipe for winning popular hegemony' and perhaps 'not even part of resistance'.[75] Gangs easily enter into agreements with the police, and their presence can be disruptive for mass events held at weekends or at night. During the gang invasion of schools in Diepkloof in 1989, there were indications that some 'jackrollers' — operating within the mass democratic movement — were involved in a systematic elimination of activists.[76] Some of these are well-known as 'comtsotsis' — gangs who have joined the resistance movement since the 1976 school crisis but have not been able to assimilate the political discipline prevailing amongst the 'comrades'. The presence of a gang culture within the resistance movement has meant uncontrolled and counterproductive military adventurism of a terrorist kind. In this sense, as Pinnock has pointed out, the gangs are reactionary.[77]

A limited but important trend is characterised by the tolerance by the middle-class youth of the hegemonic culture,

and their increasing political marginalisation from working-class political cultures. Seekings says that in Soweto for example many people in this category are widely 'accused of being "snobs", who have changed their attitudes so drastically that they no longer seem part of the community ... "they have lost all the warmth one never misses elsewhere in Soweto" ... "they only know each other by the posh cars they drive" ... though they see themselves "as still swimming in the same waters with every other black"'.[78] One could perhaps see the values and new forms of behaviour brought to the township life by 'open' school pupils within this context. These children are accused of alienating themselves from their African traditions — language, values and customs.[79] The size and social weight of this stratum has become increasingly significant.[80] However, middle-class youth subcultures seem to be overdetermined by the increasing activism and militancy of working-class youth.

Conclusion

Given the complexity of the South African society, class, race, language, gender and generation together generate specific focal concerns which allow us to develop the concept of youth culture. This cannot simply be defined in terms of age. It is a complex combination of several cultural forms and different age groups, related to the class position of those in them and their common historical experience of racial and national oppression under the apartheid system. Complementing these broader categories are also the social meanings of notions such as township life, community, neighbourhood and 'gang territory'.

However, youth culture does express itself as a coherent, harmonious and self-perpetuating system. It is a conglomerate or aggregate of a polarised variety of socially-identifiable practices and identities determined by particular interests, patterns of life and 'survival' tactics within various groups of youth. To put it differently, youth culture is made up of *youth subcultures*. These are sub-sets of the larger cultural configurations sometimes called '*parent cultures*', e.g. the

urban working-class culture, the Zulu military culture and so forth. The membership of a subculture necessarily involves membership of a parent culture. A subculture may be an extension of, or in opposition to, the parent culture. This means that social groups, particularly youth, draw on various cultural traditions, often recasting particular patterns to meet needs, in their responses to changing historical situations. A subculture may even form its own sub-world. Subcultures exist where there is some form of organised and recognised constellation of values, behaviour and action, which are responded to as different from the prevailing sets of norms and value systems.[81]

South Africa is a *limit case* where the salience of racial, gender and ethnic features cannot for a moment be denied and where the process of race polarisation and its concomitant cultural implications must not be ignored in analysing culture. What most of the revisionist writings forget is, as Brake has pointed out, that 'for black people their primary identity, the way in which they are reacted to, and the way in which they act upon the world is mediated by their colour, and the oppression that it brings, structurally, politically, psychologically and economically'.[82] Racism is the common experience they are subject to. It is race which defines them, which acts against them, and which unites them and, in a sense, helps to mould their forms of behaviour, values and ideals. Their class position subscribes their economic position, but race is the subjectivity in which their class position is lived, and shapes their relation to the world. Race remains, thus, an important sociological category. However, this does not rule out the importance of class and gender as valuable analytical categories in the conceptualisation of youth culture in South Africa.

Youth culture is a *dialectical process* which incorporates new forms and meanings while changing or reshaping traditional ones.[83] It is not an unchangeable text, but a complex, contradictory and uneven process. The new cultural forms emerge as a response to and mediation of social experience.[84] The mobility of some youths from *tsotsis* (gangsters) to *comrades* (freedom fighters) and then *to*

comtsotsis (re-conversion to gangsterism) illustrates this complex process. It is also illustrated by the history of youth culture in South Africa. Given the particular nature of South African racial capitalism and its harsh social and economic conditions, youth culture emerged predominantly as *tsotsi* or street gang culture. With the expansion of the secondary school system, demographic pressures and the development of new forms of ideological and political socialisation (e.g. the Black Consciousness Movement) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and particularly the Soweto uprising in 1976 and its subsequent consequences, the emerging street gang culture was increasingly brought into school grounds. These became a *melting-pot* where school cultures inherited from the past rural experience, street gang culture and new cultural forms were combined and processed to forge a wider, national youth resistance culture. Factors such as school size, class overcrowding, the inadequacy of facilities and the increasing drop-out rate became catalystic in the process and turned schools into youth shop-floors. Contradictions generated in the making of this culture and the increasing state repression resulted in the crisis of youth resistance culture in the late 1980s. This is discussed in Chapter Eight.

What surfaces from the above considerations is that youth culture in South Africa can be better understood from a historical perspective. Youth culture emerges in the process of changing economic, political and social practices and conflict.

Notes

1. Of course revisionists such as Bundy, Wolpe and Hyslop cannot be included in this category. They seem to be very critical about the tendency dominant in some student circles of seeing the 'struggle' as a progressive sum of 'victories' with no setbacks. However, their criticism at this level remains limited in that they concentrate on the forms of educational struggles without conceptualising these with reference to their content. The nature of the 'struggles within the struggle' is an important dimension that has been overlooked in their writings.
2. See for example P Kallaway (ed.), **Apartheid and Education** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984).
3. Aquino de Bragança & Jacques Depelchin, 'From idealisation of Frelimo to the understanding of Mozambique recent history', **Review**, XI (I), Winter 1988, p.96.
4. Ibid, p.99.
5. N Masilela, 'Establishing an intellectual bridgehead', in K G Tomaseli (ed.), **Rethinking Culture** (Belville: Anthropos Publishers, 1988), p.3.
6. See S Giner, **Mass Society** (London: 1976) and B Wilson, **Youth Culture and the Universities** (London: 1970), pp.88-90. For a review see also S Humphries, **Hooligans or Rebels? An Oral History of Working-class Childhood and Youth 1889-1939** (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.4.
7. Humphries, op cit, p.4.
8. E Durkheim, **Suicide** (Chicago: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951); R K Merton, **Social Theory and Social Structure** (New York: John Wiley, 1957); R K Merton, 'Social structure and anomie', **ASR**, 3, October 1938, pp.672-82.
9. Mike Brake, **The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subcultures: Sex, Drugs and Rock'n'roll** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p.41.
10. See Humphries, op cit, p.6; P Corrigan, **Schooling the Smash Street Kids** (London: Macmillan Education, 1985); Paul Willis, **Learning to Labor** (Hampshire: Gower Publishing Company, 1977); and Paul Willis, 'Class and institutional form of counter-school culture', in T Bennet et al, **Culture, Ideology and Social Process: A Reader** (London: The Open University Press, 1981).
11. Humphries, op cit, p.12.
12. Geoff Mungham & Geoff Pearson, **Working Class Youth Culture** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); and D Reynolds, 'When pupils and teachers refuse a truce: the secondary school and the creation of delinquency', in Mungham & Pearson, **Working Class Youth ...**, op cit.
13. H Parker, 'Boys will be men: Brief adolescence in downtown neighborhood', in Mungham & Pearson, op cit; H Schwendinger & J S Schwendinger, **Adolescent Subcultures and Delinquency** (New York: Praeger, 1985); W Westley & F Elkin, 'The myth of adolescent

culture', **ASR**, XX, December 1955, pp.680-84; and D M Smith, 'Adolescence: A study of stereotyping', **Sociological Review**, 18, 1970, pp.197-211.

14. See for example G Murdock & R McCron, 'Youth and class', in Mungham & Pearson, op.cit; G Murdock and R McCron, 'Consciousness of class and consciousness of generation', in S Hall & T Jefferson (eds.), **Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain** (London: Hutchinson, 1976); J Clarke et al, 'Subcultures, cultures and class: A theoretical overview', in Hall & Jefferson (eds.), op cit; and J Clarke, C Critcher & R Johnson (eds.), **Working Class Culture** (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1980); and Humphries, op cit, pp.18-19.
15. See K Mannheim, **Ideology and Utopia** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); and K Mannheim, **Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge** (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952).
16. See Murdock & McCron, 'Consciousness of class ...', op cit.
17. A sound critique of these explanations is presented in Humphries, op cit, p.12.
18. For a critique see D Pinnock, **The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town** (Cape Town: David Philip, 1984).
19. See L Althusser & E Balibar, **Reading Capital** (London: Unwin Brothers, 1977); P Anderson, **Arguments within English Marxism** (London: Verso Editions, 1980); B Hinderson & P Q Hirst, **Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production** (London: 1975); E Laclau & C Mouffe, **Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics** (London: The Thetford Press, 1985); E Laclau, **Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory** (London: Verso Editions, 1979); and N Poulantzas, **Classes in Contemporary Capitalism** (London: Verso Editions, 1978).
20. See E P Thompson, **The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays** (London: Monthly Review Press, 1978); R Williams, **Culture and Society** (: Penguin Books, 1985); R Williams, **Problems in Materialism and Culture** (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1980); T Bennet et al, **Culture, Ideology and Social Process** (London: Batsford Academic and Educational 1986); R Williams, **Marxism and Literature** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); S Hall, 'Cultural studies: Two paradigms', in T Bennet et al, op cit; Hall & Jefferson (eds.), op cit; N Geras, 'Post-Marxism?', **New Left Review**, May/June 1981; N Geras, 'Post-Marxism', **New Left Review**, May/June 1987.
21. Hall, op cit, p.30.
22. Ibid, p.30.
23. M Apple (ed), **Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); S Aronowitz & H A Giroux, **Education under Siege** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); H A Giroux, **Theory & Resistance in Education** (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983); M Cantor (ed.), **American Working Class Culture** (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979); N Garham & R Williams, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of culture' in R Collins, J Curran, N Garham, P Scannell, P Schlesinger & C Sparks (eds.), **Media, Culture and Society**(London: SAGE Publications, 1986).

24. For a review see Hall & Jefferson (eds.), op cit, pp.9-74.
25. Ibid, pp.9-74. See also Williams, **Problems in Materialism**, op cit, pp.31-49.
26. Ibid, pp.38-40; and Williams, **Problems in Materialism** op cit, pp.31-49.
27. See Willis, **Learning to Labor ...**, op cit; Willis, 'Class and institutional ...', op cit, pp.81-111; P Willis, 'Notes on method', in S Hall, D Hobson, A Lowe & P Willis, **Culture, Media and Language** (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1980), pp.88-96; and Liz Gordon & Paul Willis, 'Education, cultural production and social reproduction', **British Journal of Sociology of Education**, 5(2), 1984, pp.105-115.
28. H A Junod, **The Life of a South African Tribe** (New York: University Books, 1962; Orig. Pub. Neuchatel: Attinger, 1912- 1913) 2 vols; and H A Junod, **Usos e Costumes dos Bantos** (Lourenço Marques, 1944-1946), 2 vols.
29. A Isaacman & B Isaacman, **The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambesi Valley 1850-1921** (Berkeley: California University Press, 1976); T Ranger, 'The people in African resistance: a review', **Journal of Southern African Studies**, 4 (1), 1977.
30. See Isaacman & Isaacman, op cit; and E Hobsbawm, **Bandits** (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981, revised edition).
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32. L Swartz, K Gibson & S Swartz, 'State violence in South Africa and the development of a progressive psychology' (unpublished paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988).
33. L Vogelman, 'Apartheid and mental health'. Opening address, OASSSA National Conference on Apartheid and Mental Health, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 17-18 May 1986. See Swartz, Gibson & Swartz, op cit, for a review.
34. Swartz, Gibson & Swartz, op cit, p.12.
35. See T L Hosldtock, **Conscientising Psychology in South Africa** (unpublished and undated paper, School of Psychology, University of the Witwatersrand); S Swartz, 'Clinical psychology and the 1985 crisis in Cape Town', **Psychology in Society**, 5, 1986, pp.131-138; N C Manganyi, **Being-Black-in-the-World** (Johannesburg: Sprocas/Ravan, 1973); and N C Manganyi, **Looking through the Keyhole** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980).
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38. See C Meillassoux, 'From reproduction to production', **Economy and Society**, 1 (1), 1972; and G Arrighi, **The Political Economy of Rhodesia** (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1967).
39. I Wallerstein, 'Three stages of African involvement in the Third World economy', in P Gutkind & I Wallerstein (eds.), **The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa**; W Rodney, **How Europe Underdeveloped Africa** (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1972); C Palloix, **L'Economie Mondiale Capitaliste** (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971), 2 vols; C Ley, **Underdevelopment in Kenya** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); H Bernstein, 'Sociology of underdevelopment versus sociology of development', in D Lehman, **Development Theory: Four Critical Studies** (London: Frank Kass, 1979); S Amin, **Neo-Colonialism in West Africa** (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); S Amin, **L'Imperialisme et le Development Inegal** (Paris, 1976); and S Amin, **Accumulation on a World Scale**, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 2 vols. For a review see Bernstein, op cit.
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44. Hall et al, **Culture, Media and Language**, op cit, pp.329-31.
45. See for example J Petras, 'Class and politics in the periphery and the transition to socialism', **The Review of Radical Political Economics**, 8, 1976; A Q Obregon, 'The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalised labor force', in H Wolpe (ed.), op cit, pp.254-88; and R Del Omo, 'The Cuban revolution and the struggle against prostitution', **Crime and Social Justice**, 12, 1979, pp.34-40.
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66. Don Pinnock, **The Brotherhoods...**, op cit, p.99.
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70. This is illustrated for example by the choice of names: 'Bad Boys', 'Ninjas', 'Jackrollers'.
71. Necessary precautions should however be taken because this notion has often led analysts to ignore the fact that social criminals in fact tend to prey on the working class, which is their main victim.
72. Humphries, **Hooligans or Rebels ...**, op cit, p.151.
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76. Data collected from my field work in Soweto on street gang culture indicates that the wave of gangs in 1989 does not constitute a new phenomenon. Street gang culture developed rapidly throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1976, many gangs were integrated into the mass democratic movement where in many cases they assumed leadership positions because of their courageous character in challenging the agents of the apartheid system. However, organisational problems and the increasing political discipline within the movement turned some of these elements into dangerous dissidents or 'comtsotsis'.
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Chapter 4

Culture, Segregation and Education in South Africa, 1900-1953

Introduction

There are many different explanations of the role of culture in education in South Africa, particularly the culture of the dominant classes. A common trend in the conceptualisation of South Africa's cultural history is the conception of culture within a framework of a conflicting dichotomy: (1) European or colonial culture as opposed to Non-European or indigenous culture; (2) the culture of the ruling class or the bourgeoisie as opposed to working-class culture, proletarian culture or the culture of the oppressed masses; (3) the culture of the white group, as opposed to black or African culture; (4) white Afrikaner culture as opposed to broad Afrikaner culture; (5) white English-speaking culture as opposed to broad English-speaking culture; or even (6) dominant culture as opposed to the diversity of ethnic cultures. Obviously, some of these terminological constructs are an expression of the long history of racial prejudice that has dominated every sphere of social life in this country rather than satisfactory analytical categories.[1] The object of this chapter is to place these constructs in a historical perspective and explore the different ways particular conceptions of culture have influenced or conditioned the shaping, implementation and effects of the

South African educational policy. As culture has been a fundamental basis of segregation in education, this chapter will start with a brief outline of the origins of segregated schooling in South Africa. The concept of culture will be discussed in its full dimension in the following chapters.

The origins of segregated schooling, 1860-1924

The origins of segregation in South Africa have been related primarily to the material conditions at the beginning of the 20th century, specifically the attempts to impose a cheap labour policy which would allow mining capitalists to wrest vast quantities of unskilled and cheap labour from the black population and to find highly skilled white workers for the mining industry with minimum costs.[2] Those who have studied the development of the mining industry in South Africa have convincingly (though from a crude structuralist perspective) argued that the rapid centralisation and concentration of mining capital which led to the monopolisation of the mining sector were precipitated by the following factors: (1) the geological nature of the gold fields, with the very narrow reefs, mostly at great depths; (2) the fixed price of gold in the world market, which the mining capitalists could not easily influence; and (3) the increasing grievances expressed by the working class, particularly white workers, who demonstrated a high level of political militancy and organisation.[3] The geological nature of the gold fields accelerated the abandonment of the exhausted outcrop grounds and encouraged deep-level mining, which required supplementary investment of capital and both a higher degree of mechanisation and greater utilisation of skilled labour. The costs of production could not be compensated for by the profit extracted from variables such as the price of gold or the cost of machinery. The only variable which could be successfully pressurised in order to raise the rate of profit was labour.

The desire of the mining magnates to reduce labour costs to secure a high rate of profit led them to pursue the policy of not employing whites in general unskilled work, which resulted in a comprehensive rigid racial division of labour in the gold mining industry, within which wage earners of equivalent skill were divided on racial lines into occupations with different functions, income and status. An overwhelming majority of black, unskilled migrant workers worked side by side with a small but politically active section of white skilled and semi-skilled workers. While black migrant workers still preserved peasant characteristics which inhibited significant organisation against injustices and repression in the mines, the highly proletarianised white workers already had relatively sophisticated forms of political organisation.[4]

This racial division of mine labour favoured a particular development of class and race relations. It united in struggle those wage earners whose skin pigmentation happened to be white, leading to their claiming of rights on grounds of colour and thus practising racial discrimination against black workers in defence of their jobs within that structure. They differentiated and defined their class interests along racial lines, regarding their fellow black workers as potential competitors, directed their grievances against black workers and demanded a privileged status. Thus, as Johnstone has pointed out, 'white labour's claims to rights on grounds of colour legitimised the denial of rights to others on grounds of colour'.[5] The response by the state and by capital reflected this reality.

The labour structure and class relations in the mining industry resulted in the state intervening, from about 1906, in an attempt to secure preferential treatment for whites in employment outside the gold mining industry in order to minimise the spread of poor-whiteism or massive unemployment of unskilled white labour. The legacy of colour prejudices which accompanied previous colonial practices was revitalised and formalised in the form of job colour bars and an inter-locking system of economic, social and political institutions based on racial discrimination, known as *segregation*.[6] Thus the institutional racist barriers imposed to regulate labour relations in the mines were gradually extended to almost all spheres of economic, social and political life, including education. Segregation soon became the dominant mediating mechanism for the main economic and social forces.

This new dimension of segregation is well captured by Marks and Trapido in the following extract:

> The ideology of segregation did not only speak to the needs of the mining industry. It addressed a number of different audiences. It served white farmers demanding additional controls over their tenants and labourers and white workers seeking protection from cheaper black labour. It was an attractive solution for the white ruling class in the face of the rapid urbanization of poor whites and poor blacks, with its increased possibilities of competition and conflict as well as miscegenation and unified class struggle. Its doctrines even provided opportunities for those Africans concerned to restore 'traditional' authority, and for those Coloureds anxious to protect themselves against being reduced to the status of Africans.[7]

Colour began to be seen as a criterion of access to rights and power through which whites occupied an elite status and superordinate positions in the social division of labour. By contrast, Africans were kept at the opposite pole as a cheap labour force with no rights.

This structuralist explanation of the origins of segregation will serve no purpose if the heritage of cultural forms that began to take shape with the changes in social relations brought about by white settlers is not taken into account. The foundations of segregationist policies and practices were also a culmination of an earlier colonial cultural tradition dominated by racial prejudice and the ideology of white supremacy, particularly among white settlers. This tradition included, inter alia: (1) 'the spectacular explosion of biologically based racial science in the second half of the nineteenth century'[8] through the development of ideas of 'scientific racism', social

Darwinism and eugenics, which began to undermine the earlier optimistic liberal assimilationist ideas, particularly the Cape liberal assimilationist strategy based on the assumption of the superiority of 'Western civilisation', and (2) the fear of racial mixture with 'tribal' and 'heathen' African peoples, which encouraged white exclusivism.

In the late nineteenth century, racism became firmly established in science and social opinion in both Europe and North America. Basing their work on evolutionist assumptions propagated by Darwin and the doctrine of the 'survival of the fittest', biologists, archaeologists, anthropologists and psychologists undertook the task of classifying the world's races according to a natural hierarchy.[9] The eugenics movement too insisted that to safeguard Western civilisation, radical measures of social and biological engineering such as the control of genetic pools or 'racial stocks' were essential.[10] The racial imagery which emanated from these intellectual contexts was readily transferred to the colonial terrain where it was applied to questions of race by white settlers and the missionaries. Based on or associated with social Darwinism, scientific racism dominated liberal and conservative debates in South Africa in the early 20th century — e.g. the IQ research — and became a powerful legitimating tool for policy decisions. The 'amalgamationist' policies promoted by Sir George Grey in the Cape Colony, the segregationist strategy introduced by Shepstone in Natal, the discourse of the Victorian civilising mission and Milner's reconstruction policy were resonances of those very elements which dominated the intellectual world of the late nineteenth century and the programme of Victorian social and cultural imperialism.

It is within the same context that differentiated missionary work for blacks and whites became common practice. Generally, the missionaries accepted separation in church, curriculum and school as inevitable and determined by cultural differences between whites and blacks. At the time the concept of culture was interchangeably used with the concept of civilisation. Writing in 1962, Alban Winter of the Community of the Resurrection recalls this general opinion as follows:

> Why this division, it is said. The question was, in fact, raised from the very beginning of our work by Fr. Alston, who, soon after his arrival, wrote on Dec. 1st, 1904: 'To me it is very sad the native and the white work being separated. I have not been here long enough to pass an opinion upon it, but it is quite obvious that the natives just emerging from savagery cannot be treated in the same way as whites, there must be restrictions; there must be in many ways separations. But when they have become Christians it does seem to me that the Altar is one place where they certainly can meet, but it is not so.' This policy was no new one but a continuation of that advocated by Cannon Farmer, the most experienced priest in native mission work in the Diocese of Pretoria. In reporting to the Synod of 1904 on mission work he 'showed that *European and Bantu were so essentially different that it was almost impossible for one priest to tackle both efficiently*. The committee thought it advisable that missionary work should be extra-parochial, and the diocese divided into districts, with a missionary in charge of each.' [My emphasis][11]

For Winter there was more to it: 'But the question goes deeper than this. *The Africans were still mostly heathen.*' [My emphasis][12]

Although racist tradition had relatively dominated colonial practices in pre-industrial South Africa, it was not until the Milner reconstruction period that the utility of earlier traditions for an industrialising state were recognised. Only then were more sophisticated oppressive practices enforced, namely, the allocation and delimitation of African 'reserves',

the creation of African 'locations' (townships), the control of urban influx through pass laws, the manipulation of chiefs to become agents of the state, and the segregation of schooling according to race or skin pigmentation. The distinguishing feature here is that the policy of racial segregation as an all-embracing strategy was assumed and reconstituted as a necessary ideological base for capitalist development in South Africa. As such, it constitutes a turning point in South African policy. The policy of segregation cannot be adequately understood within a historical continuity which does not take these different contexts into account. The shaping of the present racially structured education system in the post-South African War period can thus be seen as a function of this broader process.

The structuring of racial social relations on the gold fields and in the countryside has been extensively studied elsewhere.[13] In this chapter, I shall concentrate on those issues which affected the formation of a new educational system based on racial segregation, particularly the role of ideology and culture. This will provide some insights into the particular way the schooling system in South Africa was moulded. It will be shown how, in the course of the first two decades of the 20th century, the education system became fragmented along racial lines into four schooling systems, both in the structure and in the content of education, as a result of the implementation of the Government's policies of racial segregation. In this process, the Victorian discourse of '*civilising mission*' gradually gave place to the *concept of culture* in the dominant educational rhetoric. Fragmented education structures and curricula were established, which would eventually preserve and promote cultural differences, enhance 'national', and 'racial' identities, shape the ethnic consciousness of minority groups such as 'coloureds' and Indians and prevent interracial class solidarity.

The ideological climate under Milner's reconstruction policy, 1902-1910

Between 1899 and 1902, South Africa was heavily shaken by the most destructive war in South African history, the

Anglo-Boer War. The causes of this war fall beyond the scope of this study. It is enough to mention that the Anglo-Boer War was ultimately related to the clash between two totally different and contradictory modes of production: the existing quasi-feudal and communal modes of production and the emerging capitalist mode of production. By the 1890s, the capitalist mode of production had already developed a strong economic base, which was not followed by suitable political and ideological apparatuses. It also required an expansion of its social base. These needs could not be met through a simple 'modernisation' of the feudal Boer states. This fundamental contradiction associated with the economic and strategic interests of British imperialism in Southern Africa led to the eruption of the South African War. As Legassick has indicated, the war essentially came as a particular form of capitalist revolution: 'a capitalist revolution made from above and not in a situation where the internal capitalist forces could achieve such a transformation'.[14] To put it another way, the transition from pre-capitalist social formations to capitalism did not follow the European route, where internal contradictions within feudal society determined the transition. Capitalist social relations of production were imposed, and became dominant, as a result of the world-scale expansion of European capitalism.

The crucial implication of the profound social and economic change caused by the war embraced the need for a re-adjustment of the whole superstructure (education, culture, ideology, religion, etc.), particularly the education system, to the level of development of the productive forces and the social relations of production. The shaping of this process was bound up with the course of the class struggle after the war and was profoundly conditioned by Milner's reconstruction policy.

It was during the reconstruction period (1900-1924) that many of the guidelines of twentieth-century segregationist policies emerged, in relation to both town and countryside, though some policies of racial segregation had been introduced in the pre-war period following the efforts made by the Boer republics towards 'modernisation', the impact of Grey

Grey's assimilationist strategy in the Cape, and Shepstone's

'separate development' theory in Natal.[15] As Marks and Trapido have correctly suggested, these policies have to be related 'not only to Milner's particular world-view ... but also to the far wider set of assumptions held by the British rulers of South Africa at the beginning of the 20th century and their interaction with local conditions'.[16] The reconstruction regime had to set up an adequate policy which could respond to the contradictions that had determined the war and the subsequent crisis. It had to meet the needs of capitalist economic growth, covering different spheres of social activity, such as the labour supply, the mitigation of growing social conflict through education, and the promotion of the interests of British imperialism. Racial segregation materialised as the dominant strategy in all these spheres. A wide debate took place in the newspapers, through the publication of pamphlets, and in the new journals and associations formed at the time. Colonial conferences, and reports produced by missionaries and education authorities provided bases for the new policy. Considerable knowledge and information also came from British and American sources. I shall discuss some of the major issues raised in this debate, starting with Milner's ideas, which appear to have played a central role in shaping segregationist policies.[17]

White supremacism

Three main areas were of major concern to Milner: (1) British settlement in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony and its implications; (2) the Dutch-English conflict; and (3) 'native policy' embracing all matters concerning black people. Two principles assumed an outstanding importance in Milner's policy. Firstly, there was an underlying assumption that any policy or development should incorporate the principle that South Africa is a 'white man's country' in the sense that the 'white man should rule', on the grounds of his 'superior civilisation'. Secondly, related to the principle of white supremacy, there was an explicit directive that the British section of the white population should play a hegemonic role in South Africa.[18] For this purpose, British settlement was to be

promoted in a selective way by attracting, as far as possible, 'settlers of a superior class' and avoiding a 'white proletariat'.[19] If any workers had to come, they should be those who could fit into the skilled labour market available.

Milner's views on education reflected the same preoccupation and displayed a permanent obsession with the growing Afrikaner nationalism, which appeared as a potential threat against his imperial ideal. He aimed at the Anglicisation of Boer society through a state-controlled schooling system. His approach was to a large extent influenced by the mining sector and by the Council of Education, Witwatersrand, founded in 1895 to expand education for white children on the Rand.

The mining sector placed emphasis on the need for technical education. A common opinion among mining magnates was that as 'the skilled white workman' was likely to be 'the chief factor in a permanent white population, the most effective way to maintain the ascendancy of the white man is by higher technical education'.[20] Debates in education frequently expressed the increasing concern with formal schooling: 'The days of the rule of thumb miner are passing and the old maxim that "trades cannot be taught in a school", has been supplemented by the at least equally true one that "trades cannot be taught without school"'.[21] More important was the assumption that 'industrial expansion unaccompanied by perfected elementary, secondary and higher education will never make South Africa self-supporting'.[22] Commenting on the report of the Transvaal Education Department for 1903, the *South African Mines, Commerce and Industries* accused the Government of 'paying too much for police and too little for pedagogics'.[23] Schooling appeared as a more effective and necessary mechanism of social control and stability than repressive institutions: 'The South African Constabulary was a war-time product... More schools, more farm schools ... schools supported by local and general taxation if need be, will minimise the demand later on barracks.'[24]

Milner considered 'native policy' a separate area, that required differential treatment. Labour problems, the question of the franchise, political and civil rights, and

education were among the components of 'native policy'. For Milner and his administration, the only form of labour for blacks should be unskilled labour. Franchise for all Africans was considered premature. Any meaningful 'native policy' should encompass the idea that '**civilisation**' represented 'the test of a man's capacity for political rights'. Milner explained this principle in a historic speech, widely known as the 'Watch Tower Speech'. The white man as the ruler had to play the role of 'gradually raising' the black man, not to a white level of civilisation, that is the level of a 'civilised franchise', but 'up to a much higher level than that he at the time occupied'.[25]

South Africa had to be ruled by voters of European descent. Milner believed that political influence of the 'civilised native' could never, within any distance of time profitable to contemplate, be allowed to preponderate in the government of South Africa. The white race had to retain the responsibility of government because of its superior intellectual endowment.[26] Thus, if the black man was not to be allowed to preponderate, institutions should be created to keep him at the lowest level. On this basis, education for Africans required a different and racialist treatment. About this, Milner said:

> I think ... that much more should be done for education of the natives than has ever been attempted... I do not mean that they should be educated like Europeans, for their requirements and capacities are very different, but that they should be trained to develop their natural aptitudes for their own good and that of the community.[27]

Neither Milner nor the Rand magnates saw any necessary connection between African education and the labour requirements in the mining sector. In the eyes of the Rand magnates, while schooling for whites was a necessary step to technical training to meet industrial needs for skilled labour, African education had to address only problems arising out of the contact between a white employer and black employee. They held that African education would result directly from

labour relations. In 1903, the South African Mines, Commerce and Industries (SAMCI) made the point that a 'course of six or twelve months of labour on the rand constituted the easiest and most profound education that can be afforded to the native'. There, 'he learns the value of discipline, regularity, and the ways of the white man'; an African trained for mine work was 'a better animal and a better man at the end of his term than he was when he began'.[28]

To some extent these conceptions reflected the particular conditions of the labour market for African workers as perceived by the dominant capitalist forces. With the increasing obstacles imposed by the state, employment for Africans existed only in the following fields: domestic service, industry, municipal employment and farms. In every case, they performed almost exclusively unskilled roles. As Philips would comment some decades later, they were 'everywhere lifting, carrying, shovelling, wrapping ... generally with that disarming genial good-nature which leads many whites to conclude that they are quite satisfied with what they get in the way of wages, food, and quarters'.[29] When it came to skilled or semi-skilled employment, limited outlets existed beyond teaching in the mission schools, working as police and subordinate clerks in the government, or working in the Municipal and Native Affairs Department, and its compounds.[30] But for the most part, the development of basic operative skills, and of certain attitudes and behaviour, were the main requirements for the training or education of Africans, in the eyes of both the mining magnates and the education authorities.

The making of a 'native policy'

Milner did not hope to bring clear-cut formulas for all the problems of reconstruction. Contradictions produced by the war, and the complexity of the inherited institutions, required profound and long reflection. He thus tried to create an intellectual climate and a basis to encourage legislation and administration along desirable lines for the future. The starting point was necessarily the elaboration of a 'native

policy' and its translation into appropriate legislation. At the Intercolonial Conference of 1903, Milner introduced the 'native question'. He also appointed the South African Native Affairs Commission of Inquiry, which, in its report released in February 1905, proposed many aspects of what was to emerge as the policy of racial segregation. Though not advocating total segregation of land areas, SANAC suggested racially exclusive occupation of land areas, separate political representation of blacks and whites, and a policy of gradual and 'assisted evolution' to facilitate the development of the Africans in a way which could not merge too closely into European life.

In the sphere of education, SANAC questioned whether education, as a development of the intellectual faculties by literary instruction, had militated against the African's usefulness as a productive force or had the effect of making him/her more productive. It concluded that while in some cases it had 'the effect of creating in the natives an aggressive spirit, arising no doubt from an exaggerated sense of individual self-importance, which renders them less docile and less disposed to be contended ... it has generally a beneficial influence ... by raising the level of their intelligence and by increasing their capacity as workers'.[31]

Sanctioning the principle of racial separation of schools, and the principle that African education should be resolved into a system of state-aided mission schools, SANAC recommended that, as the great demand of South Africa was for unskilled or partially skilled labour, instruction in manual labour should constitute the basis of African education. It had the 'particular advantage ... in fitting him [the African] for his position in life'.[32] The Commission also urged that Africans receiving educational facilities should contribute towards the cost by payment of fees or local rates. Compulsory education was not recommended nor was it considered advisable.[33]

The ideological environment produced by SANAC was strengthened by the publication of the Transvaal Indigency Commission (TIC) report in 1908, which suggested further discriminatory policies. The importance of the TIC lies in the fact that it provided grounds for the implementation of segregationist policies enacted by the Education Act of 1907,

by attributing white indigency to competition of blacks in the labour market. The Commission argued that the main problem in the Transvaal was the 'poor white problem', that is, the problem created by the growing number of whites 'who though able-bodied, are not competent to do skilled or semi-skilled work, and are unable to obtain employment in rough manual labour in competition with the native'.[34] It saw white labour as very inefficient and requiring a high scale of wages as compared to African labour. Whites therefore could not get unskilled employment and became indigent. It also argued that blacks had turned into intruders in the field of skilled work, thereby narrowing the skilled labour market for whites and thus reinforcing the potential threat of white indigency.[35] Consequently, the Commission recommended that the virtual monopoly of the unskilled market by blacks, and their gradual encroachment on skilled and semi-skilled jobs as they became more educated, must be prevented 'by the white man himself' with the assistance of the government. Among the racially discriminatory measures suggested by the Commission, of particular relevance was the improvement of the education of whites on the lines of Smuts' and Hertzog's Education Acts, which institutionalised the principle of racial separation in education. Though no specific recommendations were made regarding education for blacks, the central implication of the report was that 'native education' should not be placed on the same footing as that for whites.

It has been shown so far that the changing social and economic conditions were accompanied by an ideological climate which directly or indirectly favoured the policies of racial segregation as the appropriate solution for the growing needs and contradictions determined by capitalist development. The concept of 'civilisation', very often meaning culture, was used as a justifying reason for these policies. It became clear that racial segregation as a policy did not simply arise out of a legacy of cultural or racial prejudices, but involved a systematic body of ideas arising out of a conscious and articulated debate. In the following section, I shall analyse the initial stages of the system of racial segregation and the form in which it was implemented in education. It will be shown

how the concept of 'civilisation' was gradually replaced by an anthropologically generated concept of culture in subsequent policies and educational reforms.

State intervention and the entrenchment of segregation in education, 1902-1910

Formal schooling for Africans in South Africa began as part of the missionary method of Christianisation based on several mission schools built in the Cape and Natal in the early 19th century. These schools were not segregated; white children who wanted education attended the same schools. Segregation was limited to dormitories and eating facilities. In earlier times, slaves were also segregated but on a class rather than a race basis.[36] This pattern of development prevailed until the second of half the 19th century, facilitated by the Cape assimilationist ideology, and opened up unintended political and material opportunities for the emerging black petty bourgeoisie which hoped for incorporation in the colonial order.[37]

Selective segregation was introduced in 1884 in Natal with the establishment of government-aided schools for whites. 'Civilisation' was the criterion of selection. A statement issued by the Natal Council of Education the same year declared that 'government schools and aided schools are open to all classes of the community, but Coloured [black] children must, however, conform in all respects to European habits and customs'.[38]

More significant moves towards a policy of comprehensive segregation began in the late 19th century. In 1892, the non-racial policy of Lovedale and other mission institutions in the Cape received a severe blow when Sir Thomas Muir, the Superintendent General of Education, ruled that white students from Lovedale engaged upon courses of teacher education could not sit the examination.[39] In 1896, fourteen students who presented themselves to take examinations at the end of the first year of the course were removed from the examination hall by a government inspector under Muir's orders.[40] Muir's policy had the effect of reducing — though not

entirely removing — opportunities for intimate contact between pupils of different race in the schools of the Cape colony. In the Transvaal and Free State, however, no specific provision existed prior to the Anglo-Boer war to prevent African children from attending the same schools as white or mixed-race children. By 1898, for example, there were four private schools in the Johannesburg area, attended by white and black children. Only by the end of the 1890s was the government subsidy for some of these schools restricted on racial grounds.[41]

Cultural imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism, 1902-1910

It was not until the end of the Anglo-Boer war that the education authorities decided to intervene and gradually institutionalise racial separation in schools in the four territories. On 6 November 1900, Mr E B Sargent Sargent was appointed the Acting Director for the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal, with the task of reorganising the educational system in both colonies, administered as Crown colonies under the Milner Administration.[42] In the following year, free primary education was introduced for white children.[43] The primary objective of this change was the anglicisation of Afrikaner children, most of them concentrated in military camps. Milner hoped that an anglicisation policy, applied especially to education and immigration, would redress the balance between the British imperialist domination and Afrikaner nationalism. He went to the point of declaring that 'any school relying upon aid from the State should not only teach English, but make English the medium of instruction in all but the elementary classes'.[44] He insisted that 'Dutch should only be used to teach English and English to teach everything else'.[45] Moreover, history, 'another thing of greatest importance', should include 'British history and the growth of the Empire which would be of immense use', and not only concentrate 'on Majuba with a little Jameson raid', topics which had some bearing on Afrikaner nationalism.[46] Milner was conscious of the political effects of this kind of history:

'everything that makes South African children look outside South Africa and realise the world makes for peace. Everything that cramps and confines their views to South Africa only ... makes for Afrikanerdom and further discord.'[47]

Two important steps were taken in February 1903. The first was the passing of the First Education Ordinance for the two colonies, which made provision for the education of African children as a separate matter. It represents the first attempt to formulate the preliminary and provisional principles which guided African schools before the definition of a general 'native policy'. Emphasis was laid on the necessity for increased manual training in the education of blacks. Every African school eligible for Government grants would have to register with the Education Department.

In respect of education for whites, the ordinance introduced a state-controlled schooling system (which would determine the structures, control, training and upgrading of teachers). The principle of racially separate schools was implicitly incorporated. Thus, when in April 1903 an Asian, Dr M A Pereira, asked Sir A Milner to allow his children to attend a school for whites, the request was turned down.[48] The ordinance also laid down that English would be the sole medium of instruction and that the teaching of Dutch would be limited to five hours every week. In response to the anglicising intentions of the ordinance, Afrikaners, through the *Christeliske Nationaal Onderwys Commissie* (Commission on National Christian Education) founded in 1903, created in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State alternative Dutch-medium private schools, which, apart from language, stressed instruction based upon Calvinistic principles and the dogmas of the Dutch Reformed Church. They named them Christian National Education Schools (CNE schools). Following the promulgation of Smuts' Education Act of 1907 in the Transvaal, the state managed to transfer the CNE schools to government control.[49] Thus cultural identity was seen as a crucial factor in the struggle against British preponderance and education as a medium for moulding it.

The second step involved the creation of separate schools for 'coloured' (mixed race) children. The first such schools in the

Transvaal were opened between 1897 and 1902 under the initiative of the Rev. Charles Philips of the Ebenezer Coloured Congregational church (a separatist church).[50] When the state adopted its segregationist policy, they were incorporated into the Government school system for 'coloured' children and, theoretically, placed on an equal footing with the schools for white children with regard to annual grants, equipment and inspection. In practice, they were disadvantaged in terms of space, quality of buildings, human resources and grading.[51]

Free compulsory education for whites and the school 'colour bars', 1905-1908

More significant moves towards a policy of comprehensive segregation were introduced in 1905-8 with the promulgation of the Cape 1905 School Board Act, Smut's Education Act of 1907 in the Transvaal, and Hertzog's School Act of 1908 in the Orange River Colony, which made provision for compulsory education for white children and institutionalised racial separation in education. In the Orange River Colony, the Education Ordinance of July 1905 solved the controversy around the CNE schools and set the first general arrangements for free and compulsory education in any part of South Africa, involving children between the ages of ten and sixteen who lived within a two-mile radius of a school.[52] The ordinance also determined that African education should not be incorporated into the European system, but should have a separate organisation of its own. More detailed provision followed after the Orange River Colony received a grant of internal self-government in 1907. Hertzog's School Act of 1908 extended compulsory attendance to children between seven and sixteen years. It established the principle that all white children should acquire their education in a dual-cultural environment: English and Afrikaans. In the Transvaal, the Smut's Education Act of 1907 also established free and compulsory education for white children.

Colour bars were imposed in the schools for white children in the whole country. The Transvaal Smuts Act of 1907, for example, stated that 'No coloured [black] child or person shall

be admitted to or allowed to remain a pupil or member of any school class or institution' for white children.[53] With these measures children of both skilled and unskilled whites were placed on a fundamentally different footing from that of either 'coloured' or African children. Africans were denied the right to free and compulsory education on the grounds that they were still unfit for it.

Promoting a culture of subservience: Early segregationist reforms in African education, 1903-1912

The appointment of an organising inspector of native education in the person of the Rev W E Clarke represented a turning point in state policy toward African education in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. Shortly after his appointment, Clarke organised a detailed survey of mission schools. He advised government 'to accept the existing organisation [African schools under missionary initiative], to prescribe a certain course of elementary and industrial instruction, and to subsidise and thereby to control their instruction by means of a system of inspection and quarterly grants'.[54] Clarke's ideas and proposals played a crucial role in the formulation of the first scheme for African education introduced in the two colonies from 1 January 1904, as well as in the formulation of SANAC's recommendations on African education.

As in the Cape and Natal, one of the objects intended was that primary schools should encourage manual work, such as gardening, brick-making, mat-weaving and carpentry (for boys), and needlework and domestic work (for girls).[55] Particular emphasis was given to the teaching of the English language. Government policy, as laid down by the Superintendent of Native Education in 1903, called for the exclusive use of English in all African schools, to ensure 'a common medium of communication between white employer and native employee'.[56] A new syllabus was also set out, in 1905, for the training of teachers. A three-year course was instituted with an entrance requirement of Standard III. Industrial training became compulsory to qualify teachers to

teach manual skills in the African schools.[57] To encourage the implementation of the new curriculum the state decided to award assistance from public funds to four training institutions — Botshabelo (Berlin Mission), Grace Dieu (Catholic), Pietersburg (Anglican), Kilnerton (Wesleyan) and Lemana (Swiss Mission). The Clark Commission in Natal in 1909 made similar recommendations.[58] Conformity, subservience and productivity of African labour in white-owned farms and industry were the ultimate goals of state intervention in African education.

In the meantime, under the South Africa Act of 1910, white education, except higher education, remained a provincial matter. All matters concerning Africans, including African education, were to be transferred to the Union Government and fall under the Ministry of Native Affairs. The post-Union educational strategy included two main steps: (1) the extension of the principle of racially separate schooling to the rest of the country and consequent reorganisation and rationalisation of the school curricula and forms of control over black education; and (2) an expansion and re-adjustment of education for whites to meet the new social and economic needs. Recommendations formulated by SANAC (1903-4), the Transvaal Indigency Commission (1907-8) and the Carnegie Commission(1932) were gradually improved and translated into legislation.

Initiatives concerning white education covered three main spheres: (1) the extension of technical education for white children; (2) the introduction of programmes of industrial and agricultural training for the white working class; (3) the implementation of compulsory education for white children; and (3) the acceptance of the principle of bilingualism to reduce tensions between Afrikaans and English speakers and create an integrative 'community culture' amongst whites. The Union Department of Education received control over the South African School of Mines and Technology at Johannesburg in 1896 and gave support to evening classes conducted by the School. The Railway Department improved its own schools for white apprentices. The Agricultural Department expanded various programmes in agricultural education. The Prisons Department operated industrial

schools and reformatories which became effective instruments of social control and discipline imposition for the white working-class youth.[59] Provincial administrations, through school boards, secured control of compulsory school attendance of white pupils.

The significance of these initiatives goes beyond the instrumental function that education was expected to play in the economy. Indeed, state intervention in the reconstruction of white schooling responded to the 'heightened conflict between white labour and capital on the Rand and the need to reproduce white labour in such a way that it saw its interests as non-antagonistic to those of capital'. It also responded to the need for muting the increasing Afrikaner nationalism that threatened British hegemony in the region. This unity was to be achieved through emphasis on the racial identity of white labour and capital, thus minimising the danger of cross-racial proletarian insurgency. Consequently, educational initiatives were supported by discriminatory industrial legislation which denied Africans the access to semi-skilled or skilled jobs, such as the Apprenticeship Act of 1922. Most importantly, anthropological studies offered a new theory of 'culture contact' whereby the complexity of African society and of the distinctive nature of African culture should be recognised and a differential schooling system for Africans should be developed accordingly.

'Bantu culture'and the germ of 'Bantu Education', 1910-1953

With the decline of the Victorian 'civilising mission', the concept of 'culture', reconstituted by the new academic discipline of social anthropology, offered an apparently rational basis with which to inform efforts to provide for the differential development of Africans. Dubow distinguishes three main uses attached to the concept of culture at that time. In one meaning, culture was assumed as a synonym for 'civilisation' or associated with progress along the barbarian/civilisation continuum. In another meaning, culture, and therefore 'inferior' and 'superior' civilisations, were regarded as functions

of race. Finally, culture also emerged from social anthropology and provided an alternative to both biological determinism and universalist humanism and assimilation. It rejected assimilation as anti-cultural development, yet it permitted 'racial upliftment' and ethno-cultural identity. This concept of culture became part of the legitimising ideology of segregation and served political ends; it became a more subtle form of 'race'.[60]

On this basis, the new authorities undertook the task of extending the principle of racial segregation to the rest of the country. Thus, from 1910 onwards a process of reorganisation and revision of the system of African and 'coloured' schools was carried out, which led to the consolidation of segregationist structures in education. It included the introduction of more rational methods and institutions to render more effective the aims and the role of free compulsory education for white children.

These ideological shifts were accompanied by severe criticisms of mission education. The most common criticism charged mission education for attempting to raise Africans 'on the shoulders of the white man in a non-African environment' and for educating them to participate in an economic and social life from which they were barred.[61] The duty of the native, it was argued, was 'not to become a black European, but to become a better native, with ideals and a culture of his own'.[62] As Smuts put it, a policy defined on these lines 'is to foster an indigenous native culture or system of cultures, and to cease to force the African into alien European moulds'.[63] African education, it was maintained, should be considered as far as possible from the point of view of the African's 'own possibilities, needs and aspirations'.[64] It should not be modelled on that of Europeans. It should be dealt with as a separate and distinct problem, rather than being moulded on European education. To put it another way, African education had to adjust and conform to the social and economic roles which African people had to perform. Thus, in 1912, the Transvaal Director of Education determined that the existing scheme 'should be stripped of those portions which have ... been taken over from the code for white children, rather than

incorporated because of their particular suitability for natives'.[65] Moreover, mission education was charged with having negative effects on the African as 'it puffed him up', making him disinclined for manual labour and an easy victim for agitators.[66]

A new curriculum based on the newly-generated concept of 'Bantu culture' was devised and carried into practice in 1915 in the Transvaal. It had training as its central aim and included a wide range of subjects such as industrial training, religious and moral training and 'training in social and civic duties especially as they were laid down in the laws affecting natives'.[67] The industrial training on which the whole system rested included, in the case of boys, gardening, rudimentary agriculture, basket-making, mat-weaving, tree-planting, leading water and the care of trees. Girls received training in sewing and domestic service, including cookery, kitchen work, laundry, the care of clothes and household work. The training thus conceived of covered 'all occupations intended to develop habits and aptitudes which would enable the native to live a healthy life and render more effective service'.[68] In Natal, syllabuses were also revised and standardised at all levels from primary schooling to teacher education under the supervision of C R Loram (1879-1940), Chief Inspector of Native Education from 1918.[69] The Orange Free State began a programme of curriculum development with the publication of the first syllabus for lower primary classes in 1924, followed by a syllabus for upper primary classes during the following year, and a training syllabus for African primary teachers two years later.[70] African languages became the main vehicle of instruction.

On the same lines, segregation of the curricula was gradually extended to education for 'coloured' children. At the same time their schools began to be separated from schools for Indian children, who had hitherto attended 'coloured' schools. Although, there had been attempts to place 'coloureds' on the same footing as whites, greater concern existed about their economic and political role within the emerging segregationist structure. Indeed, racist ideology portrayed 'coloureds' as a 'mixed race', the illegitimate progeny of 'European civilisation

and non-European savagery', with however the influence of 'European blood' which made them hierarchically superior to their 'Bantu' forebears. This indeed lay behind ruling-class fears that 'coloureds', if they were not placated, would provide leadership for the 'Bantu' masses. As residential and other controls over Africans increased and separate school curricula began to create a separate cultural and ethnic identity for 'coloureds', 'coloured education' came to be appreciated by the ruling class.

A special syllabus produced for 'coloured' schools in Natal during 1914 gave emphasis to certain manual and domestic skills. In the Cape, a full curriculum for both primary and secondary pupils was developed during the early 1920s under supervision of a separate division of the Education Department's staff. As a result of Sir Thomas Muir's extremism, very few 'coloured' children remained in attendance at white schools in the Cape. By 1921, the Cape already had 423 schools specifically for 'coloured' pupils.[71] In Natal, however, in 1929 there were more than a thousand such pupils still enrolled in schools for Europeans or Africans.[72] In the Orange Free State, where the 'coloured' population remained significantly smaller than that of the other provinces, the process was also slower and a considerable number of 'coloured' children attended African schools.[73]

The next step involved the segregation of schools for Indian children, who had hitherto attended 'coloured' or white schools. Attempts made in 1877-1894 in Natal to create a schooling system for Indians, with three schools being established in Durban, Tongaat and Ungeni in 1881, had failed.[74] However, following the recommendations made by the Dyson Commission during 1928, the Natal Administration embarked upon a scheme for a steady expansion in the number of separate schools for Indians both government and aided. In the Transvaal the first school specifically for Indian children was opened in Johannesburg in 1913.[75]

Following the introduction of the new curriculum for African schools, steps were taken towards the reorganisation and reinforcement of the mechanisms of control. In the Transvaal, according to the existing arrangements, Mr Clarke,

inspector of white schools, inspected African teacher training institutions, and the district inspectors in charge of schools for whites inspected African schools. However, with the introduction of the new curriculum, the argument was put forward that African education had become definitely *sui generis*, and as such its inspection should be in the hands of individuals specially trained and qualified for this work.[76] It was advocated that the administration of education should also be based on the 'racial, economic and social differences between whites and blacks.'[77]

With the appointment of three 'inspectors of native schools' in 1918 African education took shape as a separate area in the Transvaal Education Department. In Natal, during 1923, D M Macolm, Loram's successor, succeeded in carrying into effect an idea which Loram had been pressing for for some time, that is, the appointment of the first Native Supervisors of African schools, who were deployed under the District Inspector as itinerant headmasters.[78] The Orange Free State Administration appointed an Organising Inspector of Native Education in 1924.

The Native Affairs Commission of 1921 suggested further radical changes in the forms of control. It argued that African education, as 'the chief factor in moulding a native policy for South Africa', should be administered by a body responsible for that policy, that is the Union Government, particularly the Ministry of Native Affairs, an idea reiterated by the Native Affair Commission report of 1936 and certain prominent Nationalist members.[79] This structure would facilitate the necessary co-ordination of educational policy with the broader 'native policy'. The Commission also proposed the creation of 'Native Advisory Boards' to retain the co-operation of the missionaries, and the promulgation of a Native Education Act on the lines of the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill of 1923, which institutionalised social segregation in the urban areas. These recommendations resulted in the creation of Provincial Advisory Boards, comprising education authorities and representatives of missionary societies and teacher associations.

Finally, racial discrimination also involved the funding of

African education. Traditionally, funds for African education came from school fees together with contributions from missionary societies. These were the only sources until grants-in-aid became available after the curricula reforms. An attempt to generate additional finance through a special tax imposed on Africans by the Transvaal Administration in 1921 was overruled by the Union Government following considerable agitation. In 1923, the Union Government assumed responsibility for all grants for African education. However, these grants still came from revenue derived from direct taxation of Africans.[80] Thus blacks were not only compulsorily submitted to an inferior form of education designed to fit them into subordinate positions in the racially organised division of labour, and to make them conform to the developing forms of domination; they also had to pay for it.

Conclusion

In the course of the first two decades of the 20th century, the ideology of segregation was successfully extended to the field of education. The education system throughout the Union was fragmented in its structures and curricula into four separate, hierarchically different schooling systems. 'Bantu Education', 'Indian Education' and 'Coloured Education', which, in parallel to 'White Education', were apparently products of successive Education Acts published during the 1950s and 1960s, had in reality taken shape many years before. White children were drawn into a form of mass schooling but black children have still not been fully incorporated today, a feature which reflects the segregationist strategy which dictated educational development in South Africa. Within a segregated framework, African education would meet the capitalist need for more productive black unskilled cheap labour while safeguarding the monopoly of the white working class in the skilled and semi-skilled labour market. Through segregated structures, the white working class was increasingly incorporated into a white state both politically and ideologically in order to mute social and cultural conflict between Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers as well as that between capital and labour.

The black working class was marginalised and channelled into reserves of cheap and unskilled labour.[81]

It has been shown in this chapter that the particular shape of the education system is bound up with the course of social and class relations produced under the pressure of mining capital. The class struggle in the gold fields, with the white working class claiming rights on the grounds of colour, together with the increasing threat of the 'poor white problem', determined a racially inspired response by the state and by capital. Tactics of co-option were adopted to 'silence' the growing militancy of white labour, and this led to class polarisation, with white workers gradually manifesting a racial identity with the dominant forces. Thus the state intervened in education as part of this strategy, supporting whites in their competition with blacks for both skilled and unskilled labouring positions. 'Poor whites' were equipped with better places in the labour market. Blacks, including Indians and 'coloureds', were segregated in order to minimise the potential threat they represented for whites in the labour market, and to conform to the pattern and needs of capital accumulation. Educational institutions were gradually reformed or created to meet these demands.

It has been also argued that the institutionalisation of racial segregation in the first half of the present century, though it represents a turning point in South African political process, cannot be isolated from the 19th century colonial legacy and culture of racism in South Africa. The 19th century intellectual tradition and 'scientific racism' and the ideas promoted by the eugenics movement and the Victorian 'civilising' mission created the environment for the development of a colonial culture dominated by racial prejudice, which facilitated the institutionalisation of racism and racial discrimination.

In the 1920s and 1930s, with the increasing social and economic sophistication of South African society, a newly-formulated concept of culture replaced the Victorian and colonial traditions of racism as a basis of segregation.

Notes

1. A very good reference on this matter is Willem Compschreur & Joost Divendal (eds), **Culture in Another South Africa** (London: Zed Books, 1989).
2. Shula Marks & Stanley Trapido (eds.), **The Politics of Class, Race & Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa** (New York: Longman, 1987), p.7. For details on cheap labour policy see Harold Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid', **Economy and Society**, 1 (4), November 1972, pp.424-456.
3. See for example F A Johnstone, 'Class conflict and colour bars in the South African gold mining industry, 1910-1926', in **Collected Seminar Papers** (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, October 1969-April 1970); F A Johnstone, **Class, Race and Gold** (London, 1976); and A H Jeeves, **Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890-1920** (Johannesburg, 1985).
4. Amongst African migrant workers, class loyalties were overdetermined by ethnic or tribal affiliations. The predominance of peasant characteristics also inhibited significant forms of political organisation or militancy at the workplace. However, many white workers had not only experienced the militancy of the British working class during the nineteenth century but had also developed a high level of class and political consciousness.
5. Johnstone, 'Class conflict and colour bars ...', op cit, p.122.
6. Marks & Trapido (eds.), op cit, p.7.
7. Ibid, p.8.
8. Saul Dubow, 'Race, Civilisation and Culture: The elaboration of segregationist discourse in the inter-war years', in Marks & Trapido (eds), op cit, p.70.
9. Ibid, p.72. Dubow points out that with the aid of biological sciences, 'despite their differences, social Darwinists, Spencerians, Lamarckians, craniologists and physical anthropologists all set themselves the task of classifying the world's races according to a natural hierarchy' (Ibid, p.73).
10. Ibid, p.73.
11. A Winter, **Till Darkness Fell** (Mirfield: House of Resurrection, Easter 1962), pp.8-9.
12. Ibid, pp 8-9.
13. See for example D Yudelman, **The Emergence of Modern South Africa** (London, 1983); N Levy, 'The state, mineworkers and labour regulations in the Transvaal, 1887-1906', in **Collected Seminar Papers** (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1980); M Lipton, **Capitalism and Apartheid in South Africa, 1910-1986** (Cape Town and Johannesburg: 1986); Martin Murray (ed.), **South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition** (Cambridge: Shenkman, 1987); Marks & Trapido (eds.), op cit; and Harold Wolpe, op cit.
14. M Legassick, 'South African capital accumulation and violence', **Economy and Society**, 3 (3), 1974, p.260.
15. For more details about these policies see: S Trapido, '"The friends of the natives": merchants, peasants and the political ideological structure of liberalism in the Cape, 1853-54', in S Marks & A Atmore (eds.), **Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa** (London, 1980); S Trapido, 'The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications of 1853', **Journal of African History**, V (1), 1964; G M Frederickson, **White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History** (New York and Oxford 1981); John Cell, **Segregation. The Highest Stage of White Supremacy. The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South** (Cambridge, 1982);and D J Welsh **The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal, 1910-1945** (Cape Town, 1971).
16. Shula Marks & Stanley Trapido, 'Lord Milner and the South African State', **History Workshop Journal**, 8, 1979, p.72.
17. Periodicals that played a considerable role included the **South African Mining Journal**, superseded by **South African Mines, Commerce and Industries**, the **State** (1908-12), the **African Monthly** (1906-10), and such papers as the **Transvaal Leader**, **Cape Times**, and **Christian Express**. Legassick, in a study on the origins of segregation, refers to the role played by societies such as the South African Philosophical Society, the Transvaal Native Affairs Society (formed in 1908) and the Natal Native Affairs Reform Society (formed in 1909). See M Legassick, 'The making of South African "native policy", 1903-1923: The origins of segregation', in **Collected Papers** (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1974), p.5.
18. C Headlam (ed.), **The Milner Papers, South Africa 1899-1905, 2** (London, 1933), p.467. Sir Alfred (later Lord) Milner (1825-1925) served as Governor of the Cape Colony from 1897 to 1901, and as High Commissioner of British South Africa from 1901 to 1905.
19. 'Memorandum, Sir A Milner to Major Hanbury Williams, 27 December 1900', Ibid, p.242. See also 'Interview, Sir A. Milner to a deputation from the White League, 1903', Ibid, p.459; and the letter 'Sir A. Milner to Mr Chamberlain, 9 May 1900', Ibid, p.144.
20. 'Leading Articles', **South African Mines, Commerce and Industries**, 27 April 1907, p.162.
21. Ibid, p.162.
22. 'Leading articles; Mr Trainton's Views', **South African Mines, Commerce and Industries**, 4 June 1904, p.270.
23. Ibid, p.270.
24. Ibid, p.270.
25. 'Sir A Milner to a deputation of coloured subjects, January 1901', in Headlam, op cit, p.213; and 'The Watch Tower Speech', in Headlam, op cit, p.467.
26. Sir A. Milner, 1903, quoted by Legassick, 'The making of South African "Native policy" ...', op cit.
27. 'Despatch, Lord Milner to Mr Chamberlain, 6 December 1901', in

Headlam, op cit, p.307.
28. 'Leading Articles', **South African Mines, Commerce and Industries**, 14 March 1903, p.3.
29. R E Philips, **The Bantu in the City: A Study of Cultural Adjustment on the Witwatersrand** (Lovedale, 1938), pp.12-13.
30. Ibid, pp.12-13. See also N Kagan, 'African settlement in the Johannesburg area, 1903-1923' (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1978), p.12.
31. **South African Native Affairs Commission Report, 1903-1905** (Cape Town, 1905), p.67.
32. Ibid, p.72.
33. Ibid, pp.71-72
34. **Transvaal Indigency Commission Report, 1906-8** (Pretoria, 1908), p.25.
35. Ibid, pp.25-26.
36. See Frank Molteno, 'The historical foundations of the schooling of black South Africans', in P Kallaway (ed.), **Apartheid and Education** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984); and Ernest F Dube, 'The Relationship between Racism and Education in South Africa', **Harvard Educational Review**, 55 (1), February 1985, p.90.
37. The political expression of this elite is well represented by the Native Educational Association formed in 1880, an association apparently modelled on and in response to the formation of the Afrikaner Bond, and the **Ibumba Yama Nyama,** formed by 1882 in Port Elizabeth to unite Africans in political matters in their struggle for national rights. See Marks & Trapido, op cit, p.6.
38. Union of South Africa, **Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Natal Education, 1935-6**, para.85.
39. M Horrell, **African Education, Some Origins and Developments** (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1963), p.13.
40. N Atkinson, **Teaching South Africans: A History of Educational Policy in South Africa** (University of Rhodesia: Faculty of Education, 1978), p.150.
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44. Headlam (ed.), **The Milner Papers** ..., op cit, p.133.
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46. Ibid, p.133.
47. Ibid, pp.242-4.
48. A L Behr & R G Macmillan, **Education in South Africa** (Pretoria: 1966), p.339.
49. Brian Rose & Raymond Tunmer (eds.), **Documents in South African Education** (Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1975), p.164.
50. D J Nolte, 'The educational needs of the coloured people in the Transvaal' (paper presented to the First National Coloured-European Conference, Cape Town, June 1933).
51. The Director of Education had this to say in 1908: 'The working principle which I adopt ... is to grade them one step lower than the schools for white children which have about the same enrolment' (TED, **Report of the Director of Education for the year ending 30 June 1908'**, pp.28-9).
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53. Transvaal Education Act of 1907.
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55. A D Dodd, **Native Vocational Training: A Study of Conditions in South Africa, 1652-1936** (Lovedale, 1938), p.85.
56. Letter from Lemana Training Institution to the Rev. Clarke, 18 March 1906, CPSA Archives.
57. Government Notice, 1 December 1905.
58. Natal Colony, **Report of Education Commission, 1909**, pp.11-12.
59. See for example Linda Chisholm, 'Class practice, racial control: Education of the white working class on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1913' (mimeo, University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Education, July 1985), p.6.
60. Dubow, op cit, p.83.
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63. J C Smuts, **Africa and Some World Problems** (Oxford: 1930), p.84.
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65. Ibid, pp.92-93.
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69. Union of South Africa, **Report of Interdepartmental Committee, 1935-6**, p.44.
70. Ibid, paras. 152-4.
71. Atkinson, **Teaching South Africans ...**, op cit, p.202.
72. Natal Province, **Department of Education Report, 1929**, p.13.
73. Orange Free State Province, **Department of Education Report, 1937**, p.151. All 'coloured' schools were run by government in this province.
74. Atkinson, op cit, p.206.
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76. TED, **Report of the Director of Education for the year ending 31 December 1917**, p.83.
77. Ibid, pp.80-81.
78. Natal Province, **Department of Education Report, 1929**, p.12.
79. 'Arguments for Union control and administration,' in **Report of the Native Affairs Commission, Relative to Union Control of, or Alternatively Provincial Uniformity in Native Education, 1921**.

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Chapter 5

Culture, Ethnicity and 'Retribalisation' in South Africa, 1948-1986

> Those presently in power are able to justify their policies by appealing to their 'traditional' characteristics; those in the vanguard of resistance can be expected, increasingly, to appeal to 'tradition', and to point to assaults on, and betrayals of, 'tradition', as a means of mobilising support for their cause.[1]

Introduction

This chapter examines how the apartheid state has used culture and education to promote ethnic-nationalisms in the so-called 'homelands' and 'national states' or 'bantustans'. It shows how culture and tradition and the historical past have been romanticised to inculcate ethnic-nationalist identities dividing South African society. It argues that the concept of culture, which emerged in the 1920s and 1930s in social anthropology as a function of race, acquired yet another meaning, that of a fossilised 'ethnic identity' or the peculiar way of life of an ethnic group. Culture, which was seen as an instrument and an indicator of social upliftment in the

Victorian age, came to be seen as a timeless body of values, lifestyles, norms and beliefs, a philosophy of life or world view of an ethnic group. Culture became a God-given gift to be preserved and protected through political, educational and social instruments.

The Christian National Education principle that cultures, languages and traditions of the various ethnic groups that constitute the South African society should be preserved and institutionally protected, and develop separately, emerged as the basis of apartheid educational and cultural policies. Paradoxically, while the colonial process in the rest of Africa had the contradictory impact of breaking down ethnic and tribal barriers to bring African societies into modern forms of national identity, the policy of bantustanisation attempted to consolidate those barriers and develop a sense of nationalism within the parameters of the traditional ethnic and tribal boundaries. Ironically, this could only be achieved through apartheid and oppressive protective instruments, that is, through institutional cultural protection.

'Bantustanisation': Its essence and rationale

From the early 1950s onwards the Nationalist government deliberately engaged in changing the African reserves into self-governing 'homelands' and 'independent national states'. This policy has been known as 'bantustanisation'. It emerged out of the following concerns: (1) the need for a counter-revolutionary culture that would eventually frustrate the growing national consciousness and political conscientisation promoted by labour and liberation movements; (2) the need to restructure, rationalise and consolidate the existing mechanisms of control of labour; (3) the need to minimise social, economic and political problems determined by the process of secondary industrialisation, which brought about increasing social and economic integration with profound political and ideological implications. Bantustanisation would ultimately feed white-controlled industry with cheap labour in an orderly

manner, while consolidating the foundations of white supremacy in South Africa.

With the deterioration of the economic and social conditions in the reserves from the 1920s onwards, which resulted in a massive migration to the towns, it became necessary for the Nationalist Party to rationalise, restructure and reinforce the mechanisms of control of labour. Thus, certain political functions previously performed by Pretoria's authorities were transferred to the traditional 'homeland' leaders.

As in many other processes of industrialisation, the industrial revolution in South Africa was not only an economic process but also a social and political process. Society became increasingly integrated, socially, economically, politically and culturally. New alliances and solidarities, which cut across traditional 'tribal' divisions, began to emerge. This process gave birth to African nationalism and the increasing radicalisation of the labour movement at the beginning of the present century.

In 1909 several African leaders initiated a process of political mobilisation culminating in the formation of the South African National Native Congress in January 1912, which challenged the Act that had established the Union of South Africa and excluded black people from the franchise.[2] Through regional and national conventions, social and religious organisations[3] and the African press, the SANNC developed co-operation, national solidarity and African unity to establish a solid nationalist movement. The African press, in particular, channelled the potential of the missionary-educated elite to educate and represent African opinion and thus enlighten the emerging nationalist consciousness. In the words of Daniel Letanka, Saul Msane and L.T. Mvabaza, editors of the Xhosa/English *Umlomo*, the African press succeeded in unifying all the African tribes into one people and improving the education of African children. When the SANNC was established in Bloemfontein on 12 January 1912, Pixley Seme made it clear that the conference 'was called so that we can together devise the means and ways of forming a national union for the purpose of creating a national unity and defending our rights and privileges'.[4] He argued that the

formation of the Congress represented an important step for solving the so-called 'native problem', and for uniting people who had until then been separated by tribal jealousies.

The apartheid state hoped to curtail these developments by boosting artificial ethnic-nationalisms out of traditional 'tribal' divisions and rivalries. Its strategy was twofold. Firstly, it applied a 'stick and carrot' policy towards the African middle class through fierce repression in the urban areas and co-option, with political and economic accommodation, in the reserves or 'homelands'. Secondly, and most importantly, it decided to develop an appropriate leadership by exploring the potentially strong mobilisation power of traditional African chiefs. Consequently, chieftainship became an area of fierce political competition between the nationalist movement, on the hand, and the state, on the other, for reasons that will be explained in the following section.

'By winning the chief one has won the whole tribe'

The Congress leaders were aware of and did not misregard the intimate bonds that existed between the chiefs and their constituencies. When the SANNC was formed, the leading black elite remained very weak in size though strong in determination. The Congress could not successfully forge a national alliance without the help that traditional structures and leaders provided. In some cases the process of political mobilisation became facilitated by these bonds and chiefs became active players in the process of political mobilisation. This is related to the very nature of chieftainship, the solid links between the chief and his community, his accountability to the community and the loyalty of the community to him.[5] For Sehoole, chieftainship offered an effective mechanism for nationalist mobilisation to the SANNC/ANC, partly due to the dominant role that chieftainship enjoyed in traditional African communities:

> The institution of chieftainship was indispensable for the equilibrium of a black tribal community. The unity of the tribe revolved around the chief. Traditionally the chief stood as the representative of the tribe and his word had to be honoured. A chief was not elected but born as a chief, i.e., his status was hereditary... The chief was considered the father of the tribe, as such the chief was accountable to the tribe. He was assisted in his tribal duties by a secret council of close relatives. The traditional system had three layers of advisers to the chief: (1) the family council (khuduthamaga), (2) the tribal council made up of heads of different clans, and (3) the public assembly (pitso)... The tribe owed allegiance to the chief. The power of the chief in the tribe was legitimated through oral history in the form of stories and, in some cases, written proverbs. Often the position of the chief in relation to the tribe was upheld almost to the level of infallibility. Thus any transgression of tribal rules or norms was severely punished. The fact that the unity of the tribe revolved around the chief ... made the chieftainship crucial in the process of political mobilisation by the SANNC and political co-option by the architects of the Bantustans. By winning the chief, one had won the whole tribe.[6]

The relations between the chiefs and the masses have been legitimised through tradition and oral history, which, together with the family, constitute one of the dominant ideological agencies in traditional African societies. Ideology is transmitted from one generation to another in the form of short stories and proverbs — cultural heritage — with important moral lessons about human behaviour and justifications of prevailing social relations. As has been pointed out, this

culture was accommodated by the liberation movement in its earliest stages of development in South Africa and the rest of the continent. It has been exploited by the apartheid regime and colonial rule. However, as will be shown, it has been neglected, marginalised and, in some cases, suppressed by modern liberation movements and post-colonial rule in their attempts to come to grips with the phenomenon of tribalism and the danger of national balkanisation.

As a nationalist movement, the apartheid government found in chiefs an alternative leadership that could be co-opted and easily used to dissipate the force of black resistance and the working-class movement and gradually 'retribalise' Africans through the revitalisation and incorporation of traditional structures. Since the enforcement of repressive measures in the scattered 'reserves' by white officials was becoming too costly and difficult, the Nationalist government adopted a policy of creating an intermediate cadre of African stooges from among the chiefs and the rural middle class, to mediate between the apartheid state and the oppressed majority.[7] Following the promulgation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, a hierarchy of chiefs was established in the reserves according to customary genealogies or, where local chiefs resisted collaboration with the apartheid state, by direct appointment.

However, the co-option of traditional chiefs was not a new phenomenon in Africa. It formed the cornerstone of the British colonial policy of 'indirect rule'. In South Africa, it had already been suggested by several colonial officials including Dr Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society, who in 1843 said:

> We have conquered some of the tribes in the Cape Colony, but the problem is how to govern them. We have annexed the territory up to the tropics. We have to establish a system of civil administration. For this we need the chiefs.[8]

Further:

> Had a few of the chiefs been subsidised by having small salaries allowed to them, we might by this time have the affairs of Kaffirland in our own hands.[9]

The distinctive feature in this case is in that the co-option of chiefs represents a shift from the classical theory of 'indirect rule' to a policy of national balkanisation as formulated by the Tomlinson Commission appointed in 1950 to design a scheme for the rehabilitation of the reserves.

The Tomlinson Commission designed a policy aimed at developing within the reserves a social and political structure that could preserve 'Native culture' or 'Bantu culture'. Its policy rested on the following assumptions: (1) that contact between whites and Africans and the concession of equal rights to blacks endangered the existence of European civilisation and culture; and (2) that if Africans were granted land, education and opportunities for technical training and equal political rights, there would be a 'total collapse of European culture'.[10] Interestingly, culture remained a major foundation of its policy. The commission put forward the following recommendations: (1) that social development and welfare services of the 'Bantu' should be adjusted to the nature of their society; (2) that their national characteristics should be protected from and fertilised by Western culture.[11] To implement these recommendations, the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act No 46 of 1959 delimited eight African territories, called 'homelands'. These included Lebowa for the Northern Sotho, Qwaqwa for the Southern Sotho, Tswanaland later renamed Bophuthatswana for the Tswana, Kwazulu for the Zulu, Transkei for the Xhosa, Gazankulu for the Tsonga and Venda for the Venda. These units were to undergo a 'gradual development to self-government'. As Verwoerd put it, the bantustans 'might develop to full independence, possibly eventually forming a South African Commonwealth with white South Africa serving as the core guardian of the emerging Bantu States'.[12] The following tables show the dates when these territories became 'self-governing' or 'independent'

homelands.

Self-Governing' Bantustans

Gazankulu	1978
Kangwane	1978
Kwandebele	1979
Kwazulu	1975
Lebowa	1972
Qwaqwa	1974

'Independent' Bantustans (TBVC 'states')

Transkei	1976
Bophuthatswana	1977
Venda	1979
Ciskei	1981

The reactions to the policy of bantustanisation were varied. Some chiefs such as Albert Luthuli rejected collaboration with the government and were consequently ostracised. There were cases of massive upheavals such as the Bambata revolt and Paramount Moroamoche Sekhukhune in Lebowa. Those who accepted collaboration with the apartheid government have either supported bantustanisation as part of the apartheid policy or have assumed ambiguous and contradictory positions. For example, the former Chief Minister of Transkei, Matanzima, openly showed his agreement with the policy of 'separate development'. When Chief L M Mangope was appointed as the chief councillor of the T T A in 1968, he said:

> Mr Chairman I want to ask that what I am going to announce should not be broadcasted through the Radio 'Bantu'. I want to say something in regard to the position in which I was elected yesterday. The procedure and everything done by this government is based on Government policy, namely, Separate Development. We have already indicated our acceptance of that policy of the government. It was indicated that the policy of separate development is based on our traditions. We embraced it because we favoured it and we like our traditions.[13]

Some chiefs such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi adopted the policy of using the system to challenge it. They have been very slippery in their approach to issues of a national nature. In practice, their activities have in many ways enhanced ethnic-nationalisms as expected by government officials. More radical positions have been assumed by newcomers such as Major-General Bantu Holomisa, the most outspoken of South Africa's homeland leaders, who told delegates at a conference in Egypt that he is using his Transkei powerbase as a 'lethal sword against the very system which created it'. He explained his position as follows:

> It is not an anachronism that we air these views from a Transkeian administration which is a creation of the apartheid system. We did not devise the system which tried to balkanise our land and people to guarantee white domination over a divided and desperate African community.[14]

'Tradition' and 'modernity' in South African cultures

Now that the apartheid system is definitely collapsing and the issue of national reconstruction is gaining centrality, the question that arises is about what should be done about the so-called 'traditional' chiefs, culture and institutions. What role, if any, should they play in the 'New South Africa'? However, before I discuss these important questions I would like to concentrate briefly on a more fundamental problem: what does tradition represent in the South African context? Are the present chiefs, culture and institutions traditional?

Tradition is a general and vague concept that has been

abused in South African political vocabulary. It has been manipulated by both the ruling class and the opposition to promote or justify their political ideals. For example, it has been readily used to show in what ways Africans are really *different*, by displaying differences that are manifested in their lifestyles, rituals, and customs.

The dominant concept, promoted by the media and other state agencies, labels as tradition any form of behaviour, attitude or lifestyle among African people seen as backward, tribal, 'primitive' or uncivilised, and taken for granted as typically African. This involves for example hair style, food, clothes, dance, gestures, *lobola*, initiation rituals, the authority of chiefs, the activity of witchdoctors and belief in ancestors.

In its popular sense, 'tradition' refers to the way of life in African societies before colonial domination. In this sense, people very often confuse the reality of the past with recreated images of the past and see each tradition as a coherent and self-perpetuating or unchangeable system. Spiegel and Boonzaier define 'tradition' as follows:

> In a limited sense, 'tradition' refers to the transmission of culture — the repeated handing down of ideas, conventions and practices which humans need in social interaction. Popular understanding of the term goes beyond this neutral sense. Thus when people are told something is 'tradition' they will assume that it is age-old and unchanged since its inception. Any behaviour which is thought to have originated long ago and to have been handed down from generation to generation is thus placed in the category 'traditional'.[15]

In another sense popular within academic circles, tradition assumes a much more complex meaning and reflects profound, concurrent historical contradictions in a developmental process. It has its origins in the colonial discourse developed in response to the potential threat represented by events such

as the foundation of the United Nations, the Chinese Revolution and the reinforcement of the Soviet Internationalist ideology, the Cold War, and the rise of nationalist movements throughout the world. These events were accompanied by the increasing restructuring of the world capitalist system and the rise of the organic composition of capital within the colonial world during the first half of the 20th century, which produced visible changes on the structure of colonial economies.

As the influx of capital into colonial territories increased so did the existing social and economic infrastructure (railways, roads, stores, hospitals, schools, etc.), and as a result, better, though limited, opportunities for Africans in education and administration were offered. The result was a proliferation in colonial literature of a new terminology emphasising 'progress', 'development' and 'modernisation', repeatedly used to show the 'benefits' brought about by colonialism for the colonised. African 'traditional' societies, it is assumed, are becoming 'modern' or 'Westernised' as a result of a common sharing of basic Western values like the freedom of the individual, Western democracy and social order, values the West has already achieved and the rest of world have not or, at least, not yet. It is held that development embodies two complementary movements which determine its eventual direction and outcome: one towards *modernity*, a linear movement along pre-determined historical stages founded in the exemplar of the West; the other away from the *traditional* — the indigenous, the totalitarian, the barbarian. 'Modernisation' is the term which captures the dynamics of the process of development, and is perceived as a process of change towards the condition of modernity — an abstraction of the existing state of affairs of the countries of Western Europe and North America. The point of departure, 'non-modernity' or 'tradition', is seen as a residual category. Tradition in this sense refers to those features of African life or practice that have not yet undergone a process of modernisation.

Based on the dichotomy modernity/tradition (or First World/Third World) South Africa is seen as a constellation of cultures with a Western or modern culture dominating the main urban areas, particularly the so-called 'white South

Africa', and a periphery of 'traditional' cultures. The former is dynamic, diverse and individualistic. The latter is unchanging, homogeneous and communal. It is assumed in this conceptualisation: (1) that traditions are handed down from past generations in an essentially unchanged form; and (2) that, where traditions had suffered any form of change, these have been restored and preserved by the policy of 'separate development' and constitute the basis of the present cultural diversity; (3) that traditions are an attribute of 'traditionalist' outlook, typical of backward groups resistant to modern ways of life.

As has been stressed, a common problem in the prevailing conceptions is the tendency to portray tradition as a 'fossilised' and self-perpetuating system transmitted from generation to generation. Traditions do not necessarily remain the same. Although they emphasise the cultural peculiarity of a particular social group, traditions do change as culture changes in society. African institutions and practices such as *lobola* (a bridewealth payment for the transfer of a woman's reproductive, productive and sexual services) and the tribute to the chief have changed in form and meaning with the increasing monetarisation of society. Chieftainship in South African 'homelands' represents one of those institutions that are said to be 'traditional', but which, on closer inspection, turn out to have been imposed from outside. They have a semblance of continuity with the past only because they are described as such.[16] After the founding of the bantustans, chiefs' roles and accountability and the sources of their authority changed radically. They became bureaucratic administrators controlled by the Nationalist government and a means of enforcing oppressive and discriminatory apartheid policies. They came to be seen as instruments of an alien control. The same applies to the historical institutions incorporated in the tradition of their ethnic groups. These have been in many cases re-created to serve new political ends in the 'homelands'.

It is not argued that tradition does not exist at all. It is argued that tradition in South Africa should be understood with reference to the constraints imposed by the apartheid administration. This is of crucial importance in the process of

national reconstruction.

Chieftainship, culture and national reconstruction

Chieftainship and 'traditional' institutions constitute a complex area in African politics, which is greatly under-researched. The experiences of African countries on this matter have generally been disastrous. In many cases, their policies have led to social dissatisfaction and have been criticised by oppositional groups as being against national interests. One can classify their policies in three major categories: (1) the 'back to the roots' approach; (2) total rejection and challenge; and (3) incorporation and re-conversion according to newly-set political ideals.

In countries that were subjected to colonial systems of 'indirect rule' such as Swaziland and Lesotho, African leaders not only made use of the existing colonial institutions but also engaged in a crusade of re-discovery and promotion of 'pre-colonial' traditions: kingship, chieftainship, lifestyles, rituals, etc. It represents an almost blind celebration of traditional institutions, values and symbols for the sake of national pride and identity. A similar approach has been adopted by the bantustan bureaucracy in South Africa. Genealogy constitutes the main criterion for political appointments and national administration.

In countries subjected to assimilationist policies such as Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, this process assumed passionate dimensions and led to 'negritude' movements, though with little social impact in practice. In both cases, emphasis was placed on a return to original or typical African ways of life dominant before colonial rule. Politicians found their source of inspiration in pre-colonial histories. However, this approach seems to have been superseded by the desire to pursue modern and Western political and administrative styles.

Total rejection is the strategy of challenge and marginalisation of 'traditional' chiefs adopted by socialist-oriented countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola. Most aspects of African cultural traditions and the

the chiefs and their communities must be taken seriously.

Notes

1. A Spiegel & E Boonzaier, 'Promoting tradition: Images of the South African past', in E Boonzaier & J Sharp (eds.), **The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts** (Claremont: David Philip, 1988), p.56.
2. See A Odendaal, **Black Politics in South Africa to 1912** (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1984), pp.233-235.
3. For example the Becoana Mutual Improvement Society (BMIS), and the African Brotherhood and Commercial Co-operation Society (ABCCS).
4. R V Selope Thema, 'How Congress began', **Drum**, August 1953, p.41.
5. Trevor Molatlhegi Sehoole, 'Ideology, ethnicity and social reproduction in education in Bophuthatswana, 1977-1990', (MEd Research Report, University of the Witwatersrand, 1991), p.14.
6. Ibid, p.15.
7. This opinion is shared by E S Sachs in **The Anatomy of Apartheid** (London: Collets, 1965), p.265.
8. I B Tabata, **The All African Convention, The Awakening of the People** (Cape Town: AAC, 1950), p.105.
9. Ibid, p.104.
10. Tomlinson Commission, **Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa** (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1955), p.XVIII.
11. Ibid, p.202.
12. See M Horrell, **Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa** (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1978), p.40.
13. 'Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Reconstituted Tswana Territorial Authorities, 1968', Montshiwa, p.41.
14. **The Star**, Wednesday January 9 1991, p.6.
15. Spiegel & Boonzaier, op cit, p.40.
16. Ibid, p.48.
17. See Constitution of Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, 1972, Chapter III, Part V, 13 (1), p.130.

Chapter 6

From a Culture of Resistance to a Culture of Reconstruction: A New Perspective on Educational Struggles

Introduction

This chapter discusses the political significance of the most recent trends in the educational struggles in South Africa. It looks at the shifts within the political culture developed out of the process of resistance to Bantu Education and assesses their significance to the climate of change set out by De Klerk's regime. It ultimately draws attention to the need that has emerged in various educational circles for developing a culture of reconstruction, which transcends the merely destructive mood of resistance. It suggests that an appropriate leadership should be developed at the community level to promote this process.

Two important concepts are essential for an understanding of the process of struggles for a non-racial and democratic education in South Africa: (1) the *concept of struggles of resistance* and (2) *the concept of struggles of transformation.* The concept of *struggles of resistance* refers to oppositional practices that challenge control and power in school relations by focusing on immediate issues (such as democratic representative councils, free textbooks, better equipment and school conditions). The main strategy is dominated by immediatism or short-term fulfilment of the expressed

demands or needs. The concept of *struggles of transformation* embody medium- and long-term goals, which are directed in some way at the relations of production and reproduction imposed by the apartheid system in general and segregated schooling in particular. Political strategies in this case contain a new dimension. They transcend the purely destructive nature of the struggles of resistance to incorporate the need for reconstruction, which is a fundamental factor towards emancipation.

In South Africa, these struggles included not only confrontation with state institutions which promoted the status quo and, thus, the opening of space for counter-hegemonic practices, but also attempts to fill this space with a wide range of constructive initiatives. These included changes in the 'open' schools and programmes of alternative education which culminated with the concept of *people's education*. Generally, struggles of transformation involve a struggle over global demands. It is not suggested however that no relationship exists between the two levels of struggle and their expression in the South African process. In education struggles of transformation, like struggles of resistance, are rooted in the material and ideological conditions in which people find themselves, and these conditions, with their associated contradictions, have their birthplace at the heart of the apartheid education system. They are elements of the same process, the 'negation of negation', that is the challenge to the de-humanising system of apartheid education.

However, it was not until the 1980s that struggles of transformation were definitively established as part of the strategy for emancipation in South Africa. One should note that struggles of transformation are a very difficult terrain to reach, for they encompass the struggles of social groups, which take place in a sphere which is not controlled by the state and not consciously regulated by society. They are not only an outcome of advancement or progress in the struggle against apartheid education but also an expression of new directions in the struggle within the struggle, in which the counter-hegemonic space conquered from the apartheid state is filled with constructive initiatives. As such, they will

continue after the fall of apartheid.

Besides the adoption of more constructive strategies and tactics in the confrontation with the state system, the struggles of transformation assumed the form of new ideas, new institutions, processes and movements.[1] A general concept that has been used to refer to this kind of initiative in education is the concept of *alternative education*. I shall start by categorising and assessing these initiatives in the context of the struggles waged by the oppressed people of South Africa for a non-racial and democratic educational system. I shall argue that a common weakness of these initiatives in the context of social transformation and reconstruction is that they have little concern with the terrain of culture. Culture, it is argued, is not just a legacy or patrimony to be preserved, but also a domain of social struggles and, as such, a terrain for social intervention. Forces hostile to social change are entrenched in culture in the same way that dynamic forces which promote change become part of a cultural heritage. In the process, non-formal education can play a central role in promoting and developing those cultural forms which will ultimately enable the oppressed majority to break the chains of oppression. Crucial in this process is the development and consolidation of a culture of reconstruction, which combines resistance to oppressive institutions and practices with the commitment to building those that can consolidate the process of social emancipation. Of not least importance in this process is also the appreciation of the inherited material and spiritual legacy and its reconversion for the ideal of emancipation.

The idea of alternative education

In its wider sense, alternative education alludes to any educational initiative outside the state system with emancipatory goals. In this sense, from the Afrikaner point of view, the private schools and the so-called CNE schools (1902-7) established by Afrikaners to counter Milner's anglicisation policies would possibly fall under the same category. For the oppressed majority, however, these and similar initiatives fundamentally reflected hegemonic

interests of the ruling class.

The oppressed classes also attempted forms of alternative education: 'night schools', 'independent schools', cultural clubs, and, recently, a wide range of projects from the private sector and church and community organisations. Some of them have incorporated the ideal of liberation; most of them have vanished or have been directly or indirectly incorporated by the state system. This tradition constitutes an important 'people's encyclopedia' with important lessons that no one committed to democratic education can for a moment ignore.

Surprisingly, there has not been any systematic critical scrutiny of these initiatives, particularly their significance to the process of national reconstruction. The lack of problematisation of alternative models poses a serious political problem. As Levin has indicated, 'it is always easier to coin a slogan than to give it serious content and direction'.[2] What is at stake are policies and projects with far-reaching implications for the lives of many South Africans, which are implemented without clarification of their nature and goals.

Alternative initiatives can roughly be grouped in three main categories. Firstly, there is a set of programmes aimed at minimising isolated problems faced by blacks at different levels. They are involved in what one would call 'ambulance work'. Their role is merely remedial. Though carried out privately, their effects ultimately reflect dominant hegemonic interests. Through them, minor state functions are transferred to private or community control. No space is left for any counter-hegemonic initiative. They are based on the principle of separation of education from politics, and on the assumption that the people should adjust to the system and not the system to the people. They are business oriented and some of them could well be funded by the Small Business Development Corporation. The label 'alternative education' remains only a lobbying strategy or a quest for legitimacy.

Secondly, there is a set of initiatives constrained to address the immediate situation while reconsidering traditional practices by developing critical thinking, and alternative curricula, syllabi and pedagogy.

Finally, there is also a set of initiatives representing a

radical departure from apartheid education, aimed at expanding a counter-hegemonic culture to lay the foundations of a new education system which caters for majority's interests in a free, democratic and united South Africa. Its educational projects are radically different from the first two in that they are based on the concept of education, power and democracy as an interconnected unity. One would place the concepts of people's education within this context.

There are strong constraints militating against the last two categories. One is the fact that the territory where these models have to operate is a sphere of state control and hegemony. In fact, it can be compared to a battle ground where alternative interests are involved in a battle or bargaining process with dominant forces. Alexander puts it nicely:

> This is one of the fronts on which we are doing battle in the 'war of position' against the ruling class with a view to establishing a counter-hegemonic thrust that will shift the balance of forces in our favour.[3]

However, because the bargaining takes place in a controlled territory, the demarcation between ruling class hegemonic or people's counter-hegemonic roles is obscured. This is a matter which requires a deeper reflection and constant assessment. Samuel suggests, as a spotlight in the process, a definition of a clear political goal and a constant questioning of alternative roles with reference to that goal, more precisely to its meaningfulness to the oppressed masses. This is what some theoreticians have labelled 'criticism and self-criticism' by reference to the working people's needs. This questioning should not only include the structure, feasibility, function or action and the outcome of alternative models, it should also involve aims and objectives, curriculum, funding, accountability, legitimacy, control, and constraints such as certification. The practical implications of these criteria need not be spelt out here. Enough to say that this perspective should shift our conceptions from the belief that because there are problems in the community and the state does nothing to

solve them, any initiative we take aimed at solving them falls under the umbrella of alternative education.

Having established this categorisation, I would like to draw attention to the need to transform these various initiatives into a basis for developing a culture of reconstruction in education.

Towards a culture of national reconstruction

The process of change has profound cultural implications in our social practice. Commonsensical thinking would like us to believe that change is a smooth and harmonious process. The two last decades have proved the opposite. They have shown how change is essentially a painful, contradictory, and physically and psychologically violent process leading in some cases to traumatic experiences. They clearly show how finding a course of action that does not conflict with the differing value systems of various social groupings is often one of the most difficult challenges in the process of change.

Marx may be challenged by the burgeoning 'humanist' right for openly affirming the necessity of violence (revolutionary violence) to overthrow oppressive regimes and for his conception of the class struggle as the driving force of history. He remains unchallenged however in his conceptualisation of change as a dialectical and conflictual process. In this sense, reconciliation does not necessarily mean the absence of conflict. It is rather the re-direction of potential and actual conflict to the benefit of the society. Reconciliation is harmony in tension, unity in contradiction or diversity. It is the presence of social tension and contradictions which make unity and harmony possible. This is a reality that everyone should keep in mind when engaging in the process of bringing about national reconciliation, and a pre-condition for national reconstruction.

The violent nature of change is determined by the following factors among others: (1) commitment to new ideals, whose accomplishment is very often uncertain, given the unevenness and contradictory nature of history; (2) and the re-direction of the inherited cultural legacy according to the new ideals. This involves restructuring and radically changing the existing

oppressive and exploitative social relations and material conditions of human life, for example migrant labour and job reservation, which control the social and economic mobility of the people. This involves above all reshaping the whole set of prevailing cultural practices: conceptions of life, lifestyles, methods and patterns of behaviour. In this sense, the process of change and particularly the process of national reconstruction can be seen as essentially a *cultural process*. There are three possible approaches as to how this cultural process should progress: (1) a structuralist-functionalist perspective; (2) a purely culturalist perspective; and (3) an eclectic position embodying elements of the first two perspectives in a dialectical manner.

From the first perspective, cultural change will *inevitably* emerge and materialise as society in its various parts breaks away from the existing economic and material conditions to establish a new economic and social order. It is a process with no active and direct social intervention from any particular social force. The various social forces concentrate their energy on restructuring material conditions, a process very often regarded as a purely technical process. Economic and social plans including education emphasise expansion and its quantitative aspects. This passive approach to the role of human agency in the process of change has proved inadequate.

From the second perspective, society is seen as facing an ill conscience, which conditions all forms of social practice. Change is only possible if society is freed from this pathological state. The therapy necessitates primarily a directed cultural change, the change of people's minds as a pre-condition to wider material and social changes. Individuals have to be enabled to act upon material conditions by raising them to consciousness, that is, by making them aware of the cultural barriers that prevent them from doing so, by conscientising them. A vanguard, trained or socialised into the desired forms of life, is required to direct the process. Socialist-oriented countries have several examples: the Cultural Revolution in China, re-education camps in Russia and Mozambique, and the recent campaigns against 'colonial mentality' and 'negative traditional values' in Angola and Mozambique.

The last approach is based on a synthesis and refinement of the two first approaches. The process of change is seen as a global process, as an interconnected material and cultural process. While material changes are reflected in the changing values, norms, beliefs, knowledge, skills, behaviour or culture, these immediately became a weapon whereby individuals in society most effectively change their material conditions of existence. For the second process to take place, however, a general social leadership is required. The state and the community with its democratic structures have a central role to play in developing and providing this leadership. I seem to have reached the critical issue addressed in this chapter: leadership for developing a culture for national reconstruction.

By leadership in promoting a culture of national reconstruction I mean here not just the ability to persuade people to comply voluntarily with what is seen as the necessary political, social and economic steps for the accomplishment of the wishes (the wants and needs, the values and aspirations) of the people of South Africa but also the necessary activities involved in the process. For the reason outlined above — the conflictual nature of change — this activity must involve pulling together some coherent compromise out of a diversity of conflictual interests.

There should be a systematic and widespread commitment to minimise the damage done for so many years by the apartheid system. This should emphasise the development of assertiveness, self-confidence, a sense of pride and a sense of security to counter what very often has been regarded as the 'culture of silence' and its profound psychological implications. The community should appropriate and use the main agencies of socialisation available: alternative institutions, the mass media particularly TV and radio, cultural organisations (clubs and youth clubs) and art performance.

Notes

1. E Molefe, 'An appraisal of the People's Institute for Alternative Education', in **Education for Affirmation**, Conference Papers (Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1988), p.81.
2. Richard Levin, 'Conceptualising "the People" in People's Education: People's Education and democratic transformation in South Africa' (Education Department Research Seminar Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988).
3. N Alexander, 'Ten years of educational crisis: The resonance of 1976,' in **Education for Affirmation**, op cit, p.23.

Chapter 7

Culture, Education and National Unity[1]

> In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as fingers, yet as one hand in all things essential to mutual progress.[2]

Introduction

Many countries have for a long time grappled with the problem of reconciling national unity with cultural diversity. This problem arises out of a multiplicity of situations: (1) continuing ethnic, linguistic or cultural minorities; (2) marked regional claims to autonomy or cultural identity; (3) the influx of migrants of heterogeneous cultural backgrounds; and (4) socio-economic conflict arising out of unemployment or other socio-economic illnesses, and differences of age-group, gender, race and class.[3] Another factor is what Halls describes as 'gigantism':

> Countries, like much modern architecture, suffer from 'gigantism': psychologically, ordinary people feel unable to identify with large entities, supranational or national. 'Small' is not only 'beautiful', but comprehensible.[4]

In many cases; these situations can lead to social conflict or

cultural clashes between majority and minority groups, and the assertion by minorities of a will to preserve a separate cultural identity.

Governments have responded to the challenge posed by the above situations in various ways. These have been categorised by social theorists in several typologies of policies and approaches.[5] For example, Wirt distinguishes four main policy approaches: (1) assimilation (e.g. the case of the Scots and Welsh in Great Britain); (2) socialised isolation (e.g. the case of the Lapps in Sweden); (3) cultural pluralism (e.g. the case of the Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands); and (4) colonialism (e.g. the case of the Africans, Asians and West Indians in the United Kingdom).[6]

In his first attempt to define a typology, Watson suggested five discernible policy approaches towards the education of minorities within national borders: (1) the *recognition approach* in those countries where constitutional recognition is given to minority languages, culture and education (e.g. USSR, India); (2) the *unification approach* in those countries that seek to create a unified sense of nationhood through the school system (e.g. Sudan, Ghana, Chad, Dahomey, Tanzania, Malaysia, Indonesia); (3) the *separation approach*, a modification of (2), in those countries that try to develop a common nationality while at the same time preserving the different languages and cultures of the minority groups (e.g. Singapore and Nigeria); (4) the *integration approach* in those countries that attempt through the school system, language and external pressures to integrate immigrants into the mainstream of a homogeneous society (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia, France); and (5) the *non-recognition* or *laissez-faire approach*, where the official policy is one of laissez-faire and decisions are left to individual local authorities (e.g. the United Kingdom, Germany).[7]

More recently Watson developed a modified version of his typology by classifying countries with multi-racial educational policies into three major categories: (1) those that have a deep-rooted racial/cultural mix (e.g. USSR, China, India); (2) those whose cultural mix is a direct or partial result of colonialism (e.g. many of the Asian and African countries); and

(3) those that have become multi-racial largely as a result of voluntary immigration (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia and more recently much of Western Europe).[8] In the first category, regardless of political make-up (socialist or bourgeois), national unity is preserved while an educational provision for different ethnic groups is largely guaranteed. In the second category, the educational policies pursued by different governments not only vary over time but range from assimilation through integration, to cultural pluralism. In the last category, a clear policy towards education in a multi-racial, multi-cultural society had to be formulated and a *laissez-faire* approach abandoned as the racial problem began to emerge and be exploited for political gain. As Watson himself recognises, a major weakness of this typology is the fact that it overlooks the impact of colonialism on already multi-cultural societies such as Nigeria, Ceylon or Mauritius and the fact that there were already indigenes in Australia, Canada and the USA before the arrival of the white man.[9]

There are strengths and weaknesses in the three models. This study will consider four main policy models which rather than being alternatives to the above models are a synthesis of their strengths. These are: (1) cultural assimilation and integration; (2) cultural amalgamation; (3) insular cultural pluralism; and (4) modified cultural amalgamation. These models will be discussed with particular reference to the South African context. My concern is to develop a meaningful theoretical framework for the definition of educational policy strategies in order to reconcile the inherited social and cultural diversity with the development of a national culture for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. I also intend to explore whether, given the complex diversity of the South African society and the commitment to a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic education system, everyone should study the same curriculum at school. The notion of diversity is used here in its wider sense as encompassing historically constituted race, gender, class, geographical and cultural differences. It is thus assumed as a historical, dynamic, changing and changeable phenomenon.

Model I: Cultural assimilation and integration

Assimilation and integration is common in those countries that have become multi-racial or multi-cultural largely as a result of immigration (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia and recently much of Western Europe) and have sought, through the school system, language and cultural institutions, to integrate immigrants into the mainstream of a homogeneous society. The dominant value system is transmitted at the expense of all other value systems or cultures.

Assimilation is very often justified as a means for achieving social equality. It is assumed that assimilation will compensate for the cultural deficit of immigrants and minimise socio-economic disadvantage, thus equalising society. Britain is an excellent example of this model. Since the early 1960s, immigrant/host-society relations have been interpreted in terms of the traditional/modern dichotomy. Accordingly, immigrant groups display the characteristics of the 'traditional' societies from which they come and their main problem is primarily that of adapting to the 'modern' environment of Britain.[10] Grant puts it this way:

> It is not long since almost everyone in the educational system assumed that having a first language other than English was a handicap, and that the main task with anyone in this position was to teach them English — not as well, but instead. This assumption is still widespread, and is held by many members of the minority communities themselves.[11]

In the USA, the policy of assimilation based on the 'melting-pot concept' resulted in a high degree of homogenisation. However, as culture became homogenised, it was instinctively felt necessary to preserve ethnic particularisms: language, beliefs, customs and a host of other

phenomena were felt to be under threat.[12] The Bilingual Act of 1968 and the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act of 1972 introduced multi-cultural education as a recognition of cultural rights for Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Black Americans and other minority groups.

The educational consequences of this model are obvious. Teachers are very often selected from the dominant group. The curriculum and syllabuses are based on the values and ideas of the dominant group or culture. The dominant group enjoys a 'cultural advantage'. This is very much the reality of most 'open schools' in South Africa. It can be translated into the formula $A+B+C+D = A$,[13] where the symbols represent the different microcultures in the country and A represents the dominant culture.

Model II: Cultural amalgamation

This model embodies a *strategy of unification*, whereby developing countries seek to create a unified sense of nationhood through the school system, using a national language of instruction and centrally prescribed textbooks and curricula (e.g. Sudan, Ghana, Chad, Dahomey, Tanzania, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mozambique).[14] It focuses on global rather than local concerns. It is a rejection of both segregation and assimilation. A whole generation has to be converted to a new philosophy.

This is the strategy of cultural revolution for the creation of 'the New Man' adopted by Cuba, Angola and Mozambique. It involves an educational stage designed to alter the mentality of the people in order to eradicate negative traditional cultural practices (superstition, fetishism, obscurantism and magic) and colonial cultural practices (racism, tribalism, regionalism, individualism, and elitism).[15] What is unique in these experiences is the challenge to negative forms of traditional culture. It is argued that in traditional societies, given the low level of knowledge which characterises them, superstition and similar practices take the place of science and block any scientific analysis of the material and social milieu in favour of the supernatural.[16] Through one of its mechanisms for

survival, traditional education creates passivity and respect towards inherited ideas very often taken for granted. It encourages the belief in the infallibility of the older generations personified in the elders. It also tries to justify historically women's submission to men and sexist values. The new culture is based on positive traditional forms with, however, new content dictated by the ideal of socialism.

The educational consequences of this strategy are much more complex. Teachers promote a new culture and, for this purpose, they have to undergo a process of re-education and socialisation into the desired ideal society and values. The educational, ideological and political framework precedes the creation and development of the respective socio-economic base. The curriculum, syllabuses and methods are integrated and based on old and new value systems, chiefly the latter. A core curriculum and a core language are adopted. It can be represented as $A+B+C+D = E$, where E represents the national culture of the 'New Man' or 'New Society'.

Model III: Insular cultural pluralism

This model is common in those countries that have a deep-rooted racial/cultural mix (eg. USSR, China, India, Belgium and the Netherlands). It is a policy whereby the rights of minority languages, culture and education are recognised in the National Constitution. Each group maintains its own identity. It emphasises group rights over the rights of the individual.

In 1971, the principle of cultural autonomy for the two main linguistic communities was introduced in Belgium, which has made it a 'community' far from being a unitary state. There are two ministries of education, one for French-speakers, the other for Flemish-speakers. There are also three Cultural Councils for the three main linguistic groups: French, Dutch and German. Each has its own cultural budget. The divergences that arise from this are however minimised by the existence of a national diploma system. Another and extreme example of insular cultural pluralism is Switzerland, which because of its complexity cannot be dealt with here.[17]

Pluralism and cultural regionalism taken to the extreme can certainly be divisive and patronising. While it seems to have functioned smoothly in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands it has resulted in serious frictions in India and recently in movements towards balkanisation in the Soviet Union.

Economically the model requires a considerably heavy and expensive bureaucratic apparatus of the education system. Each school system has its own teachers, methods, students, curriculum and medium. It is illustrated in the formula $A+B+C+D = A+B+C+D$.

Model IV: Modified cultural amalgamation

Schools have everywhere been instruments for the promotion of national sentiment, one unifying force for which has been a national language. Where a political entity possesses more than one mother tongue, educational regionalism may be one way of overcoming difficulties. Regionalism here means granting a modicum of cultural autonomy, where nevertheless the unifying factor of a second, more widely spoken language is also promoted in the schools (eg. French, Castilian and Russian).

Modified cultural amalgamation is common in those countries whose cultural layout is a direct or partial result of colonialism (e.g. many of the Asian and African countries). It is the unification approach pursued by developing countries such as Nigeria, which try to develop a common nationality while preserving the different minority languages and cultures. Ethnic identity is modified. The interaction between groups is free. Although the existence of minority languages and cultures is recognised, the focus is placed on global rather than local concerns. Curriculum, school syllabuses and methods reflect the diversity of cultural practices and identities. Schooling is provided through different language media. The teaching of children primarily in their own language is recognised as both correct and desirable. This can be formulated as $A+B+C+D = A'+B'+C'+D'$, where' represents

the unifying variable.

The South African case

Two important theoretical prerequisites are central for nation-building policy formulation in a Third World context. I borrow the first one from Banks who argues that the quest 'for ethnic identity and entitlement has very different meanings in a nation that has a well-developed national identity and in one that is in the process of formulating a national ethos and identity'.[18]

The mechanical transplantation of educational policies from those countries that, though pursuing cultural pluralist models, have reached a considerable level of cultural homogeneity, can be disastrous. The implication of this is that movements towards ethnic particularism that have resulted in the adoption of regionalist or multi-culturalist education policies in Western settings cannot unproblematically be taken as a starting point. The second prerequisite is that any educational policy concerned with national unity should reflect the specificity of the particular historical and cultural circumstances of the country in which it is to be implemented. However, the concept of culture is an elusive concept, which always requires clarification.

The concept of culture: Beyond the myths

In his appeal 'Let's be proud of our ethnicity in the reformed South Africa', Dhlomo regrets the way apartheid illegitimised and discredited 'natural and positive concepts, such as regionalism, culture and ethnicity'.[19] Under apartheid, he argues, a black person's ethnic origin would decree a deportation from the urban area to a remote so-called independent homeland, unilaterally set aside for people of each ethnic group. Dhlomo emphasises that this policy evoked an instant counter-reaction from many people who began to either deny or downplay their ethnic origin. Let me add that this reaction also included the so-called 'chameleons', who, for different reasons, found it necessary to opt for racial

re-classification. Ironically this attitude led to Africans becoming 'coloureds, 'coloureds' becoming Indians, 'coloureds' and Indians becoming whites and so forth, in a chain of humiliation due to skin pigmentation. Against this background, Dhlomo warns us,

> we face yet another danger in post-apartheid South Africa, whereby we might be forced to take another extreme position by totally denying the existence of these otherwise innocuous concepts.

He calls for healthy regionalism [and presumably ethnicism], free from prejudice, chauvinism or political opportunism:

> A strong and united South African nation of the future can only rise from the foundations and not the ruins of our rich and diverse cultural and ethnic heritage.[20]

At this point, Dhlomo's idea begins to make sense. Implicit in his argument is the danger of the two extremes in educational policies for pluralist societies: the *melting-pot* concept with its emphasis on monoculturalism and the *salad-bowl* concept with its emphasis on ethnic or regional cultural particularism. The first extreme is a celebration of a national monoculture at the expense of the various microcultures or, at worst, without a healthy appreciation of the richness of the diverse cultural heritage and cultural roots. Positive manifestations of regionalism, culture and ethnicity are consciously or unconsciously muffled. The *melting-pot* concept rests on a narrow view of education for national culture which sees the role of public schools as that of socialising children into the universalistic values and culture of the nation-state. It holds that schools that promote allegiances to ethnic groups or cultures would create a degree of ethnic and social polarisation that would be inimical to the culture of the nation-state.

The second extreme is an opportunistic manipulation of regionalism, tribalism and ethnicity for selfish political purposes, which in some cases results in attempts to balkanise the nation-state. In Africa it has assumed the form of tribalism. Sometimes this perspective emanates from the failure to account for diversity in nation-building, which is an abuse of the *melting-pot* concept without the necessary appreciation of African cultural roots. Those countries that have pursued socialist policies are an excellent example. While a major flaw in developed socialist systems has been the inability to reconcile the ideals of socialism and democracy, the problem with socialist-orientated African countries that have engaged in the building of a 'New Society' has been their inability to reconcile their new concept of national culture with the cultural diversity of their societies.

It seems that a pragmatic middle-of-the road choice, between the two extreme poles, is most desirable. Most difficult however is the definition and choice of appropriate developmental strategies and policies. Dhlomo's suggestion that what we need is 'a future constitutional mechanism that would totally depoliticise these concepts [regionalism, culture and ethnicity]' is an oversimplification of the matter.[21] This approach represents a particular discourse popular within the ruling ranks that concepts such as culture, education and ethnicity can be compartmentalised and isolated from the world of politics, even though they have been used in South Africa to pursue political purposes such as ethnic differentiation in the policy of separate development. I shall differ from this empiricist view, and shall illustrate this point with a brief discussion of the concept 'culture'.

There are many different definitions of culture. However, no single unproblematic definition can be found. As Williams and Hogart have indicated, the concept of culture remains a complex one — a site of convergent interests, rather than a logically or conceptually clarified idea.[22] For our present purposes, I would like to concentrate on two major perspectives in the conceptualisation of culture: (1) the one that sees culture as apolitical and (2) the one that sees culture as having political content.

The first perspective is based on what Sole calls 'an organic vision of society', which sees the growth of any particular social entity as analogous to that of an organically growing body, with all its parts in harmony and free of all disturbances from the outside. It underplays divisions, conflict and exploitation and stress harmony and stasis. Its proponents deny elements of power and struggle within social groupings. As Sole points out, 'cultures are not seen as emerging through a process of contestation between classes and groups within the defined social context, but as a simple and unproblematic accretion of values and traditions by a type of "group mind"'.[23] The way individuals respond to their social reality is also dismissed as a non-problem. The individual and society are seen as existing in an organic, reciprocal relationship. A typical example in South Africa is the belief in the existence of monolithic 'black' and 'white' cultures as a reflection of an allegedly white and black nation.

Within this framework, culture is placed within the domain of ideas as the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their experiences. For those whose emphasis is more anthropological, culture concerns the network of social practices. For them 'culture' refers to the active and indissoluble relationships between the elements or social practices. In this context the 'theory of culture' is defined as 'the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life'.[24] Culture is not a practice as it is claimed to be in certain kinds of anthropology. It is threaded through all social practices, and is the sum of their inter-relationships. It is what Sole has labelled 'organic culture'.[25] Obviously, an overemphasis of the organic, collaborative nature of culture can lead towards the uncritical idealisation of a past that must be preserved and promoted as claimed by Dhlomo.

I do not deny the fact that the economic and social changes brought about by colonialism and apartheid have resulted in a considerable cultural commonality. I want however to emphasise that because of the divisive nature of the political and ideological system, this commonality remains embryonic. It is inherited in its form and constructed or reconstructed in its content. It has to be struggled for and consolidated. This

will certainly require an awareness of the 'contradictions and discontinuities in South African society' and the diversity caused by race, class, ethnicity, geography and other factors.

The second perspective is more sociologically-oriented. It remained for a while within a strictly structuralist framework, according to which culture merely reflected the configuration of the material basis and the social relations of production. However, culture was no longer seen as separate from politics nor as neutral. A significant development came with such theorists as Gramsci, who argue that intellectual culture is inextricably bound with the question of leadership.[26]

Specifically, Gramsci rejects conceptions of class domination in favour of a sophisticated interplay of force and consent in asserting the hegemony of the ruling class. Culture forms the integral part of this process. Complex and interwoven chains of cultural, political and ideological practices work to 'cement' a society into a relative though never complete unit. For Gramsci, culture is organisation, discipline of one's inner self, a coming to terms with one's own personality, thus the attainment of high awareness, through which one succeeds in understanding one's own historical value, one's own function in life, one's own rights and obligations. It does not emerge out of spontaneous evolution. It is forged out of struggles for survival with nature and between people.

Of significant importance to my argument is Gramsci's contention that in society the dominant culture represents itself as *the* culture and tries to define and contain other cultures within its inclusive range. Other cultural configurations will not only be subordinate to this dominant order, they will enter into struggle with it, seek to modify, negotiate, resist and even overthrow its reign — in Gramsci's terms, it is hegemony 'ideology'.[27] When one culture gains ascendancy over the other and when the subordinate culture experiences itself in terms prescribed by the dominant culture, then the dominant culture also becomes the basis of a dominant ideology.

The study of cultural organisations which keep the ideological world in movement within a given country is important for understanding how culture is integrated in

society.[28] For Gramsci, cultural institutions and organisations which help in the dissemination of culture include schools and churches, newspapers, magazines, the book trade and private educational institutions which are complementary to the state system, or cultural institutions like popular universities. These operate in conjunction with professions with cultural activity such as medicine, the army, law and teaching.

One can also view culture as the vehicle through which social groups develop distinct patterns of life, and express their social and material life experience. It is the way social relations within a group are structured and shaped, as well as the way this is experienced, understood and interpreted. Groups that exist within the same society and share the same historical conditions do share the same culture.[29] In this sense, Hall and Jefferson define culture as: 'the peculiar and distinctive "way of life" of the group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in *mores* and customs, in the uses of objects and material life'. To put it differently, culture is the distinctive shapes in which the material and social organisation of life expresses itself. Moulder's metaphor simplifies some of these aspects:

> According to the dictionaries, we call a crop of artificially and experimentally grown bacteria a culture. This fact is worth noting for at least two reasons. Firstly, it reminds us that the word 'culture' is derived from the Latin word *culture*, a word for farming, for a complex process in which we deliberately and intentionally interfere with nature and try to improve its performance. Secondly, it points to the fact that, *whatever one's culture is, it is something that has been created, artificially and experimentally; it is not something that is given to us in the way in which the number and the colour of our eyes are given to us*. What this all boils down to is that when one is talking about one's

> culture, one is talking about the *product of a complex process of socialisation*.[My emphasis][30]

The myth of inferior or superior cultures

One important assumption that has dominated cultural and anthropological studies in colonial Africa is the idea that African cultures are essentially backward or inferior when compared to Western cultures. From this point of view, to understand an African culture, it has to be decoded in terms of a Western culture and graded according to a scale of values and a particular discourse involving categories such as 'backwardness', 'technological inferiority or superiority', 'traditionality', 'modernity', literary practice, competitiveness and 'free enterprise spirit' amongst individuals, ownership of private property and a preference for achieved rather than ascribed roles in society. The starting point is a particular context or geographical environment, particular family and social settings, traditions and cultural legacy, feelings and sentiments, assumed as typically European or 'white'. This tendency constitutes what Ndlovu refers to as ethnocentrism:

> Ethnocentrism occurs when people, being stepped and centred in their own heritage and cultural system, judge others who belong to different ethnic groups and cultures by the standards (i.e. norms, values, and social criteria) which are established ... in their own particular culture. This stems from the fact that we normally derive our own self-image, our world outlook, our notions of what is right or wrong, natural or unnatural, scientific (rational) or unscientific (irrational), beautiful or ugly, enjoyable or dull, moral or immoral, from our culture.[31]

Thus, any attempt to account for a variety of experiences or cultural diversity within an African context is accompanied with a generally severe critical evaluation with a great deal of bias and prejudice. Cultural difference is perceived as a barrier and not a bridge to social interaction or co-operation.

There is another important hypothesis for an understanding of culture, which regards culture as a much more complex phenomenon. According to this theory, culture expresses the *totality* of what has been learnt, conceptually and experientially, and how this is processed and reproduced in society, as a result of man-to-man and man-to-nature relationships. This *totality* includes a way of life, a world view, and particular forms of social practice and sentiments. It includes the totality of the behaviour acquired by society: its language, values, customs, the food it prepares and how it is prepared, the institutions it creates and how they are created, the way of life and its meaning.[32] In this perspective, the belief that there is a culture which is superior or inferior to another *per se* is a myth. Only particular aspects of culture can be said to be superior or inferior, better or worse, for example technology or military knowledge. A well-known example to illustrate this argument is beautifully explained by Ndlovu:

> If anyone should still be unconvinced that no culture is superior or, conversely, inferior to another per se, I challenge them to experiment with the San people (Bushmen) on the one hand, and the most 'civilised' among Westerners, e.g. President George Bush and Premier Margaret Thatcher on the other. Let the two sides go on 'exchange visits', while leaving behind whatever constitutes their normal day to day equipment for living. Let each utilise the means available in their host land. My guess is that whereas the 'Bushman' will be stranded, with all the money, means of transport, etc., made available, the

> Westerners are likely to be more stranded, given bows and arrows, ostrich egg shells, fire making sticks, etc. What is more remarkable is that the Westerners' civilisation, sophistication, literacy and modernism is all rendered dysfunctional in Bushman land, where the latter have survived for centuries on end.[33]

The fact that the Westerners may have in their cultures the necessary technological resources to change the Bushmen's land into an appropriate habitat to their *modus vivendi* does not necessarily imply the superiority of their cultures. Their cultures are essentially different.

A framework for a dynamic concept of culture

Given the apartheid heritage, it seems that any new conceptualisation of culture in South Africa would have to consider the following theoretical bases:

1. Though culture can be conceived of as a *uniting force* binding social groups or classes together, it is also a *divisive element*, which reflects the complexity of societies generally constituted by various subgroups and subcultures in a struggle for legitimacy of their behaviour, values, ideals and life-styles against the dominant culture of the dominant society, that is, the hegemonic culture. The main forms of these cultures are *class cultures*, which implies that within ethnicity, different and conflicting cultures can develop.[34] In other words, having a culture means belonging to a group whose members give the same or similar answers to the problems arising out of their own nature, their orientation in time, their relationship to nature, their primary purpose in life, their primary relationship to each other.[35] This group can be an ethnic or religious group. However, within ethnic and religious groups, and upper-, middle- and lower-class groups, cultural constellations can also be formed, depending on the existing

forms of socialisation.

As has been pointed out in Chapter Three, South Africa is clearly a *limit case* where the salience of racial and ethnic features cannot for a moment be denied.[36] Sehoole, analysing the ideology of nationhood in Bophuthatswana, illustrates how culture and its ideological components have been systematically used to ensure that the new ruling class and social structures are maintained in a way that is understandable to all members of the Tswana society. The past history and traditions of the Batswana were reinterpreted and directed towards the political needs of the Bophuthatswana state. Various mobilising and solidifying agents, amongst them the land question, the so-called back-to-the-roots campaign, religion, the Tswana language (nomenclature), music, post stamps and objects with symbolical meaning in the life of the Batswana such as the mace, national flag and code of arms, have been used to inculcate the so-called Tswana culture. This does not constitute an exception. It has been almost common policy in the 'homelands' for a long time.

2. The process of race polarisation and its concomitant cultural implications must not be ignored in analysing culture in South Africa. Brake puts it nicely: 'for black people their primary identity, the way in which they are reacted to, and the way in which they act upon the world is mediated by their colour, and the oppression that brings, structurally, politically, psychologically and economically.'[37] This is well represented in the TV series 'People Like Us'. Without romanticising it, it is race which defines them, which acts against them, and which unites them. Their class position subscribes their economic position, but race is the *subjectivity* in which their class position is lived, and shapes their relation to the world.

3. Culture is *not a neutral concept*. It is historical, specific and ideological. The dominant class uses culture to legitimise hegemony over or control of subordinate classes. The dominant culture represents itself as *the* culture, and tries to define and contain all other cultures within its inclusive range. Hegemonic cultures, however, are never free to reproduce and amend themselves without contradiction and resistance. A crisis in the dominant culture opens room for opposition,

resistance and cultural upheavals which can take different forms and lead to a new hegemonic order.[38] The subordinate classes use culture to attain their cultural emancipation and re-assert a new hegemonic social order.

4. Culture is *not a timeless and motionless* body of value systems or lifestyles that remain unaltered by social change as put forward by our common sense. Rather, it is a *dialectical process*, which incorporates new forms and meanings while changing or reshaping traditional ones.[39] The new cultural forms emerge as a response to and mediation of social experience.[40] It is not an unchangeable text, but a complex, contradictory and uneven process. It is an expression of people's experience and of their action upon their own experience. In this sense, people can intervene and create the necessary conditions for the preservation of the positive manifestations of their culture; but they can also intervene and act upon or transform the negative manifestations of their culture.

5. Culture is a *historically constituted* concept. Whatever one's culture is, it is something that is not given *a priori* but has been artificially created.[41] Thus when one talks of culture one is talking about the product of a complex process of socialisation. As Thornton puts it, it is a sharing of a complex intellectual history with the ideas of 'society,' organism and nation.[42] The apparent similarities that exist between ideas of 'cultures', 'organism', 'nations' and 'societies' in South Africa are the result of the historical development of these ideas in a common intellectual and political context and not the expression of genuine insight into the human condition.[43] The apparent gulf that separates the different 'cultures' in South Africa is an historical product. The cultural differences are themselves created by cultural processes which span and encompass these very differences. If they were artificially created by man against humanity, they can also be transformed to serve humanity. The implication of all this is that culture is acquired through human experience; culture changes as the environment in which people live change, and their perceptions of the world around them change; and nobody's culture is completely unique.[44] Hoijer puts it nicely:

> No culture is wholly isolated, self-contained and unique. There are important resemblances between all known cultures — resemblances that stem in part from diffusion ... and in part from the fact that all cultures are built around biological, psychological, and social characteristics common to all mankind.[45]

Finally I would like to conclude by stressing the five important characteristics of culture identified by Moulder:

> Firstly, everyone's culture has been created for them, and largely by people who are older than they are and who began to shape their behaviour, beliefs, attitudes, feelings and values from the moment they were born. Secondly, everyone's culture is always changing, because they are always adapting to new groups of people and to new social, political and economic situations. Thirdly, none of the members of a cultural group are totally homogeneous; that is why groups are always coming into existence and going out of existence. Fourthly, no cultural group is totally unique; this is why some individuals from extremely different backgrounds with extremely different life experiences manage to form alliances and to co-operate with each other. Finally, nobody finds it easy to change the culture that they inherit because it has taught them how to behave, as well as what to believe, to feel and to value; and most people, once they have learned these things, want to keep them that away.[46]

Culture is not necessarily homogeneous. It contains variations and differences that can lead to a development of identifiable *subcultures*. It is thus absurd to conceive of culture as something that should be institutionally protected or preserved. Similarly, it is absurd to deny its political content. What seems urgent is a re-conceptualisation of culture with a new ideological and political content based on esteem and appreciation of humanity. In South Africa this cannot for a moment ignore the ideal of non-racialism, democracy and national unity. To put it differently, the educational and cultural struggle should incorporate the struggle for reconciliation, reconstruction and national unity, in which cultural and ethnic diversity is not an obstacle but a fundamental and necessary ingredient.

Alexander and McGurk revisited

At this point, I shall briefly review the important debate between McGurk and Alexander, which has serious implications for the argument pursued in this chapter. This debate is perhaps the only attempt to grapple with the complex issues of education and nation-building in South Africa. The points of convergence of the two authors are summarised by McGurk as follows:

> (1) we are to speak of culture as a single universe of discourse uniting all people within the single context determined by geographical proximity, social interaction, and economic relations, and not 'cultures' (the origin of the notion of 'cultures' as separate entities can be attributed to the nationalistic chauvinism of the 19th century); (2) culture becomes a process that is goal-orientated that in the final analysis is morally driven; (3) culture as tradition has dialectical or overdetermined structure which in terms of an operative continuity and a contemporary formation renders

> certain aspects of culture residual or archa
> and other aspects emergent or prophetic; t
> the dialectic or the basic dynamism f
> cultural transformation becomes regulat
> by the goals, such as nation-building
> national liberation.[47]

From a radical structuralist standpoint, Alexa
that the emergence of a national culture implies
the existing relations of production and the establi
socialist mode through 'the overcoming of th
imperialism, cultural exclusivity, and partia
assimilation of the dominating groups in our p
society'.[48] The historical role in this process is a
the black working class, which must be educated
through such cultural and educational practices a
of a national language. Obviously, McGurk cann
digest this reductionist view, which seems to pl
burden on the role of the 'structures'. He suggests
of *person* to stress the role of human agency as 't
agency of social transformation' within an
Gramscian framework:

> While the class struggle might provide th
> material or dialectical basis for historic
> emergence, culture, as created by the *perso*
> in its originating moment, is the form
> resolution of this dialectic. The *person* is i
> effective agency.[49]

The implications of the two differing approac
while for Alexander only the black working cla
'organic intellectual' allies can play a major role in
national oppression in South Africa, for McGurk e
individual, regardless of race, class or ethnicity,
central role in the process, driven by his or her ow
dynamism as a *person*'.

I shall concentrate on three aspects incorporat
arguments: (1) their conflicting paradigmatic

departure; (2) McGurk's idealistic voluntarism on the role of the individual (person); and (3) Alexander's obsession with the historical role of the black working class.

Generally speaking Alexander and McGurk epitomise the controversy that separated Althusser from Gramsci, the role of structures vis-a-vis the role of human agency in a given social process, or structuralism vis-à-vis culturalism. Historically, the structuralist tradition concentrated on theories of 'modes of production', 'social formation', the use of the 'base-superstructure' model as well as the concept of 'over-determination.'[50] Culturalism refines Gramsci's cultural categories of 'common sense' and 'hegemony', and combines them with the notion of 'human agency'.[51] The main lines of divergence between the two paradigms flow, as Hall has indicated, from:

> The conception of 'men' as bearers of the structures that speak and place them, rather than as active agents in the making of their own history: the emphasis on a structural rather than a historical 'logic'; ... the recasting of history as a march of the structures ... the structuralist 'machine'.[52]

Structuralism also allows us to think of the relations of a structure on the basis of something other than mere relationships between 'people' or 'persons'; it privileges the necessity of abstraction as the instrument of thought through which relations are appropriated. Its conception of 'the whole' or 'totality' is crucial in social analysis. On the other hand, culturalism adds a new dimension by its emphasis on the relative autonomy of culture and ideology in relation to economic and political processes, secured by the mediating role of human agency. It introduces a dimension of agency, contestation and resistance into discussions of reproduction while arguing that culture, ideology and politics are not reducible to simple expression of material conditions or structures.

Alexander and McGurk represent the two extreme poles

and tend to ignore the richness of the terrain that separate them. More meaningful analyses have however taken place within this terrain. Building on Althusser, Gramsci, Thompson and Bourdieu's cultural analyses, American theorists of cultural reproduction and resistance suggest a more balanced approach between structuralist and culturalist traditions.[53] They draw our attention to the danger of deterministic approaches based on a narrow structuralism or idealistic voluntarism that may arise out of 'personalist' analyses. Their main thrust is the reminder that

> unless the dialectic is taken into account, in any particular analysis, between both halves of the proposition — that 'men make history ... on the basis of conditions which are not of their making' — the result will inevitably be a naive humanism with subsequent voluntarist and populist political practice'.[54]

Thus, McGurk is reacting against the tendency to seize the materialist, economic side of Marxism, the claim presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism that every fluctuation of politics, culture and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure or the economic base.[55] He is concerned with restoring the elements of praxis and experience to theories of social change by reintegrating the active or 'subjective' dimension of human actions, without which no meaningful change can occur. For him, the only theory capable of accomplishing this strategic goal should be the one that goes beyond the prevailing economic determinism in Alexander's thesis.

The problem with McGurk's analysis is that he overstates his case for the sake of challenging the limitations of narrow structuralist analyses. As such, he believes that what for example motivates 'the sympathetic intellectual or activist, who most often does not belong to the exploited classes', is not the fact that he is a victim of exploitation in the material organisation of work, but the meanings generated by his own

spiritual dynamism as a *person*.[56] This ignores the fact that those meanings are constructed with reference to the very same material world. An adequate account of culture in South Africa needs a more balanced approach or a synthesis between Alexander and McGurk.

What Marx defined as the *historical role* of the working class, that is, the centrality of the working class as the fundamental social agent in bringing about a socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie, is restricted by Alexander to the black working class in South Africa:

> Because of the peculiarities of capitalist development in South Africa, the only way in which racial discrimination and racial inequality, i.e. national oppression, can be abolished is through the abolition of the capitalist structures themselves. The only class, however, which can bring into being such a (socialist) system is the *black working class*. On it, by virtue of its unique historical position, devolves the task of mobilising all the oppressed and exploited classes for the abolition of the system of racial capitalism.[57]

There seems to be no indication that the working class has ever filled the historical role attributed to it by Marx. The political centrality of the working class requires that the working class comes out of itself, to transform its own identity by articulating to it a plurality of struggles and democratic demands. However, this articulatory role seems to have been assigned to it by the economic base.[58] Further, the direction of the workers' struggle is not uniformly progressive. It depends, just as with any other social struggle, upon its forms of articulation within a given hegemonic context. By articulation here I mean any practice establishing a relation between elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.

From this point of view, the very orientation of the working

class depends upon a political balance of forces and the radicalisation of plurality of democratic struggles, which are decided in good part outside the class itself. As Laclau and Mouffe have pointed out, the era of 'privileged subjects' — in the ontological not practical sense — of the anti-capitalist struggle has been definitively superseded.[59] No class or social movement can be taken *a priori* as progressive by virtue of its class nature. Its progressiveness depends upon its hegemonic articulation with other struggles or demands. It is a question that requires further elaboration within the world socialist movement. In this light, Alexander's hypothesis, though attractive, has still to be tested by history. Suffice it to say that it has serious implications in the designing of an educational model for a national culture in South Africa, particularly because of its integrationist pretensions.

Conclusion: Education and curriculum for national unity

National unity is a process whereby the mutual acceptance, cohesion and harmony of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, economic and social differences concur to the project of nation-building, through the consciousness of common history, common values and common interests. It is a result of social interaction, social mobility and voluntary enculturation. As a historical process, it emerges and develops from below, as an inevitable response to social and political contradictions. As an ideal (or 'moral ideal' as McGurk puts it), national culture involves an active and conscious process, whereby, through human intervention and creativity and through convergence of customs, practices, beliefs and institutions, the boundaries between ethnically-conceived cultures or subcultures are opened to let the universal expression of humanity assert itself.

National culture implies a degree of intellectual and moral leadership committed to the ideal of a nation free of all oppression and exploitation. As Alexander has pointed out, the building of a national culture means 'allowing a core of common cultural practices, beliefs, customs, etc., to develop, a core that is derived from all the different social, regional and language

groups'.[60] Further, the creation of a national culture is also a process of transformation, the processing of those cultural practices, beliefs and customs necessary for the construction of a new nation, including those that may hinder the development of a national sentiment. It is not simply a reflection of a pre-given nation, but also transformation and construction.[61]

At this point, a fundamental question emerges: what are the implications of the above considerations for an educational policy aimed at bringing about national unity in South Africa? If one has to take into consideration, on the one hand, the complex diversity created by the apartheid system and, on the other, the potential unifying role of the working class, it appears that a more effective strategy lies neither in the pluralist approach suggested in Model III (Insular Cultural Pluralism) nor in narrow integrationist or assimilationist approach implied in Alexander's model and in Model II (Cultural Amalgamation). A form of multi-cultural education and curriculum with the capacity and flexibility to cope with the existing layers of identity — cultural and linguistic, local, sub-national, national, and international — seems to be inescapable. It has to be a system in which it is possible to be a worker, a Zulu or Tswana, an Azanian and a member of the international community as well. An education that concentrates on any one of these identities to the exclusion of the others will ill serve the needs of the Azanian society or its individual members. From this standpoint, cultural and ethnic diversity should be seen as an enrichment for a national culture, as an asset rather than a handicap. It is not necessarily what each of these layers lacks that is essential but what it has to enrich a national culture, national sentiment and national unity, free of chauvinism.

However, a limited degree of assimilation and integration is desirable in the process of nation-building, given the divisive impact of apartheid and the levels of 'mental colonisation'. This points to a multi-cultural curriculum with an emphasis on global rather than local concerns, on national rather than ethnic or regional interests, while presumably making use of the actual diversity that exists. This means that the education system will have to emphasise national unity, in many ways,

at the expense of group or local diversity, at least until the imbalances created by the apartheid policy of 'divide and rule' are significantly redressed. The balance will then be restored. This will enable those whites and also the large numbers of blacks who for many years have been withdrawn from their African cultural roots to appreciate and value their cultural heritage.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a chapter published in a book edited by Professor David Freer.
2. Booker T Washington, quoted in W Eiselen, 'Gedagtes oor Apartheid', **Tydskrif vir die Geestewetenskappe**, 2, Jarrgang V1, April 1949, pp.5-6.
3. See Edmund King, 'Notes and comments', **Comparative Education**, 19 (2), 1983, p.132.
4. W D Halls, 'Belgium: a case study in educational regionalism', **Comparative Education**

Chapter 8

Youth Culture and Politics in South African Education: The Past, Present and Future

Introduction

In the chapter *Culture, Education and National Unity* I discussed in detail the different meanings attached to the concept of culture. I emphasised the fact that there is no single unproblematic definition of culture. I outlined the main assumptions on which the concept of culture pursued in this chapter rests, namely: (1) that though culture can be conceived of as a *uniting force* binding social groups or classes together, it is also a *divisive element* reflecting the complexity of social formations generally constituted by various subgroups and subcultures in a struggle with the culture of the dominant society or the hegemonic culture; (2) that South Africa is a *limit case* where the salience of racial and ethnic features cannot for a moment be denied and where the process of race polarisation and its concomitant cultural implications must not be ignored in analysing culture; (3) that culture is not a *neutral concept*;[1] it is historical, specific and ideological, and reflects the way class and hegemonic articulations are organised in society; and (4) that culture is not a *timeless and motionless* body of value systems or life-styles which remain unaltered by social change as put forward by our common-sense; it is a *dialectical process* which incorporates new forms and meanings while changing or reshaping traditional ones.[2] I also emphasised that new

cultural forms emerge as a response to and mediation of social experience;[3] culture is not an unchangeable text, but a complex, contradictory and uneven process.

Having this framework in mind, I would like to concentrate on the concept of youth culture or youth subcultures. Given the complexity of the South African society, class, race, language, gender and generation all together generate specific focal concerns which allow us to develop the concept of youth culture in South Africa. This cannot simply be defined in terms of age. It is a complex combination of several subcultures, of different age groups, related to the class position of those in them and their common historical experience of racial and national oppression under the apartheid system. Complementing these broader categories are also the social meanings of notions such as township life, community, neighbourhood and 'gang territory'.

One can say that *subcultures* are sub-sets of the larger cultural configurations sometimes called '*parent cultures*', for example, urban working-class culture, Zulu military culture and so forth. The membership of a subculture necessarily involves membership of a parent culture. A subculture may be an extension of, or in opposition to, the parent culture. However, a subculture may even form its own sub-world. Subcultures exist where there is some form of organised and recognised constellation of values, behaviour and action, which are responded to as different from the prevailing sets of norms and value systems.

The notion of 'youth culture' and 'subcultures' can save us from the tendency to romanticise resistance by categorising the different cultural expressions displayed by youth. For example, South African theorists, including those within the liberal wisdom, seem to agree that many children who schooled under Bantu Education are demonstrating attitudes and patterns of behaviour that can be interpreted as counter-hegemonic. However, wider youth practices cannot unproblematically be explained as exclusive manifestations of resistance or in terms of 'struggle'. This could certainly lead to an idealisation or romanticisation of the complex manifestations of youth culture. Their short- and long-term

effects are unpredictable. They might have unexpected effects in the long run once the political crisis has been resolved.[4]

In the light of the issues discussed in the literature reviewed in Chapter Three,[5] one can speculate that increasing alienation from the prevailing economic, political and social structure has produced a wide variety of cultural responses amongst South African black urban youth: classroom disobedience, school boycotts, 'stayaways' and absenteeism, social crime and street gang life. These activities have developed into three distinguishable but interrelated youth subcultural worlds: (1) lumpen and unemployed youth delinquent and semi-delinquent subcultures; (2) middle-class cultural rebellion and reformist movements; (3) working-class student and youth resistance culture, activism and political militancy. This stratification appears sometimes blurred because of the dominant role played by *race* in mediating social relations. The three social groups have generally experienced similar living conditions in the townships. Black youths have been floating from one class or cultural category to another.

I shall examine how these subcultures have developed in education and wider community life throughout South African history. An attempt will be made to highlight their interrelatedness at given points in time. The thesis developed in this chapter posits the following arguments: (1) given the particular nature of South African racial capitalism and its harsh social and economic conditions, youth culture emerged predominantly as *tsotsi* or street gang culture; (2) with the expansion of the secondary school system, demographic pressures and the development of new forms of ideological and political socialisation (e.g. the Black Consciousness Movement) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in particular the Soweto uprising in 1976 and its consequences, the emerging street gang culture was increasingly brought into school grounds; (3) these became a *melting-pot* where school cultures inherited from past rural experience, street gang culture and new cultural forms were combined and processed to forge a wider, national youth resistance culture; and (4) contradictions generated in the making of this culture and increasing state repression resulted in the crisis of youth resistance culture in

the late 1980s (the symptoms were internal struggles, the phenomenon of the *comtsotsis*, the resurgence of gangsterism targeting the comrades and schoolchildren, and the emergence of middle-class youth subcultures).

Youth culture in South Africa, 1888-1990: A historical perspective

The history of youth culture in South Africa can be divided into the following periods: (1) 1888-1939, the increasing disintegration of pre-colonial ethnic cultures; (2) 1939-1955, the emergence of Black urban working-class cultures; (3) 1955-1976, the emergence of urban youth working-class cultures; (4) 1976-1985, the development of youth resistance culture; and (5) 1985-1990, the crisis of youth resistance culture and the emergence of youth middle-class cultures.

The disintegration of pre-colonial ethnic cultures, 1884-1939

Under the South African industrial revolution profound changes began to take place in the periphery of the main industrial centres: the creation of reserves, the establishment of a migrant labour system, and the penetration of new economic and cultural forms within traditional societies, as a result of changes in the family division of labour and the impact of new values and patterns of life from urban areas. However, no significant development took place in youth behaviour and practices. Why?

Wolpe's *dissolution/conservation* thesis offers a good theoretical framework for answering the question.[6] So long as pre-capitalist modes of production survive, they restrict the recomposition of class relationships and reabsorb part of the labour force, including unemployed youth, thrown off by capital. They thus provide for the structural reintegration of unemployed youth into traditional relationships that prevent the proliferation of delinquent behaviour.[7] Structural reincorporation is consolidated by a wide range of cultural institutions such as *lobola* and circumcision, which reintegrate

them into communal relationships, exert traditional controls that support traditionally acceptable behaviour, and impede alienation of youth and consequent development of distinctive subcultures. Therefore, embryonic youth subcultures were generally aborted or absorbed into parent/family cultures without being able to develop a distinctive and autonomous expression.

The emergence of black urban cultures, 1939-1955

Depending on the nature of articulation, capitalist forces can undermine the domestic sector, driving peasants into urban slums as underemployed labourers and breeding working class and lumpen cultures. They can simultaneously give rise to small groups of elite with petty bourgeois or middle-class subcultures.[8] In South Africa, this process followed the development of the manufacturing industry from the 1920s onwards. Substantial numbers of African women and men made their way from the farms and the reserves to the urban areas. Their concentration in towns gave rise to a relatively stable urban proletariat and created sociological conditions for the advent of black urban cultures.

A word of gratitude should be awarded to Professor P Bonner, who, as has been pointed out in Chapter Three, has traced the roots of earlier African urban cultures in South Africa with an unprecedented authority. His argument deserve special attention in this chapter. Bonner argues that a distinctive black urban culture on the Rand has been forged out of a cultural exchange between a variety of elements involving the educated African elite, the Cape 'coloured' and Oorlams communities and the migrant and urban working class.[9] Influences from the neighbouring countries also played a significant role in the process.[10]

The emergence of urban working-class youth cultures, 1955-1976

Urban black cultures developed under several constraints. These included: (1) the instability of the black urban family; (2)

the lack of family and social discipline; (3) the generalised poverty that permeated African life; (4) a stagnant employment market and the massive unemployment of urban juveniles; (5) the flood of immigrants and massive over-crowding; (6) inadequate housing and shortage of housing; (7) malnutrition and disease. The migrant labour system spawned 'loose family unions', family disintegration, a high illegitimacy rate and the breakdown of family and community socialisation and disciplinary agencies. On the one hand, parental control was sluggish or entirely lacking and, on the other, besides being insufficient in numbers, schools were confronted with a high-drop out rate and low school attendance.[11] General frustration and strategies of survival, mainly social crime, dominated the lives of the black urban youth. Under these circumstances, men went to work in the factories, mines and businesses. Women spent their days washing and hawking or as maids in white suburbs. Children flooded the streets. In the streets, they developed methods of survival and compensation for their socially mutilated life and social insecurity. There they engaged in gang competitions and battles, gambling, soccer matches and various games as well as burglary and crime.

It appears that youth gang culture developed under the same constraints that conditioned the development of their parent cultures, urban black working class cultures. Under these constraints, the consequence was the development of a youth culture associated with *tsotsis* because of its anti-social make-up.[12] An important distinction should be made here. The black urban cultures that emerged in the 1920s and the 1930s were cultures of survival around the collective but politically passive institutions of the shebeen, *stokvel* (rotating credit associations) and *marabi* dance.[13] By the early 1950s, the criminal element became dominant. *Tsotsi* or youth gang culture began to command township life and spread instability through the black locations. This harsh reality of township life was well captured in the words of Steve Biko: 'Township life alone makes it a miracle for anyone to live up to adulthood.'[14] *Tsotsi* culture was a culture manufactured on the streets where black urban youths spent most of their leisure time because of

the absence of other outlets into which their energies could be channelled.

Gangs and resistance politics, 1950-1976

Can those initial forms of youth culture, that is *tsotsi* culture, be conceptualised in political terms? What political content (if any) did they have? There are no final answers to these questions. There are indications, however, that the actions of youth gangs very often assumed a political character.

The late 1940s and the 1950s were characterised by an increasing militancy in South African black politics. The foundation of the ANC Youth League in 1949 not only changed the course of African nationalism from a liberal and accommodationist approach to a militant and active challenge to the system of apartheid, but it also brought increasing numbers of youth into the liberation movement. What role did gangs or street gang culture play in this process? Evidence indicates that in spite of their anti-social behaviour youth gangs were a potentially powerful resource 'in wider political struggles presenting both opportunities and constraints to political action'.[15] Gangs took part in the defiance campaign, 'stayaways' and boycotts. In the process they brought with them some of the anarchy, self-assertion and spirit of defiance of the streets. As will be shown, this observation offers an excellent background for an understanding of the post-1976 youth practices and subcultures.

The development of a youth resistance culture, 1976-85

From the late 1960s a process began whereby initial forms of youth gang culture were increasingly integrated into the resistance movement. Three main factors played a central role in this process: (1) the psychological appeal that the Black Consciousness Movement had for youth by giving them the hope that they were capable of controlling their own destiny; (2) the expansion of the secondary schools, which incorporated a considerable portion of the surplus youth from the street and

absorbed its subcultures; and (3) the political mobilisation of the 1976 Soweto uprising, which cut across the boundaries of the developing youth subcultures. To these factors one can also add the sense of *generational unit* produced by the demographic nature of South African society, with half of its population under the age of 21 and 45% per cent of the African population under the age of 15.[16] Of relative importance was also the increasing rate of unemployment and the sense of social insecurity that it inculcated in youth.

The Black Consciousness Movement inherited the youthful militancy of the ANC Youth League, which challenged the liberal nationalism and reformist approach adopted by the old ANC leadership. As spelt out by Biko, the Black Consciousness Movement represented the emergence of a group of militant youths who were beginning to 'grasp the notion of (their) peculiar uniqueness', the peculiarity of their problems, history and culture and, thus, to realise the need to evolve a political philosophy based on and directed by blacks towards their own emancipation outside white liberal tutelage.[17] Accordingly, the process of emancipation had to start with the individual person, particularly 'the mind of the oppressed', the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor. To put it differently, the Black Consciousness Movement involved a psychological and cultural liberation, whereby black people would overcome the question of black-white dependency, the traditional inferior-superior and black-white complexes, and restore their inherent dignity to develop a national consciousness. It expressed group pride and the determination by blacks to rise and attain the envisaged self. As a political culture, it was a unifying force which brought together the whole generation of youth (from the school grounds to the streets) to see with greater clarity the immensity of their responsibility in the process of their emancipation.

The expansion of secondary schooling had a double and contradictory effect. Firstly, it bridged the gap between street subcultures and student movements by bringing the mobs and surplus children from the streets to the classrooms. Secondly, the contradictions determined by the overcrowding in the classroom and the deterioration of the school environment (lack

of staff, shortage of accommodation, packed classrooms, etc.) plus the rising political consciousness of the black university students created objective and subjective conditions for the development of a nation-wide counter-hegemonic resistance culture.

The 1976 Soweto uprising consolidated in practice the political link between students and the youth outside the schools. What had started as a new student movement with SASO in 1969 came to assume the form of a wider national youth movement against the hostile economic, social, political and educational conditions imposed by the apartheid system. It became increasingly difficult to distinguish between students' concerns and the concerns of the wider youth groups. They both had similar expectations in their future: unemployment and the harsh conditions their parents had been forced to live in. Typical gang violence tended to be replaced by political violence in response to growing state repression. School grounds became not just a battle field against the symbols of oppression but also a *melting-pot* where a variety of youth subcultures (school cultures, student movements and street subcultures, etc.) combined to form a national youth resistance culture.

Another important factor was of a cultural nature. Street-gang life involves activities which require courage, adventurism, and a sense of masculinity and self-confidence. To most Soweto youths, the uprising represented an unprecedented opportunity for asserting and testing these qualities. In the context of the rebellion, gangs could easily face hardship and undertake tasks that an average untrained youth could not successfully perform, e.g. attack a police car or set fire on what were perceived as symbols of oppression (council buildings, police stations etc.). Similarly, children from middle-class backgrounds were able to transcend their one time petty bourgeois expectations. As will be illustrated, these expectations returned to their attention in the late 1980s, which reflected wider structural changes and disillusionment with the struggle.

The crisis of youth resistance culture and the re-surgence of urban street gangs, 1985-1990

The period 1985-1990 was characterised by the intensification of the contradictions that emerged as the youth negotiated its various subcultural experiences (school, street, family etc.), which resulted in a nation-wide youth resistance culture. The distinguishing features of this period include: (1) unprecedented state repression; (2) a leadership and organisational crisis in the youth resistance movement; (3) the increasing marginalisation of youth following the disruption of organisational structures; (4) the resurgence of the street gang subculture; (5) the emergence of middle-class subcultures; and, recently, (6) greater polarisation in youth politics.

The 1985 crisis and the consequent declaration of a state of emergency was accompanied by profound change in the state's mode of repression: a shift from *total strategy* to what Haysom calls the counter-insurgency doctrine of *low intensity conflict* that had been used in El Salvador and the Philippines.[18] The theory of *low intensity conflict* stresses *total war* at the grassroots level against popular rebellions with *soft war* tactics or WHAM tactics (*winning the hearts and minds* of the people) to destroy popular insurgency without appearing to be waging war directly on the masses. It eliminates revolutionary forces, particularly by isolating the leadership from its mass base, and neutralising its structures, including homes, families and the entire grass-roots organisational network. The new strategy was expected to minimise the crisis determined by the deteriorating economic climate in the early 1980s, the proliferation of political organisations and the rapid politicisation of black communities manifested in the nation-wide demonstrations, school boycotts, consumer boycotts and stay-aways, phenomena that assumed the dimension of *total resistance*.[19]

Curiously, this shift also inaugurated the emergence of vigilante groups in South Africa, violent reactionary groupings operating in black communities to neutralise individuals or organisations that opposed the apartheid system. To mention just a few, vigilante groups that emerged in the course of 1985

and 1986 included the *Phakatis* in Thabong township in the Orange Free State, the *Amabutho* in Umlazi in Natal, the *Mbhokoto* in KwaNdebele/Uitenhage, the *Ama-Afrika* in KwaNobuhle in the Eastern Cape and the *Witdoeke* in Crossroads in the Cape Peninsula. The vigilantes penetrated the youth resistance movement, disorganising its structures and eliminating its leadership.[20] The climate of terror spread by vigilante groupings was exacerbated by the activity of the state killing machine or death squads.[21] The leadership began to show signs of weakness. Organisational structures became fragmented and ineffective under the pressure of the vigilantes and the disruptive effects of successive school closures. Informal methods of social control exercised over the youth by these structures, and by the older generation, parents, teachers, community leaders and working class organisations, were gradually swept away. This caused a growing alienation and marginalisation of youth, which increased the pace and scope of gang formation in the late 1980s. There were also other important factors in the development of the new wave of gangs. Scharf identifies three converging sets of factors: (1) the education crisis in the schools, the lack of alternative education, and thorough political conscientisation in a context where youth had little hope of employment; (2) the politicisation of sport; and (3) militaristic populism associated with the rise of youth soldiers or *Young Lions*.[22] The latter represents what Webster has labelled 'military voluntarism', characterised by uncontrolled and counterproductive military adventurism of a 'terrorist' kind:

> The state's coercive response to the rising levels of mobilisation prevented the trade unions and the national political organisations from consolidating their structures. After the army occupied the townships, protest became increasingly militaristic as large members of youths began engaging the security forces in running street battles that claimed hundreds of lives. The militaristic

> voluntarism of the youth eclipsed the organisational concerns of the activists as the township became 'ungovernable'.[23]

Evidence indicates that these factors played relatively the same role in several parts of the country. Gangs of youth spread terror over black townships, eliminating youth leaders, assaulting and raping school children and curtailing social mobility of residents and political mobilisation. As a result, in Soweto many schools were temporarily closed.

Two aspects characterised the new wave of street gangs in the late 1980s. Firstly, some actions of youth gangs clearly assumed a political character. They targeted schoolchildren, mainly girls, and student and youth political leaders. Gangs, particularly those who re-emerged from the resistance movement — well-known as *comtsotsis* — became a potentially powerful resource for state officialdom as tools against political 'agitators'. *Comtsotsis* is the term used to refer to ex-*comrades*, gangs who have joined the resistance movement since the 1976 school crisis but have not been able to assimilate its political discipline, or marginalised youth who have appropriated the status and the label of *comrade* to serve their opportunistic goals. Bonner argues that youth gang culture can be 'a vital resource in wider political struggles presenting both opportunities and constraints to political action'.[24] However, Pinnock presents a view which highlights more clearly the nature of the gangs in the 1980s. For him gang activities 'are obviously not a recipe for winning popular hegemony' and perhaps 'not even part of resistance'.[25] Gangs easily enter into agreements or partnership with the authorities in policing the townships and doing the dirty work of the police, and their presence can be disruptive for mass events held at weekends or at night. During the gang invasion of schools in Diepkloof in 1989, there were indications that some 'jackrollers' — operating within the Mass Democratic Movement — were involved in a systematic elimination of activists. In this sense, the gangs are generally reactionary.[26] Secondly, unlike in the 1950s, the gangs of the 1980s were more educated (school-leavers or drop-outs) and more politically aware, which

illustrates the contradictions generated by the nature of the South African educational system.

The resurgence of youth conformist and middle-class subculture, 1985-1990

A recent but important development in youth culture is the emergence of a typically middle-class subculture dominated by liberalism, elitism, tolerance of some aspects of dominant ideologies, concern with personal autonomy, selfishness and political indifference or apathy. Factors determining this cultural process range from (1) the values and new forms of behaviour brought to the township life by those attending 'open' schools, and (2) the effects on youth perceptions of the structural changes undertaken by the state in the townships such as the promotion of exclusively high-income housing and townships, to (3) different family, employment and leisure experience.

The 'open' schools, as schools for the elite, provide highly personalising forms of socialisation stressing individuality rather than collectivity, personal autonomy rather than ascription, competition rather than co-operation, and other values which are seen as negative within an African setting and are not directly open to parental surveillance. Thus children attending these schools acquire new lifestyles that are regarded as alienating them from their African traditions, values and costumes.[27] They tend to display more docile, diligent and conscientious behaviour. They show preference for foreign and culturally exotic forms of practice, interests and leisure pursuits. They return to the neighbourhood with a clearly identifiable sense of cultural displacement and consequent lack of authenticity. Unable to negotiate successfully their school experience with their township counterparts, they tend to form a marginal but solid subcultural group.

Material benefits, environment and the social status achieved by their parents also have profound effects on their perceptions, consciousness and social practices. They tend to engage in symbolically narcissistic forms of practice which

allow for personal satisfaction and outward prestige or, in Bernstein's words, 'a celebration of the present over the past, the subjective over the objective, the personal over the positional'.[28] Luxurious cars, 'leather jackets', foreign music and nightclubs dominate their interests and hobbies. Their parents play a central role in this process of socialisation.[29] Seekings says that in Soweto for example many people under this category are widely 'accused of being "snobs", who have changed their attitudes so drastically that they no longer seem part of the community ... "they have lost all the warmth one never misses elsewhere in Soweto" ... "they only know each other by the posh cars they drive" ... though they see themselves as still swimming in the same waters with every other black'.[30]

The size and social weight of this stratum is growing in response to the burgeoning modes of middle-class socialisation: elitist schools, rich families, better townships, better employment opportunities. Although politics have blurred the boundaries between working-class and middle-class youth subcultures, in Soweto the contours of these class strata have increasingly crystallised and their different social worlds are more distinguishable. One can speculate that the recent state initiative to rehabilitate black townships and introduce separate elite housing schemes is to a large extent a clear response to or an attempt to accelerate these trends in the social structure.[31] In Soweto this strategy has militated against the emergence of a strong sense of a (working-class) 'community' as has developed in poorer townships on the East Rand and in the Eastern Cape.

Youth and the tasks of national reconstruction

The question that emerges against the above background is whether social forces exist that have the potential to redirect youth culture into positive modes of social practice and reintegrate youth in more constructive ways of life, without perpetuating the existing oppressive status quo. The agenda is dramatically extensive. It is necessary: (1) to reduce and remove gangsterism in the townships; (2) to re-unite youth that

have been fragmented by conflicting cultural experiences and political competition after the unbanning of political organisations; (3) to liberate youth from the legacy of ideological indoctrination, racism, white-black, superior-inferior complexes of inferiority; (4) to empower youth with a sense of self-confidence, assertiveness and self-pride; and (5) to provide youth with the necessary skills, knowledge and critical thinking to cope with the challenge of reconstruction and so forth. This chapter is not aimed at addressing these specific issues. That must be an object of wider debate at the grassroots level as the process of national reconstruction unfolds. What this chapter hopes to achieve is to contribute with a historical background and a framework that can possibly inform the debate on related policy strategies.

A structural functional view would suggest that since youth problems are caused by forces inherent in the social and economic structures, they can be prevented or controlled only by radically changing these structures. This view is still popular within South African educational circles disillusioned by the failure of the reform process to address fundamental problems faced by South African society.

The problem with a structural functional view is that it overlooks the role of subjectivity and contradiction in the process of change. It disregards the role of ideology in reproducing and *transforming* social relations. There are subjective factors embedded in culture and ideology that may curtail or inhibit structural changes in society. Furthermore, history has shown that revolutions do not automatically eradicate all cultural styles that come to be seen as undesirable, outdated or incompatible with the new social order, even if profound structural changes take place.[32]

The implication is that efforts towards changing the structures and social relations should be dialectically linked to active intervention at the level of youth culture to counter the degenerating cultural forms which are becoming increasingly endemic in society: social crime, drugs and alcohol abuse. This should also include efforts to re-evaluate and transform old-fashioned youth practices, particularly resistance practices.

The question of resistance culture has already been discussed in Chapter Six. I would like however to stress that the need to emphasise *struggles of transformation* rather than *struggles of resistance* stems from the very nature of the resistance culture (see Chapter Six). Commonsensical views of resistance culture unproblematically see culture as a positive transformative process. This is an oversimplification of the matter. Resistance may serve to reproduce rather than transform existing social relations.[33] Aggleton uses the term *reproductive resistance* to refer to systematic intentioned resistance that work contradictorily by contributing to hegemonic rather than counter-hegemonic tendencies in contrast to *effective resistance* which may contribute counter-hegemonically within power struggles.[34] It is necessary to understand the significance of 'resistance' as social practice, how it is worked out, and how it is articulated with other practices within society. As Bowles and Gintis have demonstrated, determinate effects arise as an outcome of complex and contradictory articulation between practices at different sites within social formation, which means that the effects of 'resistance' are unpredictable.[35] There are constraints imposed on the development of social practices within a particular site by virtue of that site's articulation with others, as well as the possibilities allowed for by the transportation of practices across sites, for example gang culture in resistance culture and vice versa.

Notes

1. See M Brake, **The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subcultures** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp.6-7; and S Hall, 'Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance', in UNESCO, **Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism** (Poole: Sydenhams Printers, 1980), pp.308-309.
2. H Lunn, 'Antecedents of the music and popular culture of the African post-1976 generation', (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986), p.5.
3. D Coplan, 'Popular culture and performance in Africa', **Critical Arts**, 3 (1), 1983, p.2; and D Coplan, 'The urbanisation of the performing arts in South Africa', (PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1980), p.XV.
4. This is important if we realise that the sense of sympathy, support and solidarity can blind one to the reality and make one see only the idealised version, i.e. youth culture as contestation of the apartheid system. See Aquino de Bragança & Jacques Depelchin, 'From idealisation of Frelimo to the understanding of Mozambique's recent history', **Review**, XI (1), Winter 1988, p.96.
5. C Bundy, 'Street sociology and pavement politics: Aspects of youth and student resistance in Cape Town, 1985', **Journal of Southern African Studies**, 13 (3), April 1987, pp.301-330; C Bundy, 'South Africa on the switchback' and 'Schools and revolution', **New Society**, 3 & 7, January 1986; Paul la Hausse, ' "Mayihlome!" : Towards an understanding of Amalaita gangs in Durban, c.1900-1930' (African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987); Lunn, op cit; M O Nkomo, **Student Culture and Activism in Black South African Universities** (Westport: Greenwood, 1984); M O Nkomo, 'The contradictions of Bantu Education', **Harvard Educational Review**, 51 (1), 1981; P L Bonner, 'Black urban cultures and the politics of black squatter movements on the rand, 1944-1955'(unpublished paper, Univerity of the Witwatersrand, 1988); P L Bonner, 'Family, crime and political consciousness on the East Rand 1939-1955', **Journal of Southern African Studies**, 14 (3), April 1988, pp.393-420 (for this chapter I used the 1987 unpublished version); and C Glaser, 'Students, **tsotsis** and the Congress Youth League: Youth organisation on the Rand in the 1940s and 1950s', **Perspectives in Education**, 10 (2), 1988/9, pp.1-15.
6. Harold Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid', **Economy and Society**, November 1972, pp.425-456. See also Hall, op cit.
7. C Hartjen, 'Delinquency, development and social integration in India', **Social Problems**, (29), 1982, pp.464-73.
8. See for example J Petras, 'Class and politics in the periphery and the transition to socialism', **The Review of Radical Political Economics**, 8, 1976; A Q Obregon, 'The marginal pole of the economy and the

marginalised labour force', in H Wolpe (ed.), **The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society** (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp.254-88; and R Del Omo, 'The Cuban revolution and the struggle against prostitution', **Crime and Social Justice**, 12, 1979, pp.34-40.

9. Bonner, 'Black urban cultures...', op cit, p.1.
10. Ibid, pp.2-6.
11. Ibid, p.1.
12. Bonner, 'Family, crime ...', op cit; Bonner, 'Black urban cultures ...', op cit; Glaser, op cit; and Don Pinnock, **The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town** (Cape Town: David Philip, 1984).
13. See Bonner and Glaser.
14. Steve Biko, **I Write what I Like** (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p.109.
15. Bonner, 'Family, crime ...', op cit, p.13.
16. Colin Bundy, 'Street sociology and pavement politics: Aspects of youth and student resistance in Cape Town, 1985', **Journal of Southern African Studies**, 13 (3), April 1987, p.310.
17. Steve Biko, 'White racism and Black Consciousness', in Biko, op cit, pp.66-67.
18. Nicholas Haysom, 'Vigilantism and the policing of African townships: Manufacturing violent stability', in D. Davis & M. Slabbert (eds.), **Crime and Power in South Africa** (Johannesburg and Cape Town: David Philip, 1985), p.65.
19. The term **total resistance** is suggested by Haysom, op cit, p.73.
20. For more details on vigilante groups see N Haysom, **Ruling with the Whip** (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 1984); N Haysom, 'Mabangalala: The rise of the right wing vigilantes in South Africa', **Occasional Paper** (10) (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 1986); and N Gwala, 'Inkatha, political violence and the struggle for control in Pietermaritzburg' (unpublished paper, Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal Pietermaritzburg, 1988).
21. For details see Nico Steytler, 'Policing political opponents: Death squads and cop culture', in D Davis & M Slabbert (eds.), op cit, pp.107-131.
22. Wilfried Scharf, 'The Resurgence of urban street gangs and community responses in Cape Town during the late eighties', in D Davis & M Slabbert (eds.), op cit, p.237.
23. Eddie Webster, 'The rise of social-movement unionism: The two faces of the black trade union movement in South Africa', in P Frankel, N Pines & M Swilling (eds.), **State, Resistance and Change in South Africa** (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1988), p.191.
24. Bonner, 'Family, crime ...', op cit, p.13.
25. Don Pinnock, **The Brotherhoods** ..., op cit, p.105.
26. Ibid, p.105.
27. See Chapter Nine; and M Gaganakis, 'HSRC investigation: Education in a multicultural society. Perspectives of black pupils in Johannesburg private schools' (University of the Witwatersrand, 1988); J G Mativandela, 'School stayaways: Attitudes of pupils who attend township and city schools' (BA Hons Social Work, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987); and P Christie & D Butler, 'Witness through schooling: An evaluation of the Catholic open schools in South Africa 1986', Report presented to the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference. January 1988.
28. B Bernstein quoted by Peter Aggleton in **Rebels Without a Cause: Middle Class Youth and the Transition from school to Work** (London, New York and Philadelphia: The Falmer Press, 1987), p.39.
29. For details about the African middle class see S C Nolutshungu, **Changing South Africa: Political Considerations** (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); and O Crankshaw, 'Theories of class and the African middle class in South Africa, 1969-1987', **Africa Perspective**, New Series, 1 & 2, 1986.
30. J Seekings, 'Why was Soweto different? Urban development, township politics, and the political economy of Soweto, 1977-1984' (African Studies Seminar Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988), p.3.
31. Ibid, p.3.
32. Scharf, op cit, p.243.
33. See for example P Willis, **Learning to Labour** (Hampshire: Gower, 1979).
34. Aggleton, op cit, p.125.
35. See H Gintis & S Bowles, 'Contradiction and reproduction in education theory', in L Barton, R Meighan & S Walker (eds.), **Schooling, Ideology and the Curriculum** (Lewes: Falmer Press, 1981).

Chapter 9

School Desegregation and Cultural Change in a Historical Perspective: The Experience of the Catholic 'Open' Schools in the Transvaal, 1976-1990

Introduction

This chapter sets out to discuss major cultural implications of the process of school desegregation in South Africa with particular reference to the so-called 'open' schools. It will involve three main levels of analysis. Firstly, it will reconstruct and assess the history of the Catholic 'open' schools from 1976 with focus on the province of Transvaal. This will include the context which gave rise to the movement for 'open' schools in order to understand the growing social awareness and concern for social justice amongst church congregations. It will show how, after two decades of relative acquiescence and accommodation to the system of apartheid, the Catholic hierarchy began to act against racial segregation in education. It will also help to cast some light on the role of the church's struggle against apartheid education. Secondly, special attention will be paid to the debates and innovations introduced in the Catholic schools, the response of the state and the reactions of the public. An attempt will also be made to evaluate the role played by these schools after becoming 'open' schools, and their present trends, and to provide a general

perspective on their future in South Africa. Thirdly, this chapter will examine the cultural dilemma faced by the private schools in the context of the changing political climate in South Africa.

It will be argued that the rise of 'open' schools in South Africa represents the response of the church to particular historical circumstances determined by the crisis in education. With the collapse of apartheid, these schools are left with only two options: either to be integrated into the public school system or to restore their full status of private schools to cater for a privileged minority (condition *sine qua non* for their survival). However, given their particular experience as a force against the system of apartheid education and as what has been known as 'laboratories of the future', the 'open' schools have the potential to play a central role in the process of national reconstruction.

Two cases of school desegregation: The USA and Zimbabwe

My considerations about the USA are based on a six-months study on the desegregation process in Washington DC, where blacks constitute more than 75% of the population. First of all, it is important to note that school desegregation in the USA has been a *top-down* process or a process led from above, though it reflected the success of wider popular struggles. As such, desegregation has taken place essentially through the public school, which is, in general, the school for the ordinary people, the 'men in the street' or the poor. Where the practice of segregation remains — this is still a reality in the USA — it takes place through the private school. Here we are faced with two different situations.

1. There are schools which either because of their location, parents' resistance or because of financial reasons remain exclusively or almost exclusively white (I was told for example that in the District of Columbia the private schools remain 80% white, which is significant taking into consideration the percentage of black people in the area).
2. There are also educational institutions almost

exclusively for black children. Several reasons are presented for keeping them as institutions specifically for black people. Firstly, they are considered part of a cultural heritage that black Americans are committed to preserving. They are seen as a substructure of a long tradition of Afro-Americanism that unites black Americans as an oppressed minority. Secondly, they are part of their particular history as an oppressed black minority group, symbols of a history of oppression and racial discrimination. Thirdly, they provide an effective alternative for the training in leadership skills that blacks as a minority group cannot develop in the existing white institutions where they are very often forced to play a marginal role. Finally, geographical (school location), psychological and sociological reasons are also claimed for the preservation of separate or parallel institutions. For example, it is alleged that in these institutions black students enjoy a better social and psychological environment which allows them fully to explore their intellectual potential. It is argued that black students in efficiently-run separate institutions perform better than in integrated ones.

I must stress, however, that in general the mainstream American black middle class regards the integrated school as providing better conditions for optimising its chances of succeeding in a highly competitive labour market. The important thing is that the movement towards separate institutions in the USA has been used in South Africa as an argument against the process of desegregation. Integration, we are told, does not work. 'Open' schools will lead to cultural denigration and consequent ethnic or group conflict. My contention is that, though it holds important lessons for South Africa, the American model remains inadequate for addressing the educational needs of a deprived majority. It reflects the survival tactics of economically and politically disadvantaged minority groups. More meaningful experiences should be found within Third World settings, particularly Africa. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall briefly look at the Zimbabwean process which is much closer to the South African case.

Zimbabwe, like all other African territories once under British colonial rule, inherited an educational system based on

the policy of racial segregation. The first major departure from segregated schooling came with the foundation in 1957 of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (subsequently reorganised as an independent University during 1970). Though racial mixing was legally permissible in halls of residence and elsewhere on campus, it proved extremely difficult for individual students to adjust to a situation which contrasted significantly with the generalised segregation almost everywhere else in education. The first step towards racial integration at the secondary school level came as a result of an initiative by the independent schools for whites in conjunction with the churches and certain local business interests. By means of a bursary scheme introduced in 1963, small numbers of black pupils were admitted to independent schools. Only in 1979 did the new education authorities bring to an end racial segregation in education. The Zimbabwean experience is very similar to South Africa in that school desegregation was directed *from below* through the private school as a challenge to the hegemonic system of segregated schooling until the final collapse of the colonial system.

The two cases examined above provide a framework for an understanding of the argument developed in the following sections. It is hypothetically assumed that where the process of school desegregation is precipitated through the public school, the private school tends to play a conservative role. The private school becomes the main educational site where ethnic, cultural and economic tensions are diluted by giving them full expression. Emphasis is placed on particular cultural identities which divide society. The curriculum is based on these identities. It stresses cultural diversity and aspects that polarise ethnic or cultural groups. Where these tensions are accommodated through the public school, the private school tends to play a progressive role. Emphasis is placed on those values and ideals that tend to integrate society and promote unity, cohesiveness and nation building. While reflecting cultural diversity, the curriculum tends to emphasise common ideals and values that merge society together. This will be illustrated by examining the rise and fall of the so-called 'open' schools in South Africa.

The rise of 'open' schools in South Africa

Important initiatives have been undertaken by church communities in response to the ongoing educational crisis in South Africa. The most important of these is the opening of white private schools to children who are not white, a movement pioneered and carried out most consistently by the Catholic church. In 1976, the leaders of this church discussed the possibility and viability of opening their white private schools to black children. By the following year, a number of black pupils had been accepted into some white Catholic schools. Soon after, an official decision was made by the Catholic church leaders to ignore racial restrictions preventing black children from attending white Catholic schools. Despite many obstacles such as opposition from conservative white parents, difficulties imposed by economic barriers, fears of retaliation from the government and residential inaccessibility enforced by segregationist legislation, the number of black pupils, mostly 'coloureds' and Indians, gradually began to increase in these schools.

Following the Catholic church's initiative, the Anglican and Methodist churches also decided to open the doors in some of their private white schools to children of other races. Some non-racial private schools without church affiliation have also been founded. Most recently, the state introduced a scheme which allowed a limited number of white public schools to admit black children. Unfortunately, the attempts made by the State President, Mr F W De Klerk, to scrap the legislation seen as the cornerstones of apartheid fell short of addressing the crisis in education and the call from black and many white parents for a non-racial education system. The short-term future of education in South Africa remains uncertain.

Crisis and social awareness, 1953-1976

Many and different statements have been made to explain the reasons behind the creation of 'open' schools in South Africa. In general, there has been a tendency to overestimate

theological factors, either the impact of the call of the Second Vatican Council in 1962 or the principles proclaimed by the theology of liberation under the influence of Latin American theologians.[1] In some cases, these factors have been associated with the internal social, political and economic factors inherent in the current crisis of the apartheid system.

In 1979, at a Conference on 'Education and the Future Development of South Africa', Brother Jude, the Chairman of the Education Council of Associated Religious (ECAR), argued that 'the opening of Catholic schools to pupils, irrespective of race ... has been the response to an ever-increasing awareness of the implications of the Gospel message in our South African society'. For him, the 'open schools' emerged as 'an attempt to respond to the challenge of the Gospel; at no time have they been thought of as an answer to the tremendous shortage of educational opportunities available to black people, nor have they set out [to be] anything but a response to what those involved in the schools see as the demands of their religious convictions'.[2] Sister Theresa E Dempsey of the Dominican Order, interviewed in 1984, considered 'the call of Vatican II to go back to the Gospel' one of the most powerful influences. Undoubtedly, she argued, 'Vatican II influenced our thinking in every sphere and probably served to change our attitude as religious [people] to involvement in social questions'. Sister Theresa stressed the fact that concern with social problems would not have been possible according to orthodox religious tradition: 'Remember, in our early years in religion any such involvement would have been frowned upon even by the church'. The other influential factor for her was the impact of the mass media in alerting people to problems of peace and justice all over the world.[3]

The views expressed here reflect the emergence of new conceptions within Christianity about the role of the church in society. The traditional commitment of the church only to 'save souls' began to be seen as unsatisfactory. The church, it was argued, should also concern itself with social issues. Corke, headmaster of St Barnabas College, has pointed out that these new conceptions were connected with the influence of the theology of liberation brought to South Africa from Latin

America by Sister M A Neal, who conducted an important study on Catholic education in South Africa in 1970-72 under the auspices of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC).[4] How these ideas came to change the concept of Catholic education in South Africa was considered by Sister Dorothy in a principal's message published in the commemorative magazine of the Holy Rosary Convent in 1982: 'As we became increasingly aware of the injustices of our society, we realised that, in running a segregated school, not only were we supporting a sinful unjust society, but we were also inadvertently depriving our children of a basic component of Christian Education — the opportunity to grow up together and therefore be equipped to judge the morality of their society'.[5]

The problem with these interpretations is that they remain superficial and do not address the major contradictions which gave impetus to the process. For example, while the orthodox tradition in the Catholic Church was very reluctant regarding the church's involvement in political and social issues, its attitude cannot be explained by a misunderstanding of the implications of the gospel for social life. One has to consider the basic philosophical grounds on which religious life was conceived, the level of political consciousness, which was determined by the peculiarity of the social conditions of the past, and the role played by these factors in shaping the particular commitments assumed by Catholics at that time. Further, the influence of the mass media as well as the call of Vatican II was felt by South African Catholics as early as the beginning of the 1960s, but there was no immediate positive response in educational matters. Catholics preferred to accommodate themselves within the confines of the apartheid society. I would argue that, despite the significance that factors such as the call of Vatican II, the theology of liberation and the influx of progressive ideas through the mass media may have had, the fundamental determinants of the change of attitude in the Catholic schools were bound up with the increasing contradictions of apartheid society during the 1960s and, in particular, the 1970s. These produced amongst church communities a growing social awareness of the injustices

victims of oppressive political legislation. It stressed that 'to make educational opportunities readily available to some sections of the population, while others are restricted or impeded from them, is to create artificial feelings of superiority'.[11] It is important also to note that during the early 1970s there was much activity within the religious orders responsible for the Catholic schools — study groups discussed, for example, the Spro-cas report on education in South Africa.[12] Thus the bishops found themselves under pressure from the communities and religious orders, a fact which certainly led Goller, a leading Catholic activist, to state categorically that 'it was the pressure from nuns that helped to open up Roman Catholic schools to black children'. He pointed out that 'young nuns in particular had become increasingly unhappy about the intolerable situation of segregated schools ... it was against the whole Christian ethos that they should teach only whites'.[13]

Finally, the balance of forces in Southern Africa had changed dramatically after the independence of Angola and Mozambique and with the spread of guerrilla warfare in the then Rhodesia. South Africa was increasingly confronted with nationwide strikes, the problems of growing unemployment and school unrest culminating with the 1976 Soweto uprising of black youth. While the state set out the basis for its reform, the Catholic Church became the first religious institution to challenge the 'colour bar' by opening some of its white private schools to children of all races, and thus initiating the movement of 'open' schools in South Africa.

The beginnings, 1972-1977

In order to know accurately the situation of the Catholic schools, the Catholic Education Council invited Sister M A Neal from the USA to conduct a survey of Catholic schools in South Africa and suggest a policy for Catholic education. Her report, released in 1971, revealed important facts about the practice of racial segregation and social injustice in the Catholic schools. For example, it was disclosed that, in the schools operated by religious orders, '72% of children were European and 18% African; 75% of the religion was taught in European schools

and 12% in African schools; 58% of the schools were for Europeans and 22% for Africans'.[14] We can add that, in the Johannesburg area, there were 20 white secondary schools and only one African secondary school run by Catholics in 1970.[15] Sister Neal's recommendations, however, fell far short of the desirable. The major innovation suggested was a plan of rationalisation in the distribution of resources to minimise inequalities by making facilities 'equally' available to both blacks and whites. Nothing was suggested about moving away from the existing segregationist apparatus. The main thrust of her report was to show how Catholics had been positively condoning the policies of racial discrimination in their schools, and thus provide a basic philosophy for the 'open' schools formula.

Ironically, it was the government itself which was the unwitting catalyst of the 'open' schools. In 1973, it approached white Catholic schools to admit the children of black diplomats.[16] Catholic leaders, however, were not prepared to do so while excluding black South African children. Thus, in 1974 a Department of Schools was created within the SACBC and received as its first task, together with the ECAR and the Association of Women Religious, the investigation of possibilities for opening the white Catholic schools to children of other races.[17] As a result, in February 1976, the SACBC decided that the policy of promoting the admission of 'coloured' and Indian pupils to the white Catholic schools should be encouraged, where it was feasible.[18] In adopting this selective policy, the Bishops might have relied on the fact that the existing legislation was obscure on the admission of 'coloured' and Indian children to white schools. They also believed that matters concerning African children could be resolved through negotiation with education authorities. Fears existed that the Government would retaliate through a sudden closure of those schools which admitted African pupils for contravening the law.

The Anglican, Methodist and Congregational churches and two Jewish Rabbis came out in support of this step. Despite all precautions, the initiative did not escape the curiosity of the press. The 'open' schools made the front page of the *Sunday*

Times on 21 March 1976 and evoked a worldwide response. ECAR regretted that 'the first hint of the policy burst upon unprepared minds by dramatic headlines in the Press', and warned that 'the whole question has become distorted in the public mind and might suffer a serious setback'.[19] These statements reflected the fears and reluctance of some school leaders to take any step that could, in any way, antagonise the authorities or jeopardise the 'good' standing of their schools in the eyes of education officials and white parents. Only two schools in the country had admitted South African black children in 1976. In the Transvaal the only black pupils at white Catholic private schools were the children of foreign black diplomats.[20]

The search for recognition, 1977-1990

The events of 1976 in Soweto led to an immediate radicalisation of the Catholic Church's position. As a result, from 1977 onwards important developments took place within the 'open' schools movement. These included the following steps: (1) negotiations with education authorities in an attempt to have the 'open' schools recognised; (2) development of the social base of the 'open' schools; (3) attempts to restructure the curriculum in these schools to reflect their multi-cultural basis; and (4) the emergence of similar initiatives from other church congregations. In the provinces of Natal and the Cape, the process was characterised by gradual acquiescence and tolerance from the education authorities. In the Transvaal, it became more difficult because of the intransigence and hard-line position assumed by the provincial administrator. The 'open' schools survived in a climate of threat, insecurity and uncertainty, until the announcement of the revised subsidisation scheme on the 26 September 1985. I shall briefly examine these developments in the Transvaal, beginning with a note on the policies affecting the functioning and status of private schools.

Private schools and state policy

One of the earliest cornerstones of segregation in education in the Transvaal, the Education Act of 1907, determined that 'No coloured [black] child or person shall be admitted to or allowed to remain a pupil or member of any school class or institution ... for white children'. This principle was supported by the Bantu Consolidation (Urban Areas) Act No. 25 of 1945, which reads in paragraph 9.7:

> Except with the approval of the Minister ... no person shall on premises situated within any area outside a Bantu residential area conduct any school which is attended by Bantu or to which a Bantu is admitted other than a Bantu attending in the capacity of an employee.

The same Act made it impossible for all schools outside 'locations' or 'Bantu villages' to admit blacks even as day pupils. Education became part of the 'separate development' strategy with the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. In respect of church schools, the Transvaal Education Ordinance No. 20 of 1956 determined that: (1) 'non-white pupils are not allowed in a school for white pupils', and (2) 'every church primary school shall be staffed exclusively by European teachers and shall be attended only by European children'. In the light of these clauses, it was clear to the school leaders that admission of black children to a white school constituted an 'illegal' practice.

Other restrictions were imposed, for example, by the Group Areas Act No. 36 of 1966 which prevented the 'occupation' of land or premises in a 'specified area' by persons who were not members of the same race group. This Act excluded any possibility of admitting black children to a white private school as boarders. The Act is not clear regarding black pupils as day scholars. However, as Corke pointed out, the occupation of a desk during school hours could also be interpreted as constituting 'occupation' and as such be penalised.[21] The

situation of 'coloured' pupils in the white private schools was obscured by amendments made in 1973, but in practice restrictions affected all black children. Corke indicated that, for example, attempts made on the part of private schools in the Cape in the 1970s to obtain licences in terms of the Group Areas Act for the admission of 'coloured' pupils were refused by the Minister concerned.[22] Thus, the 'open' schools emerged in opposition to the barriers imposed by the existing segregationist legislation. While some of its implications could be negotiated with the education authorities, there were other difficulties beyond the control of the education departments such as influx control and the inaccessibility of the areas where these schools were situated.

The Catholic 'open' schools and the state response

Despite all such obstacles, the Catholic hierarchy, backed by the Vatican, was determined not to accept race as a criterion for admission to Catholic schools.[23] They interpreted this decision as aimed not at 'fighting against the Government but to serve the people ... to obey God rather than man',[24] a commitment almost irreconcilable with the existing circumstances in South Africa, as the subsequent experience of the Catholic schools demonstrated.

In the meantime, the request made by senior Catholic Church leaders to the Director of Education in the Transvaal for a meeting to discuss the admission of black children to their white schools was accepted after first being bluntly refused. Preliminary negotiations took place in February 1977, marking the beginning of a long and unsuccessful process up to 1981, when the church's position changed radically and it decided to go it alone.

Previous statements had shown, however, that there would be no significant progress in these negotiations. In 1976, for example, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M C Botha, responded to the new initiative by saying that the Government's view was unchanged.[25] Some days before the negotiations, the *Daily News* reported that 'Mr van Niekerk

said that certain church school principals would be asked about children in their classes and would be told to get rid of them'.[26] Three days later the *Eastern Province Herald* said, 'Today according to reports, school inspectors in the Transvaal will visit Catholic schools; not to see how school work is progressing, but to examine registers for race classification of pupils. It's distasteful enough for decent South Africans and it's humiliating enough for young people subjected to such skin scrutiny; but what of the memories it must raise of inestimably more sinister but uncomfortably similar actions in Hitler's Europe.'[27] The *Star* also reported on 18 February 1977 that 'Mr van Niekerk had made it clear he would not discuss [with the Catholic schools' delegation] the possibility of black pupils remaining in these schools'.

The only progress was the decision that the 57 'non-white' children already enrolled in the Transvaal and the 64 in the Cape would not be withdrawn, but no new scholars might be admitted at the beginning of 1978. The Cabinet added that, in future, applications for authorisation to admit such pupils had to be submitted to the education authorities.[28] This did not change the SACBC's decision made in 1977 that black children should be admitted to Catholic schools on merit, which allowed that some pupils (mostly 'coloureds') could attend some of the 30 schools controlled by Catholics in the Transvaal in defiance of the Government's policy. However, the majority of these schools adopted a wait-and-see strategy until 1979. Many black parents who made applications for their children were referred to the Department of Community Development.

In the Cape and Natal, where the authorities responded with more flexibility, the admission of black pupils on the basis of a 'permit', as determined by the Cabinet, proceeded smoothly. In the Transvaal, progress was much slower. The Government's announcement that the policy of racially separate schools would be left to the discretion of the provincial authorities was taken by the Transvaal Administrator as the green light for his hard-line policy.[29] Applications submitted in 1978 were turned down. A circular was sent by the Transvaal Education Department (TED) to schools declaring mixed sports, and mixed social and cultural meetings 'not

desirable'.[30] Until the beginning of 1979, out of a total of 223 applications, most of which were from Catholic schools, only four were approved.[31] Representatives of the Catholic, Anglican and Methodist private schools, who called for talks to discuss the situation, were told that the provincial authorities would reconsider the applications which had been turned down. Meanwhile, the Cape Administration had already allowed more than 400 'coloured' and Indian pupils to attend white private schools.[32] By the end of the first quarter, the number of 'non-white' students in these schools in the Cape had increased to 605 (66 Africans, 370 'coloureds' and 169 Indians);[33] whilst by June the Transvaal had still only approved 11 out of 310 applications, for one 'coloured' and 10 Indian pupils.[34] Over 200 pupils were in Transvaal schools without permission from the department.[35]

The attitude of the Transvaal Administrator, S van Niekerk, has been interpreted in different ways. For Archbishop Fitzgerald, 'the position in the Transvaal was more tense than elsewhere precisely because it was the region in which the Afrikaner felt most threatened'.[36] More recently, Randall has linked this to the commitment of Van Niekerk to contest the parliamentary seat of Koedoespoort for the ruling National Party during 1979. He argues that, allied to this, there was probably 'fear of right-wing reaction if the government should be seen to be too soft on the question of integrated private schools'.[37] Apart from these reasons, the Transvaal Education Department seems to have been dominated by more conservative forces within the ruling party than the Cape and Natal. Thus, new hopes were created when Van Niekerk resigned in June 1979, having been substituted by a somewhat more *verligte* (enlightened) W Cruywagen.[38]

The intransigence in the Transvaal led the Catholic schools to proceed with their own policy of racial mixing without the go-ahead of the local Administration. By 1981, a stage had been reached where many white private schools saw no further point in submitting applications to the TED. The 'permit system' was seen as a 'fruitless exercise involving a great deal of work'[39] that resulted in 'standard refusals'.

Three main factors had strengthened the church's position

and had led to this uncompromising commitment. Firstly, through the consultation campaign launched in 1978-80, the Catholic schools had succeeded in developing community support and unity. Although relatively strong opposition against racial mixing in schools still remained, many white and black parents became more tolerant. For example, an opinion poll about white attitudes on school integration, conducted in 1982 by the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper *Rapport*, concluded that whites had voted for mixed private schools, though Afrikaans speakers appeared more opposed to any form of racial mixing.[40] Black parents who objected against 'open' schools argued on financial grounds. I shall return to this point later.

Secondly, the 'open' schools had expanded somewhat from 1977 onwards when the Anglican, Methodist and other institutions took the same steps. The support of the 'open' schools also increased with the growing involvement of the private sector. This became a decisive financial factor for improvements in the infrastructure. The intervention of the private sector can be explained in terms of the role which these schools were expected to play in ideologically shaping and equipping sectors of the black middle class for the 'free market' or 'free enterprise' system.

Thirdly, the release of the De Lange Report in 1981, calling for equalisation of education and state subsidies for 'non-racial' private schools, led to more flexibility towards the 'open' schools on the part of the State. This created more optimism and a stronger determination amongst school leaders, who believed that the 'open' schools would not easily collapse.

These factors were reflected by a gradual relaxation of the Transvaal hard-line policy. In 1983, the SACBC reported that, though nine-tenths of all applications had been consistently turned down, the TED made 'angry noises from time to time, but to date it has not taken steps either to de-register or change the status of any open school'.[41] The same year, the Minister of National Education, Dr G Viljoen, declared that the private schools which enrolled pupils from other 'population groups' would be allowed to continue to do so. He pledged that these schools would not be disqualified from subsidies if they enrolled

members of other races.[42] One can speculate that before this stage, despite the intransigence of the Transvaal Administration, the State was also watching to see how the system would work. By 1982-83, it recognised that the 'open' schools could make a contribution to the overall reformist policy.

A new strategy was devised in 1982, not to prevent the admission of black pupils but to control the growing number of enrolments.[43] A 'quota system' was imposed according to which 'open' schools could accept black pupils only up to one-third of their total enrolment. Only the Cape Province and Natal had tried to implement this policy. In the Transvaal, the quota system was completely ignored by local authorities. The Catholic bishops rejected this restriction, which they considered 'a more subtle way of imposing racial discrimination, and of placing the onus for discrimination on the Catholic schools and not on the government'.[44]

New attempts to impose restrictions and control were made in September 1985 and again in 1986 when new regulations regarding private schools were introduced. These regulations determined that the admission of pupils who were not white must be done in accordance with the 'new constitution'; the appointment of teachers must be approved by the white 'own affairs' education authorities; and the school principal would be subjected to the directives and instructions of the Director of Education. Every private school applying for subsidies should re-register with the Government under these new regulations.[45] The subsidy scheme was divided into two categories: a subsidy per child of 15% of the annual cost of educating a white child or 45% of that amount. The Government would pay the higher subsidy only if the school enrolment was 90% white. To receive a 15% subsidy, schools would have to be 80% white. To register at all, schools had to be 70% white.[46]

The new dispensation was received with anger by school leaders who saw their independence threatened. The strongest opposition came from the 75 Catholic open schools in the country, which accommodated 22,000 pupils. Progress was made when the racial clauses imposed by the new regulations

were withdrawn in May 1986. The Government finally backed down on conditions intended to keep private schools white and stipulated that the 15% and 45% subsidies would be based only on scholastic standards.[47] By 1986, the 'open' schools had definitely consolidated their position in South African education. This position is being strengthened by the foundation of the New Era Schools Trust (NEST) which is building new non-racial private schools in Natal, Grahamstown, Cape Town and Johannesburg.[48]

The 'open' schools and the challenge of national reconstruction

When the SACBC decided in 1976 to promote the 'open' school policy, the response from both the white and black communities revealed a degree of insecurity and fear. Some white parents disapproved of the initiative and decided to remove their children from the schools which admitted blacks. Many white parents were reluctant to enrol or keep their children in a school with a large number of black pupils. To some extent, this has forced some schools to adopt a policy of tacit control of the number of black pupils, and it explains to some extent the greater attendance by Indian and 'coloured' children in many of these schools.[49] However, there has been an increasing number of white parents who see the 'open' schools as preparing their children for the future. They accept the fact that the reality of the South African situation is that whites are in the minority and will have to live with the majority's expectations.[50]

Amongst black parents two main positions could be identified. About this, the minutes of a meeting with members of the Black Priests' Solidarity Group in 1977 provide the following account:

> Rich people were very happy that the bishops were taking a stand... The poor man however asked: 'Does it mean anything to me?' and the answer was 'No' — a poor man can't afford to pay the R20 fee at the local

> Catholic school; the R700 required by the White Catholic school made the question irrelevant to the poor Black man.[51]

Sister B Flanagan of the SACBC also noted in 1977 that 'many black parents and pupils consider it sheer hypocrisy to declare schools open when fees are prohibitive'.[52] Many years have passed since the first black child entered a white private school. School fees have sharply increased. Bursary schemes have been introduced to the extent of covering 100% expenses in extreme cases. However, experience has shown that 'open' schools can only survive financially as genuine private schools by sharing their financial burden with the parents.

Some parents have criticised 'open' schools on cultural grounds. On these grounds, the 'Soweto Introspection' Conference, organised in 1979 by the Committee of Ten (later known as the Soweto Civic Association) and attended by 400 people, recommended, as an alternative, that schools in Soweto should be improved and 'instil a spirit of black idealism in school children'.[53] Thus, fees and the concern with cultural identities have been presented by black parents as the main obstacles. Consequently, class and cultural relations have become the most problematic areas in the 'open' schools process. These will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

'Open' schools: Financial and social constraints

Traditionally, English private schools in South Africa have served, among other roles, the function of enculturating the economic elite, both those who own the means of production and those who exercise executive and managerial control over the economic power. Generally, they have empowered the ruling class in economic terms to establish hegemonic control over the system. The concept of excellence and standards were generally defined with reference to this social and economic role. This does not exclude the fact that these very same schools, as sites of struggles, may have been appropriated by some members of community to pursue contradictory and

oppositional goals. However, this phenomenon has been more of an exception than the rule.

Since the 'open' schools inherited this tradition of elitism and impose relatively expensive fees and strict meritocratic principles in their selection of pupils, black children attending these schools come, by and large, from a black middle-class background. Only this privileged elite have the social and economic conditions required by the 'open' schools. Corke has put it clearly that 'middle-class parents have sound personal reasons for promoting the existence of these schools'.[54] To understand the implications of this fact one has to look at the characteristics of the developing black middle class in the Transvaal.

Nolutshungu, in his study of the black middle class in South Africa, argued in 1978 that blacks who actually own or control means of production are few and not represented in any of the major industries of the country. He pointed out that 'it is more to salary earners than entrepreneurs that the term "black middle-class" is commonly applied, although it also includes small traders and businessmen'.[55] The 1970 population census showed an overwhelming majority of teachers and nurses in this category, vastly outnumbering those in other professional, technical and managerial jobs. For example, out of a total of 93,000 African professionals listed, there were 71,760 nurses and teachers, or nearly 74%, alongside 40 lawyers and 120 doctors, dentists and veterinarians.[56] The proportions were similar regarding Indians and 'coloureds'. Yet, access to university education has been underlying the weak representation of blacks in what Nolutshungu calls the 'professional bourgeoisie', as reflected by the extremely weak enrolment in disciplines such as medicine, veterinary science, engineering, commerce and law.[57]

Under the government's reformist policy, from the late 1970s onwards, there have been deliberate attempts to increase the size and prosperity of the black middle class.[58] There has been for example some movement towards the equalisation of salaries between whites and blacks in selected occupational categories such as doctors and academics, and more recently teachers and nurses. Paralleling this, an

increasing number of educated Africans have been drawn into junior managerial positions in some companies during recent years.[59] The political economy of the townships has been deliberately restructured to precipitate this social stratification.

Under these circumstances, the 'open' schools were expected to bring about a middle-class ideological self-definition by providing a suitable ethos binding all those who go through these schools, aimed at ultimately forestalling the danger of a radical change in South Africa. In this sense, as Randall has noted, some 'open' schools might 'unwittingly be playing a part in supporting government policy'.[60] The state subsidisation scheme might have been based on these conciliatory aims. To put it another way, while combating the official policy of racial segregation, the 'open' schools might be promoting another form of social discrimination, discrimination based on class or social condition. This is an ambiguity which to a large extent compromises the church's commitment to social justice.

The state subsidisation makes it relatively possible for the 'open' schools to operate not only at the level of the 'rich people' but also at the level of the poor or disadvantaged families without any considerable change in their ultimate goals.[61] Though apparently plausible, there some moral constraints against the diversion of resources to a privileged top stream of schools segregated by virtue of being fee-paying, which generally reflects and perpetuates social class divisions.[62] This would be more tolerable once proper support for mass education had been achieved.

However, the question still remains as to whether the 'open' schools will or will not be prepared to abdicate from their traditional elitist and selective policy without compromising their commitment to high educational standards and excellence. While this problem can be overcome with relative success, the major difficulty will remain the strong constraints imposed by many white conservative parents who would not like to see 'their' schools becoming 'too black'. The fact is that those schools which for different reasons have gone 'too far' and accepted a majority of black children are now striving to maintain their white enrolment.[63] Another difficulty that has

recently been overcome was posed by the current social conflict and education crisis in South Africa. Black children attending the 'open' schools came to be seen by those who attend government schools in the townships as 'sell-outs', and some black parents were asked under threat to remove their children from these schools 'to join the struggle'.[64]

Another potential threat to the future of the 'open' schools is also the increasing disillusionment and radicalisation of the black elite, which has begun to see the different initiatives undertaken to accommodate the black middle class as 'a matter of tokenism': 'Whatever is happening is too little and too late.'[65] For example, the belief that the black middle class, including black businessmen, would form a buffer between the white ruling bloc and the black masses was positively challenged during the Conference of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce in July 1986. Black businessmen decided to side with 'total liberation': 'We do not want to be used to perpetuate the status quo.'[66] This confirms the remark made by Nolutshungu in 1978 that although the South African black elite has shown signs of moderation,

> It would, however, be a grave misconception to construe this political temper as evidence of a willingness to enter into a deal with racialist rule on any terms it might accept, or as indicating that ... such Blacks would actively fight to preserve a modernised system of racial domination under which Whites would continue to have overwhelming economic and political advantage'.[67]

Perceptions of the political future have also changed amongst blacks. The possibility of a majority rule now appears almost irreversible in the medium to long term. This changing political context is also a strong reason to argue that an appreciation of the dialectical nature of societal relations is needed. 'Open' schools cannot ignore the wider struggles in education and the changing political economy of South Africa.

Of course, we cannot expect these schools, as educational institutions, to be caught up in the broader, contradictory and complex mass movements, but they can still create their own political space in the liberation struggle. If they do not become part of the resolution of the crisis, they will remain part of its ongoing cause.

'Open' schools: Cultural constraints

Schwartz refers to parents who argue against the 'open' schools on cultural grounds as follows: 'opponents ... speak of breeding "black skins with white masks" '; they forecast alienation and a complete loss of identity.[68] As I have already mentioned above, some parents have seen the 'open' schools as a threat to their cultural identity. The 'open' school leaders see their schools as instruments of social change contributing to the shaping of new attitudes and behaviour towards race prejudices in both white and black school children. They see these schools as '*laboratories of the future*', where pupils from different social and cultural backgrounds learn to live together, interchanging their cultural experiences and building up new values and a new type of education based on non-racial principles. Some of these aspects were described by Randall as follows:

> They often generate a greater awareness of, and concern for, social justice at the 'micro-level' in the minds of some pupils. The children come from conservative backgrounds but they are exposed to experiences denied to children at state schools and often emerge with a greater sense of social justice.[69]

Thus, the 'open' schools, it is argued, are having a particular experience which can indicate or, at least, provide some insights of what schools in a non-racial education system would be like. From 1984/85 onwards, attempts have been made to revise the existing curricula in order to meet the

'multi-cultural' composition of their students.[70] Indeed, experiments are taking place in some of these schools involving curriculum changes, the exercise of community control and alternative roles for PTAs, alternative teaching and learning styles and didactic innovations. For this purpose, schools such as Sacred Heart College in Johannesburg have set up special research centres. Mistakes and errors are made but lessons are drawn that might be relevant to the establishment of a new educational order in the country. There are however, some limits to the process of curriculum change. A study conducted in 1986 by Christie and Butler[71] identified four main sets of schools in terms of their attempts to adjust the curriculum.

1. There are those schools which offer subjects within the established range offered in white Government schools and follow syllabi set down by white education departments. The reason put forward is the fear to lose 'what has taken so many years to build up'. They are committed to the whole competitive curriculum under which schools function — the scramble for marks, credentials, access to university and access to economic positions and privilege.
2. There are those schools which, though following the same curriculum as in white schools, have made some attempts to acknowledge a black presence in the schools by teaching an African language as a third language alongside English and Afrikaans. In 1986 only three schools offered an African language as a matric subject, thereby giving it full academic status.
3. There are those schools where changes of a more fundamental nature have been attempted such as encouraging pupils to recognise broader educational struggles in the country, and promoting programmes of social awareness on the ongoing crisis in education.
4. There also a few schools where adjustments have been attempted in the dominant curriculum. For example, it is assumed in some of these that while 'classical studies' would help pupils to appreciate a western background and culture, 'African studies' would allow them to ex-

plore and understand the African background and culture.

There are however strong constraints which preclude any successful change in the curriculum and the prevailing educational practice in these schools. As private, fee-paying and white-registered, 'open' schools cannot escape the context of apartheid, no matter what they stand for; they are attached to the tradition of white education with its peculiar basis for the definition of standards. The tradition of a white school itself, the experiences of the white staff and the expectations and fears of white parents play a dominant role. Africanisation of the curriculum in this case is very often associated with 'dropping standards'.

The concept of the 'open' schools as 'laboratories of the future', however, should not be taken too far. The 'open' schools constitute a little island in the large ocean of apartheid. They operate at the ideological level of attitudes and non-racialism, which can easily vanish if no further changes are introduced in the apartheid system. Their student body still constitutes a micro-society which can hardly produce tangible impact in the short term. This weakness is translated in the minds of some pupils by statements like this: 'they are providing us with an experience of an unreal world, the real world is out there'.[72] Nonetheless, one has to realise that education under apartheid will never be the same as that which will eventually take place in a society that is not racially based and organised. No school can divorce itself from the society in which it operates.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can make a strong case in favour of or against the 'open' schools. On the one hand, these schools embody a number of aspects that have been criticised in different educational circles. First, the 'open' schools draw from the community important sections of parents and children who should be playing a crucial role in the struggle for a new educational order. The possibilities for conquering a significant counter-hegemonic space in these schools, it is

argued, are very limited. Second, as a strategy for expanding non-racial educational alternatives, they face the danger of falling into the decentralisation and privatisation strategy, which tends to free the state from its social responsibility of providing free and compulsory education to all. This would mean commitment to an elitist education in a pre-mass-schooling situation, that is, when the larger mass of people have not yet experienced free and compulsory education for everybody irrespective of race, ethnicity or social condition. Third, there is also the problem of skilling a black intelligentsia for its own sake, a task that the country cannot afford. Under the circumstances, educational entitlement should always be considered together with political power — as in People's Education for People's Power. Finally, if, as experience has demonstrated, the most sensitive area and a crucial one for laying the foundations for an alternative educational order is the very basic area of the pre-school and primary school, it seems that there is a potential waste of resources, particularly when these are used to expand the existing infrastructure of the private school system.

On the other hand, one can make a very strong case in favour of the 'open' schools. First, there is a potential value in the notion of 'open' schools as 'laboratories of the future'. Closely related to this, there is another meaningful sense that can be attached to the 'open' schools. McGurk explains it as a process of conversion which in turn becomes a source of creativity. Such a process, he argues, 'implies the conversion from group biases, racial, class, cultural, and religious'.[73] The creativity engagement becomes a self-correcting process of learning and mutual enculturation in which communication is always overcoming this alienating past. This is, he argues, a process in which the diversity, and the experience of cultures other than one's own, is not alien but in which richness of the other cultures is appreciated in an 'imaginative passing over' from one's one culture to others, in a full sharing of human heritage and creation of togetherness or nation-building. In this process, as in a melting-pot, one's own meanings are reconstituted into the intrinsic humanness of the human family, transcending differences of race, culture and ethnicity.

All everyone has to do is to hand on a legacy, a legacy that is meaningful to the free, democratic, and non-racial society that we so deeply wish for our children.

As has been pointed out, 'open' schools emerged from a background of private education in which the desire for monopolising economic power, cultural identity, social exclusiveness and individual success were the driving force. The return to this tradition once the liberation goals are met would be disastrous. In the struggles against the apartheid system, the 'open' schools have undergone unusual changes and developed experiences that must not be lost. They have developed strategies to move away from an economically and culturally fragmented schooling system to cater for children from different social, economic and cultural backgrounds. By doing so, they have walked a long way towards ending the larger divisions of private versus public education within the South African educational system as a whole. They have redefined the boundaries of the community in a much wider way to reflect the social composition of the whole South African society. There has been a commitment to match these changes with an adequate curriculum and examinations reform.

These changes indicate that under the present economic and social constraints 'open' schools can only survive if they can develop a new concept of private schooling within the sphere of what I would call 'community schooling'. Vital to this concept is the reduction of social class differences, and genuine local community participation, support and understanding, where those involved in a school agree together to move in a particular direction against the background of the history of social and racial discrimination. This would require giving more control to teachers over the curriculum, and to parents, pupils and the community over choices within and uses of the educational resources in their area. It also means that an individualistic and meritocratic approach should not prevail upon the effort to eradicate class differences but should be part of that effort. This concept of private schooling also has important financial implications. It reduces the hostility to the diversion of resources to the benefit of a privileged minority by allowing a more meaningful use of these resources.

Notes

1. The importance for SA of the Second Vatican Council lies in its concern with fundamental human rights. It stressed that 'with respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, or based on sex, race, colour, social condition, language or religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent'.
2. Jude Petersen, 'The Open Schools' (summary of an address delivered at the Conference on 'Education and the Future Development of South Africa' held at the University of the Witwatersrand 9-13 July 1979), p.1.
3. Sister Therese Immanuel Dempsey, Acting Regional Superior of the Dominican Order, interviewed on 13 August 1984.
4. M Corke, Acting Headmaster of St Barnabas College, interviewed on 7 September 1985. Sister Marie Augusta Neal from the Department of Sociology of Immanuel College, Boston, USA, was invited by the SACBC in 1970 to undertake a survey of the Catholic Schools and suggest a policy for Catholic education in SA. Her report, released in 1971, constituted one of the first attempts to redirect Catholic education in SA.
5. Sister Dorothy, 'Principal's Message', **Commemorative Magazine 1886-1982** (Port Elizabeth: The Holy Rosary Convent, 1982).
6. Pat Schwartz, 'Integrated Schools', **Fair Lady**, 19 September 1984, p.116.
7. This decision, however, did not correspond with the main concern of black parents and teachers, who were pressing for the attainment of as high a level of qualification as possible, in no way inferior to that of whites.
8. Jabulani Nxumalo, 'Church, Salvation and Politics', in Andrew Prior (ed.), **Catholics in Apartheid Society** (London and Cape Town: David Philip, 1982), p.52.
9. See for example, E G Malherbe, **Bantu Manpower and Education** (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969).
10. P F Butelezi, 'Black Consciousness and Human Rights', in Andrew Prior (ed.), op.cit, p.184. See also Basil Moore (ed.), **Black Theology in South African Voice** (London: C Hurst & Co., 1973).
11. SACBC, 'Call to conscience addressed to Catholics in Southern Africa' (statement issued in 1972), in Andrew Prior (ed.) op cit, p.181.
12. **Report of the Education Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society**. This is one of six Spro-cas Commissions established in mid-1969 under the sponsorship of the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa.
13. Margaret Smith, 'The Mixed School Row', **Sunday Times**, 30 January 1977.
14. M A Neal, **The South African Catholic Education Study** (Durban: The Catholic Education Council, 1971), p.7.

15. **Rand Daily Mail**, 24 January 1970.
16. John Rae, 'Breaking Apartheid in the Private Classroom', **The Times of London**, 5 August 1980.
17. Bridgid Flanagan, 'Education: Policy and practice', in Andrew Prior (ed.), op cit, p.91.
18. Minutes of the Plenary Session of the SACBC, February 1976.
19. ECAR, Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 6 June 1976, p.1.
20. Interview with Brother Neil McGurk, Headmaster of Sacred Heart College, 27 September 1985.
21. Michael Corke, 'The admission of black pupils to white private schools in South Africa' (memorandum for Mr Robert McDermott of Dewey, Ballentine, Bushby Palmer, Wood, New York), Johannesburg, 20 March 1975.
22. Ibid.
23. **Weekend Argus**, 22 January 1977.
24. SACBC, Minutes of the Ordinary Plenary Session, 1977.
25. **The Star**, 20 January 1977.
26. **Daily News**, 21 January 1977.
27. **The Eastern Province Herald**, 24 January 1977.
28. Summary of Dr Koornhof's reply, MCNED.
29. Peter Randall, 'The English private school system in South Africa', (MEd thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1980), p.273.
30. ECAR, Minutes of Annual General Meeting, 3-4 June 1978.
31. **Cape Times**, 19 January 1979.
32. **Sunday Times**, 29 April 1979.
33. **Eastern Province Herald**, 19 May 1979.
34. **The Star**, 7 June 1979.
35. **The Star**, 23 February 1979.
36. Minutes of the Meeting of Major Superiors of Teaching Congregations in the Transvaal, 25 January 1978.
37. Peter Randall, op cit, p.275.
38. Ibid., p.274; and **The Star**, 21 June 1979.
40. **Rand Daily Mail**, 15 February 1982.
41. SACBC, Minutes of the Ordinary Plenary Session, 1983.
42. **Rand Daily Mail**, 24 November 1983.
43. Interview with Brother Neil McGurk, Headmaster of Sacred Heart College, 27 July 1985.
44. Directive given by the Administrative Board of Bishops on the Quota System for the 'Open' schools, 1982.
45. **The Star**, 15 April 1986.
46. Ibid; and **The Star**, 22 April 1986.
47. **The Star**, 30 May 1986.
48. **The Star**, 28 February 1986.
49. There is, nevertheless, the fact that African children in general come to these schools with the lowest standards.
50. See, for example, the opinions collected by Pat Schwartz in 'The slippery road to mixed education', **Frontline**, March 1981, p.11.
51. Minutes of the Meeting with Members of the Black Priests' Solidarity Group, 25 March 1977.

52. Brigid Flanagan, 'The open schools in the context of schooling in general in South Africa', talk given to Major Superiors, 30 March 1977.
53. **Sunday Post**, 23 November 1979.
54. Michael Corke, 'The place of private schools in South African education' (mimeo, Johannesburg, July 1980), p.5.
55. Sam C Nolutshungu, **Changing South Africa: Political Considerations** (Manchester University Press, 1978), p.116.
56. Ibid.
57. Africans have been prevented from attending some of these courses by law or other artificial barriers.
58. Owen Crankshaw, 'Theories of class and the African "middle class" in South Africa, 1969-1983', **Africa Perspective**, 1 (1 & 2), 1986.
59. The tendency has been to employ Africans in positions such as personnel management to facilitate communication between African workers and management.
60. Peter Randall, 'A matter of identity: South Africa's English private schools' (mimeo, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984), p.21.
61. R Rogers, 'Education and social class: Privatisation and the sociology of the school: Discussion', in R Rogers (ed.), **Education and Social Class** (London: The Falmer Press, 1986), p.101.
62. Michael Corke, op cit, p.5.
63. This is happening in the schools located on the border areas between the white and black residential areas.
64. This is also related to the fact that the 'open' schools are without interruptions and far from the constant unrest in the townships.
65. Dr Sam Motsuenyane, president of the African Federated Chamber of Commerce, in a press conference, **Sunday Star**, July 13 1986.
66. Ibid.
67. Sam C Nolutshungu, op cit, p.119.
68. Pat Schwartz, 'The slippery road to mixed education', op cit, p.11.
69. Patrick Laurence, Interview with Peter Randall, **Rand Daily Mail**, 6 July 1981.
70. This issue is still under discussion among school leaders.
71. Pam Christie & Dawn Butler, 'Witness through schooling: An evaluation of the Catholic open schools in South Africa 1986', Report presented to the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, January 1988.
72. Interviews with two senior students at St Barnabas College, Bosmont, 18 April 1985. For more details on students' perceptions see Christie & Butler, op cit; and M Gaganakis, 'Perspectives of black pupils in Johannesburg private schools', University of the Witwatersrand, 1988.
73. N J McGurk, **I Speak as a White: Education, Culture, Nation** (Johannesburg: Heinemann Southern Africa, 1990).

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