'Cross of Gold: The gold, liquor and pass laws and the problem of identification, 1895 – 1899'.

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Cross of Gold: The gold, liquor and pass laws and the problem of identification, 1895 – 1899

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I think that it is fair to say that the special problem of South African historical writing is the search for the origins of the Apartheid state. The most influential works of our historiography have traced a South African sonderweg back to its beginnings in the period of Reconstruction following the South African War in 1900. There, under Lord Milner, the key institutions of coercive migrant labour and racial segregation were energetically laid down by a small army of British administrators. I have some small quarrels of detail and interpretation with these studies. What I want to show here is that the state-building of the Reconstruction period was undertaken using plans that were drawn up in the last five years of the Boer Republic.

The modern South African state – during Apartheid and before it – exhibited an extraordinary capacity for the large scale imprisonment of innocent workers, almost all of them black and male. In an essay published a quarter-century ago – which has renewed significance in the post-Apartheid democracy – Charles van Onselen showed that South Africa’s distinctive “labour-repressive institutions” fostered the development of tightly organized criminal organizations inside its prisons. “At the very heart of the new order,” he argued, were the “mine compounds of the Witwatersrand.” But the mine compounds were not the engine of incarceration in South Africa, certainly not directly and not really figuratively—the work of imprisonment was undertaken by other institutions: primarily the pass office compound and secondarily the prohibition on the production, sale and consumption alcohol by Africans. It was these two areas of South African law, and the special instruments that were developed to police them, that populated the prison system. In this essay I want to show that these laws were drafted and implemented under the influence American mining engineers who dominated the gold mining industry in the 1890s.


By the end of 1895 the corps of American mining engineers had broken into two camps. One side—dominated by Gold Fields’ John Hays Hammond—supported Rhodes’ ill-considered effort to overthrow the Boer state. The other, led by Rand Mines’ Hennen Jennings, publicly declared its support for Boer independence. Hammond’s adventures have received vastly more attention (at the time and subsequently) but it was Jennings’ efforts that resulted in the blueprint of the 20th century South African state. Some of this work was accomplished through lobbying by the Association of Mines Managers and the Chamber of Mines, but the most important intervention was in his testimony and direction of the commission of enquiry that Kruger appointed after the Jameson raid.

The deliberations of the 1897 Mining Industry Commission, including some six hundred pages of evidence, recommendations and already existing law, were carefully collated (and where necessary translated into English), nicely bound and very widely published. The Industry Commission, as it was called by contemporaries, was not the first public official enquiry in the Transvaal, or even the first to deal with the mining industry, but it was the first to mobilize the powers of the blue-book, albeit commercially. And, in the history of official commissions in South Africa, it is unusually consistent in its terms of evidence and recommendations. Running through all of the evidence and the report of the Commission is a steady preoccupation with the administration of three newly enacted statutes of the old republic: the gold, liquor and pass laws. I want to show that these three laws, amidst a sea of local regulations directed at the control of African labourers and their families, should be viewed as the foundations of the modern South African state.

The combined operations of these three republican laws, which only started working in earnest under Edward Henry in late 1900, had distinctive effects on the form of the South African state, especially in the area of policing. All three laws inverted the normal procedures of liberal due process by setting very low requirements for the demonstration of culpability. Anyone caught in possession of unrefined gold after 1895 without “proof that he obtained the possession” lawfully was presumed guilty of the crime of Illicit Gold Buying and subject to harsh penalties. Identical provisions in the liquor and pass laws essentially removed the requirement for the police to prove that a crime had taken place at all. More importantly, the urgency and clarity with which the engineers enunciated the requirements of their industry meant that the Transvaal detective force after 1900 devoted fully two-thirds of its manpower and institutional resources to the prosecution of crimes that affected only the gold mines. One consequence of the state’s efforts to protect the mining industry by preventing workers from stealing gold or drinking alcohol can be seen in the neglect of a basic forensic


capacity for the investigation of civil crimes. Another is that each of these laws placed the problem of reliable bureaucratic identification at the centre of policing.

Two types of American Engineers

By the beginning of 1895 the international significance of the Witwatersrand basin was unmistakable. In the previous year John Hays Hammond, serving as Gold Fields’ chief consulting engineer, presented a report to the shareholders of the British South Africa Company that killed Rhodes’ much cherished fantasy that he would find a “Second Rand” north of the Limpopo River. “I did not wish the investing public to be misled into believing that the reefs of Rhodesia resembled those of the Rand in the remarkable continuity of pay ore,” Hammond explained much later, “the reefs of the Rand are unique among the ore deposits of the world in this respect.” And in February, Hamilton Smith published another famously influential essay on the Witwatersrand gold mines in the “Stocks and Shares” section of The Times of London. In a long and detailed report he systematically dismissed the possible obstacles to profitable exploitation of the deep-level mines (underground water, ambient heat underground, changes in the grades of gold-bearing ore, increased working-costs). He explained the significance of the new mining corporations (again without acknowledging his own role in the establishment of Rand Mines) and their success in managing technical obstacles and controlling costs. And then he concluded his studiously dispassionate assessment with an observation that undoubtedly contributed significantly to the frenzied speculation in Rand shares that followed. “In most mining districts the brilliant success of a few rich mines has had the effect of inducing men to expend large sums in exploiting neighbouring mines, with disastrous financial results, so that in the long run the aggregate losses have often been greater than the aggregate profits,” he observed with characteristic American prudence, but, he continued using language that would raise the pulse of even the most sanguine investor: “the Rand deposits are, however, so much more regular than has been the case with previous gold deposits or lodes that it is almost certain that in the next 20 years or more the profits from working them will much exceed the losses.

The speculative boom of 1895 produced unprecedented rewards for the new corporations. This was especially true for Rhodes’ Consolidated Gold Fields. In November 1895, just as the speculative bubble began to pop, Gold Fields declared a dividend of £2,540,918—the largest profit by a limited liability company in the history of the City of London. But these riches were full of peril. The very prosperity of the Witwatersrand threatened Rhodes’ plans to build, like Clive, another East India Company in southern Africa. In its place Kruger’s obstinate Boer Republic would thrive, absorbing the bulk of the available British capital and population. “It was obvious to Rhodes and Hammond,” Rotberg observed, “that the Transvaal would soon grow too wealthy to subvert.”

Working with Rhodes, but with their own enthusiastically held political views of the Boer Republic, Hammond and another Californian engineer, Gardiner Williams, De Beers’ General Manager in Kimberley, began to organize an armed insurrection of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg. On New Year’s Eve, 1895, after Jameson had begun his ridiculous “invasion” of the Transvaal, Hammond called a meeting of all the Americans living in Johannesburg to express their support. Of the five hundred men present at the

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6 See van Onselen forthcoming.
meeting, just five voted against his proposal to take up arms against the Boers, and one hundred and fifty of those present formed the George Washington Corps to guard the city. 11 The absurd tale of the Jameson raid, its causes and consequences, has really been told too many times to bear repeating here, except to say that what is sometimes called the Blainey debate is, I think, a red herring, drawing us away from the ideological issues that were fostering conflict between the Boer state and its enemies.12 Instead, I want to focus on what Hammond and his confederates said about their reasons for fostering an armed revolt.

Writing in the 1930s Hammond explained the revolt, presumably approvingly, as a “Fascist rather than Bolshevik” uprising, by which he meant that “direct action was finally undertaken by a group of hard-headed, successful, conservative men of affairs, not by hotheaded, irresponsible radicals.” In this account the weight of the intervening events in Italy (and perhaps Germany) seem to press heavily on his understanding of the revolt, at least in terms of the ideologies motivating people to participate. Soon after leaving South Africa, Hammond became an intimate political ally of William Taft, who would succeed Teddy Roosevelt as President in 1908. This alliance drew him steadily in to conflict with the original bull moose as the Progressives split from the Republicans in 1912.13 Yet there is much in Hammond’s own account of his life, his writings at the time and in his actions which can best be described as the actions of a Rooseveltian progressive: an enthusiasm for public courage, theatrical violence and what he called vigor, usually directed at the sinister combinations of immigrant American workers, bloodthirsty African warriors or corrupt and reactionary Boer peasants. Barely masking this enthusiasm for public drama was the conventional progressive concern: “I could not carry on my work efficiently.” Hammond probably came closest to the truth when he observed that the Jameson Raid was a “revolution in behalf of good government.”14

Many of the American engineers were motivated to rise against the Boer Republic by a glassy-eyed progressivism; they believed that anachronistic and corrupt governments forfeited their sovereignty, and that inefficiency implied illegitimacy. The telegraph that Hammond’s wife sent on his behalf to the Hearst newspapers at the end of January 1896 reads like a jingle for late nineteenth century American Progressivism. “The history of the Transvaal is that of a small unenlightened retrogressive community,” Hammond explained, apparently in mitigation of the charges of high treason levied against him, “The Government is a narrow oligarchy with a bad, inefficient administration. Monstrous monopolies and corruption are rampant.”15 After his visit to the Rand in 1897 William Hammond Hall, the California State Engineer and cousin to his namesake, described the Transvaal government in terms that located it firmly within a North American political landscape. The Boers, he noted in his unpublished autobiography “could give our Tammany friends points in their own game.”16

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11 Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee, 51.
But not all of the American engineers sided with Hammond’s Reform Committee or his views of the Boer Republic’s sovereignty. The dividing line between those who favoured and those who rejected the violent overthrow of the Boer republic had little to do with the type of mine they were involved with; it was drawn by their sympathy for the claims of Boer sovereignty. Hamilton Smith, the leader of the corps of engineers and chief advocate of deep level mining, was born on the Indiana border of the old confederacy, and he viewed the Boers less as obstacles to Anglo-Saxon progress than remnants of a white race who had remained “wonderfully free of negro taint.” As early as 1893 he had warned his English audience that the Boers idea of “South Africa for the Afrikanders” was as “deeply rooted a feeling with them as the Monroe Doctrine is with us Americans” and he had urged them to consider a system of imperial federation that would preserve the Boers’ closely-guarded independence.\(^{17}\)

In Johannesburg the deep level mining specialists—Rand Mines’ consulting engineers Hennen Jennings and Henry Perkins and Thomas Leggett, the consulting engineer for S Neumann and company—conspicuously announced their opposition to the revolt. To Hammond’s fury they had travelled up to Pretoria to see Paul Kruger to personally distance themselves from the activities of the Reform Committee.\(^{18}\) Perkins left the Transvaal soon after the Raid, but Jennings and Leggett (in the absence of Hammond and Lionel Phillips) became the most authoritative voices of the mining industry inside the Transvaal. It was to these men that the progressives in the Transvaal Parliament turned when, after Hammond and the other members of Reform Committee had been expelled from the Transvaal, Paul Kruger agreed to an investigation of the mining industry’s grievances.

Both Jennings and Leggett invoked the solidarity of a sister republic, at a time when intellectuals in the Transvaal were working to associate Republicanism with progressive reform. Jan Christiaan Smuts was working as an attorney and a journalist, an unpaid advocate of Boer independence, while the Mining Industry Commission was hearing evidence from the engineers. For Smuts, writing at this time, Republicanism was “a grand cause all over the world” with history “on its side.” In the Transvaal, he argued, Kruger was finally confident in the support of “the entire Dutch and a large part of English South Africa” and he could “start upon a bold policy of internal economic reform and external South African rapprochement.”\(^{19}\)

**Drawing the legal blueprint of the 20th century state**

The Mining Industry Commission was not the first, the most systematic or the most ambitious state enquiry in the history of modern South Africa: its significance lies in the fact that, quite unlike the 20th century commissions, it provided a blueprint for institutional and administrative interventions at a time when the state was undergoing rapid, and uncontested, change.\(^{20}\) One of the reasons that Milner was so impressed with the Commission was that the witnesses, and the report itself, made a compelling case for a sweeping program of social transformation in the Transvaal, using the Mining industry as a lever to revolutionize the railways, agriculture and the urban working class.\(^{21}\) Yet, closer to the frontlines of state regulation, the report also provided unambiguous and clear instructions for the development of policing. For Smuts, appointed as State Attorney of Kruger’s Republic in June 1897, for Edward Henry, dispatched by

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Chamberlain to the Transvaal in July 1900 to build the new Transvaal Police, and for Godfrey Lagden, Milner’s Commissioner for Native Affairs after 1901, the Industry Commission was an indispensable guide to action on the basis of the existing Republican laws: the Gold (Act Number 21 of 1896, especially Chapter 4 dealing with unwrought gold and labour), Liquor (Act Number 17 of 1896) and Pass (Act Number 31 of 1896, amended by Act No 23 of 1899) laws.  

The Commission heard evidence from dozens of engineers and managers, but a single dominating voice emerges unmistakably from a reading of the verbatim record, often cited as an authority in the statements of the other important witnesses. The person whose research and recommendations directed both the witnesses and the report was Hennen Jennings. Decades later he recalled his involvement in the Commission as one of the key events of his time in South Africa: “I took great interest in this work, and gave direct and cross-examination testimony extending over some three days, during which I attempted to summarize the history and statistics of the mining industry to that date.” The press noticed at the time. The South African Mining Journal commented that the American engineers had produced the “large proportion of the most valuable evidence” and that they had shown “remarkable industry in the compilation and remarkable ability in the marshalling of their facts.” Nor should Jennings’ modest stress on his compilation of statistics be treated at face value: the data he presented made an unanswerable case for the mines’ recommendations – the first of many occasions in which the mines’ access to, and control of, aggregate production data meant that the state was helpless to challenge their threats and recommendations. The mining industry’s “monopoly of information,” as Jeeves has observed, left the state with “little choice but to rely upon the Chamber [of Mines’] data and even Chamber expertise in conducting their investigations.”

The structure of Jennings’ argument followed a pattern that became common in the 20th century: it was repeated (as some of the Commissioners observed) by the other powerful American witnesses like Thomas Leggett and William Hammond Hall. He elaborated in detail on the staggering wealth locked in to the rocks beneath them, listing the estimates that the world’s finest geological experts had produced of the Rand. From Hamilton Smith’s original 1893 estimate of £350 million, to the more recent assessment produced by Professor Becker of the US Geological Survey of £700 million, he painted an hypnotic prospect of a century of gold-supported economic development. He then moved on to the daunting technical task that faced the mines as they looked to harvest the gold down to a vertical depth of 7000 feet. The fabulous story of long term economic growth, Jennings argued, was dependent on the profitability of the enormous low-grade, deep level mines.

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22 The South African Native Affairs Commission, which reported a decade later, provides a useful contrast. SANAC collected evidence from hundreds of witnesses in dozens of places around the country. Ashforth has suggested that “in combining uniform principles for an efficient system of administration with paternalist ideologies of ‘Native’ advancement, the Commission elaborated the structural fundamentals” of the modern state. In fact, however, SANAC was an effort to work out a flimsy hegemony from very different, and antagonistic, regional methods of administration; it was framed and endorsed by political leaders of limited and declining legitimacy. While the Commission and its report generally strengthened the case for Shepstonian methods of administration, most of the specific institutional elements were fought out repeatedly for the next thirty years, starting with the constitutional struggles over Union itself. See D R Burton, “The South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-5: An Analysis and Evaluation” (Masters, University of South Africa, 1985)

23 T. A. Rickard, Interviews with mining engineers (San Francisco: Mining and Scientific Press, 1922), 248, \tux\breckenr\pdfs\1615608082wsMiningEngineers.pdf.


The profitability of the mines, after the systematic reorganizations of scale and plant in the middle-1890s, Jennings and the others argued, was a function of the cost of living, wages and transport. A key point here, often repeated, was that the engineers had now done everything technically possible to improve the operations and profitability of the mines. Their technology was perfect. After describing the work that he and other American engineers had done on Rand Mines’ £3 million Robinson General Mining property, including a massive program of expenditure on plant, Jennings showed that the mine had already achieved a 60% reduction in working costs. There was no further fat to cut: “I cannot see how efficiency of this Company’s works can be greatly increased.” At the heart of his argument was the claim that the engineers had done everything technologically possible, the fate of the future of the industry now rested in the hands of the state. “Now, in 1897,” Jennings observed, “the class of machinery on these fields can be considered the most perfect in the world; the various processes dealing with the extraction of gold are rapidly approaching practical perfection, and our working costs have been decreased until we can scarcely reduce them further without the Government’s help.” The same point was belaboured by the other American experts. The visiting Californian State Engineer, William Hammond Hall, went even further: the Rand mines, he claimed, had “the most perfect mining machinery and appliances, the most refined methods of work, and some of the best trained and experienced experts on earth.”

The Republican state’s policy of selling concessions to the railway and dynamite companies threatened the achievement of a further reduction in working costs directly through an inflated cost of living and working, and indirectly by corrupting the bureaucracy. The engineers made no mention of the terrible struggles between mines and railways that had riven the American west in the 1860s; they focused on the more encouraging national relationship, stressing how mining profitability was dependent on efficient, and competitive, railways in the United States. The concessions granted to the dynamite and railway companies threatened to undo the scientific reorganization of the mines. The monopolies charged inflated rates, but they were also incompetent and inefficient. A long list of witnesses complained that the Netherlands South African Railway could not be relied upon to deliver goods, they did little to meet the branch line requirements of their most important customers, and they were tardy in adopting the new (American) technologies for bulk handling. But the real danger, at least for Jennings, was that the monopolies threatened the proper bureaucratic administration of the existing laws. There was “much more to be said on the subject of the Dynamite Concession than £ s d,” as he put it, “it gives opportunity to unscrupulous persons to play upon the worst and best motives of your people.” The engineers’ attempts to reform the monopolies were vociferous but they flew in the face of the existing political arrangements in the Republic (a fact that Milner would use to great advantage in making the case for war); their efforts to stamp out corruption and incompetence stood on much firmer ground in relation to the three laws that had already been approved by the Transvaal Volksraad.

The first of these, drawing on the racial solidarities of English and Dutch-speaking progressives after a decade in which the mining industry had used alcohol to attract workers to the Rand and keep them there, was the effort to stamp out the lodging-houses and eating-houses that provided alcohol to African workers. Almost every single witness to the commission complained of the lax administration of the new prohibition law. “When this law was first enforced, in January and February,” Hennen Jennings’ brother, Sydney, complained, “we received great benefit from it, in that the kaffirs were never drunk, and … consequently worked their full week.” But the law “is

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not enforced now” and the workers “freely and openly, drink of the most vile compounds, and … they cannot work as well as before.” The real problem was that the engineers had no faith in the Republican bureaucracy’s ability to resist the persuasive powers of the Russian Jews who operated the eating-houses. All the key witnesses called for the appointment of what they called “Advisory Committees,” appointed by the mining industry, to take control of the administration of the liquor law, the granting of eating-house licenses and the control of a specialist detective force. The Report of the Commission noted that the Liquor Law was not being administered properly and insisted “especially and strongly” that the “stipulations of Article 16 [the prohibition of the issuing of liquor licenses on mining ground] shall be strictly enforced.” An identical concern with the implementation of an already favourable law shaped their demands over the policing of the sale of gold-bearing ore.

The Gold Law of the old Transvaal was probably the most determinedly pro-capitalist of any similar body of law on the planet: by 1895 claim-jumping had effectively been outlawed and the mining companies had secured special landowners’ mining rights (the weef-mijnpacht) that effectively denied outsiders any prospect of accessing gold-bearing ore. Following the Kimberley precedent Articles 145 and 146 of the Transvaal Gold Law of 1896 criminalized the possession of “unwrought gold.” Where Gold Laws, outside of South Africa, generally sought to regulate and protect the rights of individual prospectors, the law in the Transvaal did the opposite. What is striking about the engineers’ demands in 1897 is that they sought a further tightening of the provisions of the law to close the final loopholes of their control, and that these demands were met by the reforming State-Attorney, Jan Smuts, a year later. The focus of their demands turned over an unspecified concern that workers were stealing gold-bearing ore from the recovery works on the surface.

“It is a perfect certainty that Illicit Gold Buying is going on,” Percy Fitzpatrick explained. “It is notorious that there are a number of persons nominally engaged in the watchmaking and jewellery business, but who are doing a much better business than their capital and apparent energy warrant.” His confidence that the jewelers’ gains were ill-gotten might easily have been derived from his own situation: “They sit still all day, and yet prosper exceedingly.” None of the witnesses could provide any meaningful estimate of the total amount of gold that was being stolen from the mines, but that did little to temper the engineers’ concern for drastic remedial action. “The Gold Theft Laws should be amended so that there is no possibility of escaping justice through a mere technical quibble,” Hennen Jennings suggested, “and the police and detective department should be made more efficient.” Again what Jennings’ was looking for was an administrative mechanism that would allow the mines to police their own employees, under the guise of strengthened local government.

Most of the mining experts argued for a similar fusion of the mines’ private policing capacity and an invigorated and sharply focused detective effort as the remedy for the limits of their control of the movements of their African workers. But the evidence to the Commission is important because it introduced to the workings of the Republican police the requirement that workers without the proper documentation should be subjected to a process of identification. Within months this requirement was elaborated by the Mine Managers in to a demand that workers arrested under the Pass

27 Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, ed., The mining industry, evidence and report of the Industrial commission of enquiry, with an appendix (Johannesburg: Chamber of Mines, 1897), 44, \rux\breckenr\pdfs\0672345857y_Commission_1897.pdf.
29 Chamber of Mines, The Mining Industry, 44.
Law should be subjected to mandatory imprisonment for a period of at least two weeks – here lay the origins of the South African engine of incarceration.

By the time Hennen Jennings came to present his own evidence the Commission had been hearing testimony for more than three weeks. In his statement he helpfully pointed out to the commissioners that not a single witness was prepared to accept that the new Pass Law applied to the Witwatersrand in 1895 “had benefited his company.” Drawing on the work of the other witnesses he painted a picture of chaos. “Out of thirty-three companies employing 19,000 boys monthly,” he noted, “14,000 have deserted since the new Pass Law came in to operation, without one single one of these deserters having been brought back to the mines and justice.” His brother made the same point for a single mine. “The Pass Law, as it is carried out at present, does not give any satisfaction,” he complained, echoing the chorus of complaints, “From the Crown Reef, where I am manager, no fewer than 1,300 kaffirs deserted since the 1st June, 1896, and it is impossible for us to trace these kaffirs.”

Unlike the theft of gold amalgam, which the managers suspected but could not quantify, the cost of desertion was something that they could easily measure. As John Henry Johns, the manager of the Fereira Gold Mining Company, explained, the system of long-distance labour recruitment provided a perverse economic incentive for desertion. The normal penalty for being caught without a pass in Johannesburg was a 20 shilling fine, but many recruits had been brought to the city from Mozambique at a cost of some 60 shillings, which they had promised to repay to the mine. Every deserter, he explained, learned “within a few days that by deserting to the Boksburg district, and submitting to a fine of 20s they save 35s, consequently many desert, and my company loses the money advanced to bring them to the mine.”

Sydney Jennings made the same point; his mine could easily recruit workers in Mozambique to 12 month contracts, but “they work for only two weeks and then leave, and it is impossible for us to find them.”

The best informed witnesses complained bitterly that the enormous sum of £150,000 per annum that the state was generating from pass fees and fines every year was being absorbed by the central treasury, and not being allocated to the policing of the Pass Law. Every worker starting work on the Witwatersrand, including those who were deserting from another mine, were liable for the 2 shilling fee for pass registration. In this way the state was a beneficiary of the wave of desertions. “There is more than enough money to properly carry out the Pass Law, but the money is lying idle,” Johns, who was also president of the Association of Mine Managers, complained, “If it were expended the law could be carried out.” A properly funded and efficient staff of detectives, “who did their duty and looked up deserters” would solve the problem of desertion.

The problem of policing the pass laws was, of course, a great deal more difficult than these mine managers were prepared to acknowledge; like 19th century criminologists in Europe and India the Pass Officers faced intractable difficulties of identification. Sydney Jennings singled out the problem in his description of the process of investigating suspected deserters: “If we take a native to the Pass Office, and ask whether he has ever been registered before, it is impossible for the officials to give us any information.” News of Bertillonage would arrive on the Witwatersrand only in March 1898 when anthropometric portraits of the murderer of the magnate Wolf Joel, Baron van Veldheim
were received by the State Attorney’s office. But in 1897 identification without paper was still inconceivable. As Frans de Kock, the chief of the newly formed Pass Department explained to the commission. “It has to be acknowledged that when a native throws away his passes and badge he cannot again easily be identified by pass officials,” he protested, “I challenge anyone to describe a native, and register him in such a way that he would be able to identify him without the aid of his passes and badge, out of 60,000 other natives.” But that, after all, was precisely what the American engineers were asking of the state. “If every kaffir could be traced; if it could be told whether they have been registered before, or been in the service of a company,” Sydney Jennings asked the commissioners, “then we would have control over them.”

33 TAB SSA RA1466/98 Staatssecretaris Kabinet Waarnemend Staatsprocureur Re Wenschelykheid Een Portret En Antropometrisch Signalement Van Bacon Van Veldheim, Beschuldigd Met Moord Op W Joel, Naar Landen Waar Hyvroeger Woonde Te Zenden 18980331 to 18980331

34 Chamber of Mines, The Mining Industry, 297, 44